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Restrictions on Corporate Distributions

I.

INTRODUCTION

It appears that we have entered an era of reform for state statutes that
regulate payments by corporations to their shareholders. With the benefit
of hindsight, it is now apparent that the era began with the adoption by the
California legislature in 1975' of that state's unique series of restrictions
on dividends and share repurchases by corporations. 2 That development
was followed in 1977 with the publication by Bayless Manning of an eloquent plea for the elimination of most state restrictions on corporate financial distributions to shareholders. 3 The reform movement then received a
substantial boost in 1979 when the Committee on Corporate Laws of the
American Bar Association Section on Corporation, Banking, and Business Law completely revised the financial provisions in the Model Business Corporation Act. 4 As a result of the interest generated by these developments, at least six states 5 have recently adopted significant changes
in their corporate financial provisions, and a number of other states have
considered, 6 or are considering, 7 changes of similar dimension. It seems
I. See Act of Sept. 12, 1975, ch. 682, 1975 Cal. Stat. 1514. The financial provisions were
amended as part of an overall revision of the California Corporations Code.
2. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 500-11 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983). The provisions are discussed
infra Part IIlA2a.
3. See B. MANNING. A CONCISE TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL CAPrrAL 90, 108 (1977).
4. The amendments appear in Changes in the Model Business CorporationAct-Amendments to
FinancialProvisions, 34 Bus. LAw. 1867 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Amendments (1979)]. The
amendments were adopted by the Committee on Corporate Laws at its meeting on December 8, 1979.
See Changes in the Model Business CorporationAct-Amendments to FinancialProvisions, 35 Bus.
LAw. 1365 (1980).
The amended Model Act provisions are discussed infra Part IIIA2b.
5. Idaho (moved from Uniform Business Corporation Act provisions to pre-1980 Model Act provisions), see IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1-6, -45, -46,-66 (Supp. 1982-83); Minnesota (moved from earned
surplus-based provisions to equitable insolvency limitation), see MINNr.STAT. ANN. § 302A.551
(West Supp. 1983); Montana (moved from pre-1980 Model Act provisions to Amended Model Act
provisions), see MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-711 (1982); New Hampshire (moved from equitable insolvency dividend test to pre-1980 Model Act provisions), see N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 293-A:6, :45,
:46, :66 (Supp. 1983); New Mexico (moved from pre-1980 Model Act provisions to Amended Model
Act provisions), see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-44 (1983); Oregon (modified pre-1980 Model Act
provisions to incorporate some Amended Model Act concepts), see OR. REv. STAT. §§ 57.004, .035
(1983).
6. The Alaska legislature has considered adopting distribution provisions similar to those in California. See Alaska H.B. 343, 13th Leg., 1st Sess. §§ 10.06.358, .360 (1983) (currently in the Alaska
House Labor and Commerce Committee); ALASKA H. & S.J. JOURNAL Supp. No. 11, at 64-75 (Apr.
8, 1983) (commentary on proposed Alaska corporations code). Hawaii has considered adopting the
pre-1980 Model Act provisions. See The Hawaii Business CorporationAct, 3 U. HAWAIu L. REv.
169, 206,221-22,227(1981).
South Carolina, as part of a recent general modification of its corporation statute, reenacted the
pre-1980 Model Act provisions. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-9-150, -170, -180, -190 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1983).
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probable that over the next ten years most state legislatures will be asked
to reevaluate the statutory systems by which they regulate corporate financial distributions to shareholders.
Rational legislative inquiry on such a subject would seem to require at
a minimum identification of alternatives available, assessment of the
costs and benefits related to each alternative, and finally selection of an
alternative providing an acceptable balance of costs and benefits and reasonable consistency with general social goals. 8 Existing literature has not
been particularly helpful in supplying assistance on any part of this inquiry. One of the major effects of the reform movement has been an expansion in the number of alternatives available to legislatures concerning
statutory regulation of corporate financial distributions. Yet there has
been no recent comprehensive analysis of statutes in the United States
dealing with the subject. 9 More importantly, determination of the respective costs and benefits of each of the major statutory systems has not to
my knowledge been undertaken. This article therefore attempts to provide
information related to, and an analytical approach for, the first two areas
of legislative concern. Its conclusion should also provide some insight
regarding the ultimate selection of statutory provisions regulating corporate financial distributions.
7. The Corporate Act Revision Committee of the Section on Corporation, Banking, and Business
Law of the Washington State Bar Association (WSBA) has proposed adoption of the Amended
Model Act provisions. See WSBA Corporate Act Revision Committee, Proposed Amendments to
Incorporate RMA Financial Provisions (November 22, 1983) (copy on file with the Washington Law
Review).
8. The effects of statutory restrictions on corporate financial distributions upon income distribution is an extremely difficult and subjective inquiry. To the extent such restrictions operate to increase
losses falling upon small creditors of corporations without significant amounts of long-term debt, it is
arguable that such restrictions may particularly impact employees of such enterprises. It is also arguable that most employees of such corporations come from lower-income levels. But other trade creditors may also be impacted by such losses, and such creditors appear likely to be randomly distributed
over the income distribution scale. Further, it is not clear that shareholders receiving distributions in
some way implicated in the losses ultimately suffered are not also randomly distributed over the
income scale. Since there is no reasonable way of determining any conclusive pattern to possible
losses from any set of statutory restrictions, the issue of the effects of the restrictions upon income
distribution is left to general legislative analysis.
9. The most recent law review article appears to be Kreidmann, Dividends-ChangingPatterns.
57 COLut

L. REv. 372 (1957). B. MANNING. A CONCISE TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL CAPITAL 59-77,

164-180 (2d ed. 1981) provides a general description of most of the statutes currently in operation in
the United States. But he offers no indication as to relative use of such statutes by the various states.
That information can be obtained with some effort from the MODEL BUSINESS CORP ACT ANN (2d ed.
1969 & Supps. 1973, 1977). Unfortunately, the annotations have not been updated since 1977.
The laws of other countries provide few concepts that are not present in some form in current
American statutes. See P. Nordquist, Regulation of Financial Distributions in Foreign Countries
(April 1, 1983) (unpublished manuscript) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review). The most
prominent exception, the English Companies Act, 1980, ch.22, is discussed infra note 460.

Restrictions on Corporate Distributions
The main body of my analysis of state statutory restrictions on corporate financial distributions appears in the second section following this
introduction. The intervening section provides a brief summary of the interests of groups in society that are affected by such restrictions. That
material, derived from the first part of this article, 10 forms the necessary
underpinning for the analysis of costs and benefits resulting from any
form of regulation of corporate financial distributions.
HI. SOCIETAL INTERESTS IN CORPORATE FINANCIAL
PROVISIONS
The groups affected by state statutory restrictions on corporate financial distributions can be broadly divided into persons concerned with the
amount of corporate financial distributions (common shareholders, senior
security holders, general creditors, corporate officers, employees, and the
public) and persons involved in the administration of the statutory restrictions (directors, lawyers, accountants, and judges).
A.

PersonsInterestedin the Amount of CorporateFinancial
Distributions

1.

Distributionsby Way ofDividend

a.

Common Shareholders

Shareholder interests appear to vary dramatically with the size and
ownership of the corporation involved. Shareholders actively involved in
a small, closely held corporation are likely for tax reasons to prefer that
any distributions be by means other than dividend payments. 1 1 Shareholders in a publicly held corporation, on the other hand, appear to value
stability in dividend payments by the corporation 12 and to view changes
in the amount of such payments as signalling alterations in management's
perception of the corporation's future profitability. 13

10. Kummert, State Statutory Restrictionson FinancialDistributionsby Corporationsto Shareholders (pt. 1), 55 WASH. L. REv. 359 (1980).
11. Id. at 372-73. Thus, the two means by which funds are typically distributed by closely held
corporations to shareholders are by salary payments and by share repurchases.
12. See id. at 370-71.
13. Id. at 366 & n.33. For a more recent discussion of the point, see Brudney, Dividends, Discretion, and Disclosure, 66 VA. L. REv. 85, 108-14 (1980); Fischel, The Law and Economics of
DividendPolicy, 67 VA. L. REv. 699, 708-09 (1981).

189
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Senior Security Holders
Holders of preferred shares and intermediate or long-term debt issued

by a corporation usually have a strong interest in the corporation's longterm solvency. 14 Such interest is usually manifested in contractual restrictions upon the corporation's ability to pay dividends to, or make repur-

chases of shares from, its shareholders, which are more stringent than the
statutory restrictions on such distributions imposed by the corporation's

state of incorporation.
c.

General Creditors
The primary concern of general, unsecured creditors-typically short-

term creditors-is that the corporation retain sufficient funds to pay its
current obligations as they become due in the ordinary course of business.

Such creditors also have an interest in the corporation's continued existence as a viable, growing source of business. 15 General creditors receive
relatively free assistance toward both goals if they are fortunate enough to

deal with a corporation subject to contractual restrictions imposed by senior security holders. 16
d.

CorporateOfficers

Despite corporate legal norms,17 it appears that officers determine the
financial policy of most corporations. Top management's primary interest
in connection with dividend payments appears to be retaining maximum
flexibility with respect to the direction of the corporation's assets. 18

14. Kummert, supra note 10, at 373-74. Senior security holders are interested in the ability of
the corporation to produce sufficient cash to pay annual returns on the securities throughout their life,
and to maintain net assets that even in the event of financial adversity will be at least equal in value to
the securities' liquidation preference. For a recent attempt to protect such interests against the effects
of a distribution, see Robinson v. T.I.M.E.-DC, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 1077 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (a spinoff of major assets held not to constitute a "liquidation" for purposes of preferred shares' liquidation
rights).
15. Kummert, supra note 10, at 375-76.
16. General creditors benefit in such circumstances to the extent that the operation of the covenant causes the corporation to retain more assets than it would have otherwise retained. Such creditors
will also benefit from the monitoring undertaken by the senior security holder to ensure the corporation's compliance with the covenant. Cf. Levmore, Monitors and Freeridersin Commercial and
CorporateSettings, 92 YALE L.J. 49, 49-59 (1982) (discussing the freeriding problem in relationship
to the monitoring typically done by a secured creditor).
17. Corporate law formally vests the power to determine distribution policy for a corporation in
its board of directors. See, e.g., MODEL BUStNESS CORP. AcT §§ 6, 35, 45 (1979).
18. See Kummert, supra note 10, at 376-80.

Restrictions on Corporate Distributions
e.

Employees

Employees on occasion may be a corporation's primary short-term
creditor, and on such occasions desire that the corporation retain sufficient funds to pay current obligations as they become due. More generally, employees have a strong interest in the continued profitable operation of the corporate employer. 19

f.

The PublicInterest

The public presumably has a strong interest in the continued profitable
operation of most corporations. 20 Various governmental units tax dividends received as income; such units therefore have a direct interest in the
aggregate amount of dividends paid, and on occasion, when such divi21
dends are paid.
2.

Distributionsby Way of ShareRepurchase

a. Common Shareholders
Shareholder interests vary with the type of corporation involved, and
with the impact of the repurchase upon the shareholder's ownership interest. Shareholders of closely held corporations attach great importance to
share repurchases. Such transactions are frequently the only means by
which the selling shareholder can realize upon his or her investment and
by which the remaining shareholders can retain control over participants
in the enterprise. 22 Shareholders of both closely held and publicly held
corporations generally prefer for tax reasons that excess funds be distributed to shareholders by share repurchase rather than by dividend. 23 Shareholders not tendering shares in a repurchase by a publicly held corporation may benefit economically in certain circumstances. 24
19. Id.at380-81.
20. Indeed, if profits are determined after a reasonably thorough determination of costs caused by
the corporation, the public interest would appear to be in continued operation of all profitable corporations.
21. Kummert, supranote 10, at 360-65.
22. Id. at 391-92. Both sets of shareholders may gain if a repurchase ends disharmony among
shareholders threatening the corporation's existence.
23. See id. at 361 n.8. This statement assumes that the repurchase is treated as being in exchange
for the shares under I.R.C. § 302(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981), and thus that the seller is entitled to
long-term capital gain treatment on any gain realized. Because of § 243 of the Internal Revenue
Code, corporate shareholders may prefer dividends to share repurchases. I.R.C. § 243 (1976 & Supp.
V 1981). Tax exempt organizations are presumably indifferent between the two forms.
24. Remaining shareholders may benefit if the corporation repurchases shares at a bargain price,
or if the corporation's earnings per share will increase more as a result of the repurchase than they
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All Other Groups

Generally, a change in the form of a proposed distribution from a dividend to a share repurchase will not affect the interests of the remaining
groups discussed above. However, senior security holders, short-term
creditors, and employees will prefer such a change if it ends shareholder
disharmony and avoids liquidation of a closely held corporation. 2 5 The
same groups will prefer such a change by a publicly held corporation if
the repurchase eliminates small shareholders and concomitant disproportionate service costs. 26 Finally, governmental units imposing taxes based
on income will face a reduction of tax revenue if there is a substantial
shift from making distributions in the form of dividends to repurchases of
27
shares.
B.

PersonsInvolved in the Administrationof the Statutory Restrictions

It appears that all persons engaged in the administration of the statutory
restrictions on corporate financial distributions have some interest in the
rules being intelligible, 2 8 unambiguous, and permissive.
Directors are interested in the content of the rules because most statutes
regulating financial distributions make assenting directors personally liable for illegal distributions. 29 Directors seeking to avoid such liability,
and to minimize the corporation's expense, will prefer rules that are intelligible and unambiguous regarding restricted transactions and available
defenses. They will also prefer, following top management's preference
30
for flexibility noted above, rules that are permissive.
Persons who advise directors on such matters-lawyers, accountants, 3t
and appraisers-appear likely to have mixed emotions about rules that are
intelligible, unambiguous, and permissive. Advisers who give such advice infrequently will prefer such rules as enabling them, rather than corporate specialists, to provide service without fear of malpractice. Corpowould increase if the funds were invested in other investment opportunities. See Kummert, supra

note 10, at 381-91.
25. See id. at 392.
26. Id. at 388-89.
27. See id. at 361. As noted in the data presented id. at 362-63, share repurchases do not appear
to be replacing dividends as a means of distributing corporate assets.
28. The need to appraise intelligibility led me to discuss in some detail each of the statutory
systems considered in the next section. One cannot avoid the impression that some systems merit
much higher grades on this score than others.
29. Kummert, supra note 10, at 392-93.
30. See supra text accompanying note 18.
31. Accountants may also face slightly reduced demand for their services if the state statutes
facilitate use of a single shareholder's equity account rather than the traditional stated capital, contributions for shares in excess of par or stated value, and retained earnings accounts.

Restrictions on Corporate Distributions
rate specialists, and perhaps the bar at large, may conclude that rules
meeting the three criteria will reduce significantly the aggregate amount
32
of expert time spent on opinions related to the legality of distributions.
The interest of judges with respect to the content of restrictions on corporate financial distributions relates primarily to the probable effects of
such rules on the volume and complexity of litigation arising because of
the rules. There is no reason to believe that adoption of intelligible, unambiguous, and permissive rules would have any effect other than reducing the already small number of distribution cases litigated. 33 Further,
such rules should reduce the complexity of any cases that do proceed to
trial.
III.

ANALYSIS OF CURRENT STATE STATUTORY
RESTRICTIONS ON CORPORATE FINANCIAL
DISTRIBUTIONS

State legislatures desiring to reevaluate their corporate financial provisions must first identify for consideration a reasonable range of alternative
means of dealing with the area. The statutes currently in effect in the
United States provide a suitable array of possible alternatives. Current
statutes range broadly from those that are complex to those that are relatively simple, from those that are based ori familiar concepts to those that
are based on innovative constructs, and most importantly, from those that
are deregulatory in purpose to those that are protective in outlook. This
section, therefore, seeks first to categorize and describe major current
statutes as an aid to legislative consideration. It then attempts to assess the
relative costs and benefits of each of the major statutory systems.
State restrictions on corporate financial distributions are currently imposed by two different bodies of law: restrictions that appear in the state's
general corporation act, and restrictions that result from the operation of
the state's fraudulent conveyance rules. 34 One of the major questions that
a legislature reexamining its statutory scheme must address is whether
provisions in its general corporation act should be made the exclusive
determinant of rights related to corporate financial distributions. 35 To
32. See Kummert, supranote 10, at 393-94.
33. On the volume of such litigation, see id. at 394 & nn. 156-57.
34. State fraudulent conveyance rules may have their source in statutes or in state common law.
See infra notes 377-78. In addition, the federal bankruptcy statute imposes a set of rules highly
similar to, but not identical to, the most common series of state statutes.
35. The catalyst for discussion of this issue was the decision by the Committee on Corporate
Laws of the Section on Corporate, Banking, and Business Law of the American Bar Association to
provide an optional provision in the Amended Model Act that would preempt the operation of the
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highlight that possibility, this section at the outset considers and compares provisions that appear in states' general corporation acts. It then
examines restrictions imposed by operation of states' fraudulent conveyance laws and analyzes the preemption issue.
A.

CorporateLaw Restrictionson FinancialDistributions

In the great majority of state corporation acts, 36 restrictions on corporate distributions to shareholders are based, at least nominally, 37 on the
concept of "legal capital," i.e., the notion that a corporation, in order to
protect its creditors and its common and preferred shareholders, should
retain a margin of net assets at least equal to its stated capital. 38 This
section will first examine the provisions in the Model Business CorporaUniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act provisions with respect to corporate financial distributions. See
Amendments (1979), supra note 4, at 1877, 1882-83.
36. Only five states--California, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, and New Mexico-currently have statutes that do not utilize the concept of legal capital. See infra notes 205, 274 & 330.
37. Sixteen of the 45 states that use legal capital as a base for their statutory systems (these 45
states are listed infra notes 41 & 133) also permit "nimble dividends" from current earnings in the
absence of any kind of surplus. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-045(A)(1) (1977); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 64-402(A)(3) (1980); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170(a)(2) (1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-90(A)(1)
(1977); KAN STAT. ANN. § 17-6420(a)(2) (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. § 271A.225(l)(a) (1983); LA. REV
STAT. ANN § 12:63B (West 1963); ME, REV. STAT ANN. tit. 13-A, § 514(I)(A) (1964); NEV. REV
STAT. § 78-290(1) (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §293-A:45(I)(a) (Supp. 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT §
55-50(a)(2) (1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.132(a)(3) (West 1953 & Supp. 1982-83); R.I.
GEN LAWS § 7-1.1-40(a) (1969); TENN. CODE ANN. §48-511 (1)(a) (1979); VT. STAT ANN tit. I1, §
1889(a)(1) (1973); WASH REV CODE § 23A.08.420(l)(b) (1983). For corporations in these states,
one can argue that the operative limitation on dividends will be the nimble dividend provisions. Similarly, of the states with systems based nominally on "legal capital," all but four, see ILL. ANN STAT.
ch. 32, § 157.6, .41, .58 (Smith-Hurd 1954 & Supp. 1983-84); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 450.1351,
.1365(l) (MIcH STAT. ANN. §8 21.200(351), (365)(1) (Callaghan 1983)); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§
351.210, .220, .390 (Vernon 1966); Wts STAT. ANN §§ 180.38, .385, .39 (West 1957 & Supp.
1982-83), empower natural resource corporations to ignore depletion deductions in determining permissible distributions. See infra notes 41 & 133 (listing states). However, none of the states with
either nimble dividend or depletion-reserve dividend provisions permit repurchase of shares out of
either source; all instead regulate such distributions with provisions based on legal capital. It is clear
that for many corporations the restrictions on repurchases are far more important than the restrictions
on dividends. See Kummert, supra note 10, at 396-97 n.168. Thus, it seems fair to characterize
states with either nimble dividend or depletion-reserve dividend provisions as having provisions
based on legal capital.
Some may disagree with the determination that the provisions in the Model Business Corporation
Act are based on the concept of legal capital. Such an argument would be premised on the Act's use
of earned surplus as a primary source for dividends and as a measure for share repurchases, and the
use of a definition for that term that does not involve stated capital. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT
§ 2(l), 6, 45 (1979). However, capital surplus can also be used for such purposes in specified circumstances. See id. § 6, 46. Capital surplus is defined under the Act by reference to stated capital.
Id. § 2(k), (m). Thus, legal capital is again the central concept.
38. See H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 570-72 (rev. ed. 1946); D. KEHL, CORPORATE DIvIDENDS 14-20 (1941). The concept and its history are also discussed extensively in B. MANNING,

supra note 9, at 1-108.

Restrictions on Corporate Distributions
tion Act prior to its 1980 revision, 39 which is the most popular statutory
series currently utilizing the concept. It will then examine the provisions
used by jurisdictions that employ the balance sheet surplus test on financial distributions, which is an almost equally popular statutory sequence
based on the legal capital concept. 40 Finally, this section will examine the
provisions in effect in the relatively few states that do not base their statutory systems on the concept of legal capital.
1.

Statutory Systems Based on Legal Capital

a. Pre-1980Model Business CorporationAct
Twenty-nine states have adopted the substance of the financial provi41
sions in the pre-1980 Model Business Corporation Act.
i. Summary of the Model Act Provisions
Under the Model Act, corporations may pay dividends to shareholders
39. The Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business
Law of the American Bar Association adopted a substantial series of amendments to the financial
provisions in the Model Act in 1980. See supranote 4, infra note 274.
40. Sixteen states and the District of Columbia use the balance sheet surplus approach. See infra
notes 133-34. But included in the list are such large commercial states as Delaware, Florida, Illinois,
Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and Ohio. Thus, there is a substantial likelihood that the balance
sheet surplus test affects more corporations than the provisions based on the Model Business Corporation Act. For a list of states whose statutes are based on the Model Act, see infra note 41.
41. States are considered to have adopted the substance of the Model Act provisions if they
impose restrictions (e.g., shareholder vote, or articles of incorporation authorization) upon the use of
capital surplus for dividends, or for repurchases of shares. Based on this standard, 29 states have
adopted the substance of the Model Act provisions. See ALA. CODE §§ 10-2A-22, -67, -68, -118
(1980); ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.05.012, .201-.210, .309 (1968); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §9 10-006, 045, -046, -066 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 64-105, -402, -403,-601 (1980); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 33-356 to -358 (West 1958 & Supp. 1983-84); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-2-90 to -93 (1977 &
Supp. 1983); IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1-6, -45, -46, -66 (1980); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-2-3, -2-15, -4-10
(Bums 1972 & Supp. 1983); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. 99 271A.030, .225, .230, .330 (Baldwin 1983);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, §§ 514-518 (1964); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 79-3-9, -83, -85, -87, -131
(1972); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2005, -2043, -2044, -2066 (1977); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 293A:6, :45, :46, :66 (Supp. 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-50, -52 (1982); N.D. CErWr. CODE § 10-1905, -44, -45, -67 (1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1.132, .133, .136, .137 (West 1953 & Supp.
1982-83); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 57.035, .216, .221, .390 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1701-1703
(West 1967 & Supp. 1983-84); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-1.1-5, -40, -41, -60 (1969 & Supp. 1982); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 33-9-150, -170, -180, -190 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 473-43 to -46,-49,-70 to -83 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-511 to -513, -515(5) (1979 & Supp.
1982); TEx. Bus. CORP. ACr ANN. arts. 2.03, .38, .40,4.09 (Vernon 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 1610-5, -41, -42, -63 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1853, 1889, 1890, 1938 (1973); WASH. REv.
CODE §§ 23A.08.030, .420, .430, 23A.16.090 (1983); W. VA. CODE §§ 31-1-83, -99, -100, -112
(1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.38, .385, .39 (West 1957 & Supp. 1982-83); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§
17-1-105, -139, -140, -308 (1977 & Supp. 1983).

195
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in cash or property only out of their unreserved and unrestricted earned
surplus. 42 Such dividends may not be paid when a corporation is insolvent or when payment would render the corporation insolvent, or when

payment would be contrary to any restriction contained in the corporation's articles of incorporation. 43 If the corporation's articles of incorporation so provide, or if the holders of a majority of the outstanding shares
of each class so vote, 44 a corporation upon proper disclosure may distribute to its shareholders cash or property out of capital surplus. 45 No distribution from capital surplus shall be made when the corporation is insolvent or when the distribution would render the corporation insolvent. 46
Purchases of a corporation's own shares may be made only to the extent of the corporation's unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus, 47
and if its articles of incorporation so permit, or if the holders of a majority
of all shares entitled to vote thereon so vote, to the extent of the corporation's available unreserved and unrestricted capital surplus. 48 No purchase of or payment for the corporation's own shares shall be made when
it is insolvent or when such purchase or payment would make it insolvent. 49 To the extent that earned or capital surplus is used as the measure
of the corporation's right to purchase its own shares, such surplus is restricted as long as such shares are held as treasury shares. Upon disposition or cancellation of any such shares, the restriction is removed pro
50

tanto.

The Model Act excepts from the surplus limitation purchases or other

42. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Ac-r § 45(a) (1979).
43. Id. § 45.
44. The holders of each class vote for this purpose whether or not entitled to do so by the corporation's articles of incorporation. Id. § 46(b).
45. Id. § 46(e). No such distribution shall be made to the holders of any class of shares unless all
cumulative dividends accrued on all preferred or special classes of shares entitled to preferential
dividends have been fully paid. Id. § 46(c). Further, no such distribution shall be made to the holders
of any class of shares which would reduce the remaining net assets of the corporation below the
aggregate preferential amount payable in the event of involuntary liquidation to the holders of shares
having preferential rights to the corporation's assets in the event of liquidation. Id. § 46(d).
A corporation may distribute cash out of its capital surplus in discharge of any cumulative preferential dividend rights of outstanding shares if at the time of the distribution it has no earned surplus
and is not, and would not thereby be rendered, insolvent. Id. § 46, para. 2.
46. Id. § 46(a).
47. Id. § 6, para. 1. The Act treats restrictions on purchases of shares appearing in a corporation's articles of incorporation differently than similar restrictions on dividends. The Act gives dividend restrictions the effect and status of a statutory limitation. It awards no such status to restrictions
on purchases. Compareid. § 6 (purchases of stock) with id. § 45 (dividends).
48. Id. § 6, para. 1.
49. Id. § 6, para. 4.
50. Id. § 6, para. 2.
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acquisitions 5 1 made to eliminate fractional shares, collect or compromise
indebtedness owed to the corporation, pay dissenting shareholders, or effect the retirement of its redeemable shares by redemption or purchase for
an amount not in excess of the redemption price. 52 The Act elsewhere
provides that no redemption or purchase of redeemable shares shall be
made by a corporation when it is insolvent or when such a redemption or
purchase would render it insolvent. Further, no such redemption or purchase may be made if it would reduce the corporation's net assets below
the aggregate amount payable to the holders of shares having prior or
equal rights to the assets of the corporation upon involuntary dissolu53
tion.
The Model Act defines "earned surplus" as follows:
"Earned surplus" means the portion of the surplus of a corporation equal to
the balance of its net profits, income, gains and losses from the date of incorporation, or from the latest date when a deficit was eliminated by an
application of its capital surplus or stated capital or otherwise, after deducting subsequent distributions to shareholders and transfers to stated capital
and capital surplus to the extent such distributions and transfers are made
out of earned surplus. 54
"Capital surplus" is defined as "the entire surplus of a corporation
other than its earned surplus." 55 "Surplus" is defined as "the excess of
the net assets of a corporation over its stated capital." 56 "Net assets" is
defined as "the amount by which the total assets of a corporation exceed
the total debts of the corporation. ' 57 "Stated capital" is defined as follows:
"Stated capital" means, at any particular time, the sum of (1) the par value
of all shares of the corporation having a par value that have been issued, (2)
the amount of consideration received by the corporation for all shares of the
corporation without par value that have been issued, except such part of the
consideration therefor as may have been allocated to capital surplus in a
manner permitted by law, and (3) such amounts not included in clauses (1)
and (2) of this paragraph as have been transferred to stated capital of the
corporation, whether upon the issue of shares as a share dividend or other51. It is not clear why the exception extends beyond purchases to other acquisitions. As noted
above, only purchases are subject to the surplus limitation and restriction.
52. Id. § 6, para. 3.
53. Id.§66.
54. Id. § 2(0. Section 2() goes on to provide that earned surplus includes "any portion of surplus allocated to earned surplus in mergers, consolidations or acquisitions of all or substantially all of
the outstanding shares or of the property and assets of another corporation, domestic or foreign." Id.
55. Id. § 2(m).
56. Id. § 2(k).
57. Id. § 2(i).
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wise, minus all reductions from such sum as have been effected in a manner
permitted by law. 58
"Insolvent" is defined as the "inability of a corporation to pay its
debts as they become due in the usual course of its business." 59 Earned
surplus becomes "reserved" by a resolution of the corporation's board of
directors to that effect. 60 Earned or capital surplus becomes "restricted"
when it is used to measure a corporation's ability to repurchase its own
shares and remains "restricted" as long as such shares are held as "treasury shares. "61 "Treasury shares" are defined as "shares of a corporation which have been issued, have been subsequently acquired by [it],
and have not ... been cancelled or restored to the status of authorized but
unissued shares.' '62
The procedure for and limitations upon reduction of a corporation's
stated capital depend on the type of reduction proposed. Redeemable
shares are cancelled when purchased or redeemed by the corporation. 63
Other shares reacquired by a corporation, including shares repurchased
and shares contributed by shareholders, 64 may be cancelled by resolution
of the corporation's board of directors. 65 In either case, upon the filing by
the secretary of state of a statement of cancellation, stated capital is reduced by that part of the stated capital represented by the shares cancelled.66

Where stated capital is to be reduced by reducing the aggregate par
value of shares having par value or the aggregate of stated capital allocated to shares without par value, 67 the Model Act requires that the procedure for amending the corporation's articles of incorporation 68 (i.e.,
58. Id. § 2(j). The subsection also contains an additional sentence discussing the determination
of the stated capital of foreign corporations for purposes of computing various fees and charges imposed by the Act.
59. Id. § 2(n).
60. See id. § 70, para. 4. To the extent so reserved, such surplus is not available for the payment
of dividends. Presumably, "reserved" capital surplus arises from similar action by the directors.
Directors may abolish such reserves by adopting a resolution to that effect.
61. Id. § 6, para. 2.
62. Id. § 2(h). The definition also states that "treasury shares" are deemed to be "issued"
shares, but not "outstanding" shares.
63. Id. §67.
64. The Comment of the Committee on Corporate Laws to § 68 states that 'non-redeemable
shares are ordinarily reacquired only through purchase." 2 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr ANN. §§ 67,
68 2 (2d ed. 1971). It is clear, however, that "reacquired" encompasses types of transfers beyond
"purchases." See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 6 (1979).
65. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AT § 68 (1979).
66. Id. §§ 67, 68.
67. See id. § 58(e), (h), (i).
68. See 2 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT ANN § 58 9 2 (2d ed. 1971) (comment of the Committee
on Corporate Laws) which requires "substantial compliance in good faith with the corporate pro-
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adoption of a resolution by the directors, notice to the shareholders, and
69
approval by the holders of a majority of shares entitled to vote thereon)
be followed. Such a reduction is effected when the articles of amendment
have been issued by the secretary of state. 70 Finally, amounts transferred
voluntarily to stated capital 71 may be reduced upon adoption of a resolution by the directors to that effect, approval by holders of a majority of
shares entitled to vote on the issue, and filing with the secretary of state of
a statement of reduction. 72 This last type of reduction of stated capital
may not be made if it would reduce the corporation's aggregate stated
capital to an amount equal to or less than the aggregate preferential
amounts payable upon issued shares having a preferential right in the corporation's assets in the event of involuntary liquidation plus the aggregate
73
par value of all other issued shares having a par value.
Any surplus created by a reduction of stated capital is capital surplus. 74
A corporation may, by resolution of its board of directors, apply capital
surplus to reduce or eliminate any deficit in earned surplus arising from
75
losses, however incurred.
cedures required by sections 59 and 60." Section 59 of the Model Act requires at a minimum the
adoption of a resolution by the directors, notice to shareholders, and approval by a majority of shareholders entitled to vote. MODEL Busm'Ess CORP. ACr § 59 (1979).
69. MODEL BustnEss CORP.Acr § 59 (1979).
70. Id. § 63. The articles of amendment may also provide that the amendment (and hence the
reduction of stated capital) shall not be effective until a date not more than 30 days subsequent to the
issuance by the secretary of state. Id.
71. See 2 MODEL BusmNEss CORP. Acr ANN. § 63 4 (1960) (comment of the Committee on
Corporate Laws).
72. MODEL BustNEss CORP. ACr § 69 (1979).
73. Id. §69, para. 5.
74. Id. §70, para. 1.
75. Id. § 70, para. 3. Section 45, subsections (c)-(e) of the Model Act regulate the declaration
and payment of dividends in the corporation's own shares. Such acts are prohibited when the corporation is insolvent or when the payment of the dividend would render it insolvent, or when the declaration or payment thereof would be contrary to any restriction contained in the corporation's articles of
incorporation. Id. § 45. Assuming these conditions are met, a corporation may declare and pay dividends of its own treasury shares (the consequences of such action upon the corporation's surplus
accounts are not specified in the Act beyond the removal of the restriction of surplus created at the
time the shares were reacquired). See id. § 6. Again, assuming the conditions are met, a corporation
may also declare and pay dividends in its own authorized but unissued shares, as long as it transfers to
stated capital at the time such dividend is paid unreserved and unrestricted surplus equal to either the
aggregate par value of shares having par value to be issued or the aggregate stated value fixed by
directors for shares without par value to be issued. If shares without par value are paid as a dividend,
the amount per share of surplus transferred to stated capital must be disclosed to shareholders receiving such dividend concurrently with the payment thereof. No dividend payable in shares of any class
shall be paid to the holders of shares of any other class unless the articles of incorporation so provide
or the payment is authorized by holders of a majority of the outstanding shares of the class in which
the payment is to be made.
A final, unlettered paragraph in § 45 of the Model Act provides that a split-up or division of the
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Directors who vote for, or assent to, 7 6 the declaration of any dividend 77
or other distribution of corporate assets to shareholders contrary to the
Model Act provisions or contrary to any restrictions in the corporation's
articles of incorporation, and who have not met the Act's standard of performance for the duties of directors in such action, 78 are jointly and severally liable to the corporation for the amount of the illegal dividend. 79 Similarly, directors who vote for, or assent to, the purchase of the
corporation's own shares contrary to the Model Act provisions, and who
have not met the Act's standard of performance for directors in such action, are jointly and severally liable to the corporation for the consideration illegally paid for such shares. 80 Any director held liable on a claim
for the payment of a dividend or other distribution of assets under these
provisions is entitled to contribution from shareholders who accepted or
received any such dividend or assets knowing the dividend or distribution
was made in violation of the Act. 81 Any director against whom a claim is
asserted under these provisions is entitled to contribution from other directors who voted for or assented to the action upon which the claim is
asserted. 82
ii.

CostImplications of the Pre-1980Model Act Provisions

The pre-1980 Model Act provisions result in the imposition of substantial costs on all corporations incorporated in any Model Act jurisdiction,

issued shares of any class into a greater number of shares of the same class without increasing the
corporation's stated capital is not a dividend of shares for purposes of the provisions above. Id. § 45.
76. A director's assent is presumed if the director is present at a meeting at which directors'
action is taken, unless the director's dissent is entered or filed in specified ways. See id. § 35, para. 3.
77. As to whether this language results in directors being liable for illegal share dividends, see
Kummert, The Financial Provisions of the New Washington Business CorporationAct (pt. 3), 43
WASH. L. REV. 337, 403 n.859 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Kummert, FinancialProvisions(pt. 3)].
78. The Act's standard is set forth in MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 35, para. 2 (1979).
79. Id. § 48(a). While the Act posits liability for dividend or distribution declarationsin violation of law, the amount for which directors may be liable is
the amount of such dividend which is paid or the value of such assets which are distributed in
excess of the amount of such dividend or distribution which could have been paid or distributed
without a violation of the provisions of this act or the restrictions in the articles of incorporation.
Id. (emphasis added).
80. Id. § 48(b). Although the statute is not clear on the question, shares redeemed by a corporation in violation of the Act's provisions also presumably result in such liability.
81. Id. § 48, para. 2. Note that apparently directors are not entitled to contribution from shareholder-recipients of an illegal share repurchase, even if they knew that the purchase was made in
violation of the Act.
82. Id. § 48, para. 3. It is not clear why this provision is triggered by only the assertion of a
claim, rather than by the director being held liable, as is the case with the shareholder contribution
paragraph.
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on the shareholders and creditors of such corporations, and on any courts
83
called upon to adjudicate controversies involving the provisions.
Under these provisions, each corporation incorporated in a Model Act
state requesting certification of its financial statements by a public accountant must bear the cost of determining the appropriate accounting
85
treatment 84 for transactions that affect its shareholders' equity accounts.
Such cost would appear to be a significant factor only for corporations
that frequently engage in complex transactions with shareholders, 86 or
87
that have numerous subsidiaries.
83. The provisions may also cause some loss of revenue for governmental units that tax income.
The provisions are more permissive toward share repurchases (which are typically taxed at a lower
rate than dividends, see Kummert, supra note 10, at 360-61) than toward dividends. Repurchased
shares can be cancelled under § 68 of the Model Act, with the result that surplus of some type, see
infra note 104, equal to the par or stated value of the shares is created. Thus, a share repurchase at a
price equal to or less than the par value of the shares, followed by cancellation of the shares, can be
repeated until the insolvency limitation is encountered-in effect recycling (or increasing if the purchase price is less than par) the surplus used to support the first repurchase. With a dividend distribution, surplus is reduced at the time of payment. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 45 (1979).
The amount of revenue that may be lost because of the more permissive share repurchase provisions is hard to gauge. The condition required for surplus recycling (or creation)-a purchase price
equal to or less than the par or stated value of the shares-is not likely to exist often because of
increases in the value of the shares due to inflation or because of the use of minimal par or stated
values at the time of issuance. Share repurchases also tend to be more expensive to consummate than
dividend payments. See infra note 95, and text accompanying notes 94-113. In addition, the governmental units may vary the tax on periodic redemptions. See Kummert, supra note 10, at 361 n. 10.
84. Determining the appropriate accounting treatment of transactions affecting shareholders'
equity appears to be a complex matter. Accounting authorities state that if a state statute prescribes
the accounting treatment for a transaction affecting shareholders' equity, accounting should conform
to the law. See FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, ACCOUNTING STANDARDS, ORIGINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS ISSUED THROUGH JUNE 1973, at 126 (1983) (APB Opinion No. 6, 13, issued Oct.
1965) [hereinafter cited as FASB ACCOUNTING STANDARDS, JUNE 1973]. But see B. MELCHER, STOCKHOLDERS' EQUITY, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH STUDY No. 15, 120-21, 136 (1973) (recommending that
legal requirements not be controlling in the financial reporting of such transactions). On the other
hand, if the statute does not provide accounting treatment for a transaction (and note that the Model
Act provisions discussed above make very few prescriptions for such treatment), the laws of the state
of incorporation are simply one of a series of factors used in determining the appropriate accounting
for such transactions. See B. MELCHER, supra, at 81-86.
85. Numerous accounting issues are addressed in the footnotes in Kummert, The FinancialProvisions of the New Washington Business CorporationAct (pt. 2), 42 WASH. L. REV. 119, 136-75
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Kummert, Financial Provisions(pt. 2)], and in Kummert, Financial
Provisions(pt. 3), supranote 77, at 337-402.
86. Such transactions would be, for example, frequent repurchases of shares from shareholders,
followed by resale, distribution, or cancellation of the reacquired shares. The accounting problems
involved in such transactions are discussed in Kummert, FinancialProvisions(pt. 3), supra note 77,
at 382-90.
87. The accounting problems involved in such a situation are discussed in Kummert, Financial
Provisions(pt. 2), supra note 85, at 161-68. Since that discussion was published, accounting rules
have been modified to require equity accounting in any case where the investing corporation has
significant influence (presumed to occur if the corporation owns 20% or more of the voting power of
another corporation) over the operating and financial policies of an investee. See FASB ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS, JUNE 1973, supra note 84, at 262 (APB Opinion No. 18,
17, issued March 1971).
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Most of the Model Act corporations wishing to obtain a large or longterm loan must pay the costs related to covenants in loan agreements required by creditors not satisfied with the protection afforded them by the
Model Act provisions against excessive distributions. 88 The initial cost of
inserting a typical protective covenant into a loan agreement does not appear to be significant. 89 But even when great care is expended in drafting
the covenant, the corporation and its lender are likely to incur significant
costs with some frequency related to determining the effect of unusual

Such change simply increases the number of situations in which the difficult accounting-legal issue
considered in that earlier discussion can occur. For a recent discussion of the matter, with the added
complication of the subsidiaries being foreign, see Current Issues on the Legality of Dividends From
a Law and Accounting Perspective: A Task Force Report, 39 Bus. LAw. 289, 291-300 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Legality ofDividends].
88. The survey in Kummert, supra note 10, at 374 n.63, of the terms of such provisions in loan
agreements entered into by large corporations indicated that 12 of the 100 corporations surveyed had
long-term debt but were apparently strong enough financially that no covenants or security devices
were required by the lender.
A smaller sample indicated that most preferred stock agreements do not contain such covenants.
Id. To the extent such agreements contain protective covenants, the text paragraph should be extended to issuances of preferred shares, as well as long-term loans.
It does not appear that trade creditors will incur additional costs at the time of granting credit to
Model Act corporations as a result of the operation of the Model Act financial provisions. Decisions
to grant short-term credit are heavily dependent on the debtor's ability to pay the debt in the ordinary
course of the debtor's business. See id. at 376 n.69. The decision to acquire information about the
debtor's recent bill-paying history (either through internal analysis or through credit-rating agencies)
does not appear to depend so much on the debtor's status as a corporation, as on the size of the debt
and the creditor's assessment of the speed with which bills are being paid by most of its customers.
Further, it does not appear that the costs of acquiring such information are materially affected by the
fact the debtor involved is a Model Act corporation.
As previously discussed in id. at 375, trade creditors may suffer significant losses in the event the
debtor corporation encounters serious financial difficulties. If the debtor has made legal financial
distributions to shareholders within a reasonable time span before the date of insolvency, the corporation's creditors will undoubtedly feel that the distributions were one of the "causes" of the insolvency and thus that they have suffered their losses because the state's financial provisions were not
stringent enough. The evaluation of financial provisions in terms of relative impact on the survival
rate for corporations is a difficult, subjective inquiry. See infra text accompanying note 448. One can
say, however, that the Model Act provisions are considerably less permissive than those in effect in
some states, e.g., Minnesota, see infra Part IIIA2ci, somewhat less permissive than those in balance
sheet surplus jurisdictions, see infra note 319, and somewhat more permissive than those in effect in
California, see infra text accompanying note 272.
89. In the survey discussed in Kummert, supra note 10, at 374 n.63, the language limiting distributions to earnings after a "peg-date" and to conditions of specified liquidity varied little between
corporations. Indeed, most covenants were quite similar to the specimens in AMERICAN BAR FoUNDATION, CORPORATE DEBT FINANCING PROJECT, COMMENTARIES ON MODEL DEBENTURE INDENTURE PROVISIONS § 10-12 (1971). This is not to say that drafting of such covenants can or should stop with
"form" language, because such matters as defining "net earnings" for such purposes are difficult,

time-consuming issues that ought to be resolved only after careful analysis of the debtor's major
income sources, and the pattern of expenditures to obtain such revenue. See B. MANNING, supra note
9, at 106.
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transactions on the operation of the covenant. 90 And on some occasions,
litigation may be necessary to resolve such questions, 9 1 with significant
92
costs for the corporation and lender involved.
Almost all of the Model Act corporations considering a proposed financial distribution to shareholders must bear the cost of determining
93
whether the distribution can be made without violating the provisions.
This cost should not be large if the corporation's surplus and cash-flows,
the size and type of the distribution, and the relevant statutes and cases
are such as to permit counsel to render a short, affirmative opinion on the
proposed distribution. If, however, counsel has reasonable doubt about
the validity of a proposed distribution, the cost to the corporation may be
quite large, both absolutely and in comparison to the size of the proposed
distribution.
Consider, for example, the costs involved for a small corporation in
consummating an installment repurchase of shares-a type of distribution
that recent litigation concerning financial distributions suggests is both
common 94 and fraught with doubt about its legal validity. 95 Counsel for a
90. Thus, in Ramo, Inc. v. English, 500 S.W.2d 461 (Tex. 1973), the issue was whether "advances" from a subsidiary to its parent corporation constituted a "dividend" for purposes of a covenant in a loan agreement entered into by the parent corporation. On the general subject of the interpretation of the language in such indentures, see Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Archer Daniels Midland Co.,
570 F. Supp. 1529 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
91. Ramo, Inc. v. English, 500 S.W.2d 461 (Tex. 1973). Such covenants may also produce
litigation when their existence is not fully disclosed in connection with securities transactions subject
to § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982), or in proxy solicitations subject to § 14 ofthe same Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1982). See Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills,
Inc., 623 F.2d 422 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980). See also Shofstall v. Allied Van
Lines, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. I11.1978) (a § 10(b) action involving the omission of a restriction imposed by the Interstate Commerce Comm'n on dividends).
92. The controversy in Ramo, Inc. v. English, 500 S.W.2d 461 (Tex. 1973) had been the subject
of ajury trial, a court of appeals decision, and a state supreme court decision.
93. It would appear that the only corporations considering a distribution that might not have to
bear this cost are those subject to loan covenants more restrictive than the statutory provisions. In
such situations, the covenants become the operative provisions. But even in these situations, careful
counsel may determine the validity of the distribution under the statutory provisions on the off-chance
that the distribution might be acceptable under the covenant but not pass the statutory provisions. See
Kummert, supra note 10, at 395 n. 161.
94. See id. at 394 n. 157, which indicates that over half (52) of all cases (96) involving state
financial provisions since 1946 that did not impose or suggest liability for directors or shareholders
concerned installment repurchases of shares. In addition, at least three of the cases imposing liability
on directors or shareholders involved installment repurchases. See Steph v. Branch, 255 F. Supp. 526
(E.D. Okla. 1966), affd, 389 F.2d 233 (10th Cir. 1968); Cunningham v. Jaffe, 251 F. Supp. 143
(D.S.C. 1966); Gray v. Sutherland, 124 Cal. App. 2d 280, 268 P.2d 754 (1954).
The hypothesis in the text as to the most common question presented to counsel can also be supported by the sheer number of small corporations in the United States and by the distinct tax advantages for a selling shareholder in receiving funds from the corporation in the form of an installment
repurchase of shares. The great bulk of corporations in the United States can appropriately be labeled
"small." For example, of 2,710,538 active corporation income tax returns filed with the Internal
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corporation considering a proposed installment repurchase often must re96
solve most of the following issues raised by the Model Act provisions:
(a) how the Act's insolvency test 97 applies to installment repurchases of
shares; 98 (b) whether application of the insolvency test is affected by the
corporation's issuance of a negotiable instrument as evidence of,99 or a

Revenue Service for the tax year 1980, 2,298,004, or approximately 85%, had assets under
$500,000. Over half of such active corporations' returns showed corporate assets under $100,000.
See U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., CORPORATtON INCOME TAX RETURNS. 1980

STATISTICS OF INCOME 2 (1983). An installment repurchase meeting the requirements of §§ 302(b) and
453 of the Internal Revenue Code provides the selling shareholder with the advantage of reporting a
proportion of the total long-term capital gain in each tax year a principal payment is made. I.R.C. §§
302(b), 453 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Such advantage is preferred by most shareholders over a dividend distribution of the same number of dollars. See Kummert, supra note 10, at 367-68 nn.36-37.
95. A repurchase of shares for cash would reduce the issues discussed infra text accompanying
notes 96-111, only by issues (a)-(c).
A proposed dividend would also raise a number of similar legal issues. Thus, counsel may have to
determine: (a) what valuation standard is to be used in determining the value of the corporation's
assets, and thus its surplus; (b) if current value is considered to be the appropriate valuation standard.
what approach to determining current value is to be used, and what type of surplus results from the
corporation's recognition of unrealized appreciation; (c) if the accounting approach to asset valuation
is considered to be the appropriate valuation standard, whether numerous transactions potentially
affecting the corporation's surplus accounts have been appropriately treated for purposes of the application of the Model Act provisions; (d) what steps must be taken in the event it is necessary to reduce
the corporation's stated capital; and (e) what constitutes reasonable care by directors in effecting the
dividend.
96. It may not be clear at first glance why some of the issues raised in the text present problems
for the corporation repurchasing the shares. The corporate interest in such transactions stems from the
determination by a board of directors that a repurchase of shares is a necessary step for the corporation to take. Once that determination is made, the transaction must be arranged by corporate counsel
so that the possibility of liability for directors is minimized and that the legal incidents of the transaction for the selling shareholder and for the corporation are acceptable to each. A case can be made for
allocating the expense of the latter inquiry between the selling shareholder and the corporation: however, it seems doubtful that such allocations will be made unless the issue is of relevance almost
exclusively to the shareholder. The only issue discussed in the text that appears to fit within that
category is whether application of the insolvency test is affected by the use of a negotiable instrument
or a security device. Thus, almost all of the expense in connection with such transactions will likely
be borne by the corporation.
97. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 6, para. 4 (1979) states: "No purchase of or payment for its
own shares shall be made at a time when the corporation is insolvent or when such purchase or
payment would make it insolvent."
98. Herwitz, Installment Repurchase of Stock: Surplus Limitations, 79 HARv L. REV. 303, 322
(1965), argues that the words "or payment for" were added in 1957 to the last paragraph of § 6 of the
Model Act to ensure that the insolvency test is imposed both at the time the installment obligation is
entered into and at the time each payment in discharge of the obligation is made. This position is in
accord with common law authorities, see id. at 308-11, and seems accepted by recent decisions. See
Neimark v. Mel Kramer Sales, Inc.. 102 Wis. 2d 282, 306 N.W.2d 278, 283 (1981) (dictum). But
see Libco Corp. v. Leigh (In re Reliable Mfg. Co.), 703 F.2d 996 (7th Cir. 1983) (involving Delaware law).
99. See Williams v. Nevelow, 513 S.W.2d 535, 539 (Tex. 1974) (dictum) (issuance of a secured
negotiable instrument could be considered "payment" for the repurchased stock).
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security device in support of, 00 its obligation to make deferred payments;
(c) how the Act's surplus measurement test' 01 applies to installment repurchases of shares; 02 (d) whether capital surplus may be used as the
measure for a share repurchase even though the corporation also has
earned surplus; 0 3 (e) how the corporation's surplus is affected if the reacquired shares are cancelled; 04 (f) what valuation standard is to be used in
100. Courts in Model Act jurisdictions have not addressed this question. The authorities in other
jurisdictions are divided. See Walsh v. Paterna (In re National Tile & Terrazzo Co.), 537 F.2d 329
(9th Cir. 1976) (lien arising from a deed of trust issued to secure an installment repurchase by a
California corporation of shares covered at the outset by adequate earned surplus is not rendered
ineffective by the later insolvency of the corporation and failure of the underlying installment note);
accord Tracy v. Perkins-Tracy Printing Co., 278 Minn. 159, 153 N.W.2d 241 (1967) (based on
Minnesota statute). But see Reiner v. Washington Plate Glass Co., 711 F.2d 414, 417 (D.C. Cir.
1983) ("[t]he security falls with the underlying obligation"); Gold v. Lippman (In re Flying Mailman Serv., Inc.), 539 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1976) (based on New York statute, holding later insolvency
voids the lien). Earlier authorities are reviewed in Annot., 4 A.L.R. FED. 654 (1970).
Courts in Model Act jurisdictions are divided on the analogous question of the effect to be given to
a shareholder's guarantee of a corporation's repurchase obligation where it is determined that such
repurchase is contrary to law. Compare Field v. Haupert, 58 Or. App. 117, 647 P.2d 952 (1982)
(corporation's repurchase of stock while insolvent held illegal, not ultra vires, and illegality was a
complete defense to shareholder's liability under the guarantee) with James v. J.F.K. Carwash, Inc.,
275 Ark. 141, 628 S.W.2d 299 (1982) (corporation's promissory note given for repurchase of stock
when it had no earned surplus held ultra vires, not void, and none of the conditions for shareholder's
assertion of ultra vires defense were present).
101. MODEL BusINEss CORP. Acr § 6, para. 1 (1979). This section states:
[P]urehases of [a corporation's] own shares, whether direct or indirect, shall be made only to the
extent of unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus available therefor, and, if the articles of
incorporation so permit or with the affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of all shares
entitled to vote thereon, to the extent of unreserved and unrestricted capital surplus available
therefor.
102. CompareFisk v. Newsum, 9 Wn. App. 650, 513 P.2d 1035 (1973) (apparently interpreting
the Washington (Model) Act language to mean that the surplus measurement test is to be applied as
each principal payment is made) with Neimark v. Mel Kramer Sales, Inc., 102 Wis. 2d 282, 306
N.W.2d 278, 284-85 (1981) (holding that the Wisconsin (Model) Act surplus test is to be applied at
the time of purchase).
103. MODEL BustNmss CORP. Acr § 6 (1979) does not specify that a share repurchase shall be first
measured against existing earned surplus. The Act also does not require notice to be provided to the
selling (or remaining) shareholders when shares to be repurchased will be measured against capital
surplus. Such notice is required when distributions of cash or property are made out of capital surplus, see id. § 46(e). The requirement of notice on distributions out of capital surplus and lack thereof
on share repurchases measured against such surplus would seem to encourage corporations to measure share repurchases against capital surplus whenever possible. Such accounting for the transaction
may provoke a reaction from the SEC and from some accountants. See L. RAPPAPORT, SEC AccoUNTING PRACnCE AND PROCEDURE 18.32-.33 (3d ed. 1972).
104. Assuming the repurchase price is equal to the par value of the shares, the issue is whether
the reduction of stated capital resulting from the cancellation of the reacquired shares has the effect of
restoring the earned surplus restricted on the acquisition to unrestricted earned surplus, or of increasing capital surplus (while earned surplus is reduced by an equivalent amount). On the issue, compare
D. HERwrrz, BusINEsS PLANNING 425-26 (1966) and Sprouse, Accountingfor Treasury ShareTransactions:PrevailingPracticesand New Statutory Provisions,59 COLUM. L. REv. 882, 892-93 (1959)
(both arguing that the effect of such a cancellation is to create capital surplus equal to the par value of
the shares cancelled, and to reduce earned surplus by an amount equal to the purchase price) with
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determining the value of the corporation's assets, and thus its surplus; 0 5
(g) if current value is considered to be the appropriate valuation standard,
what approach to determining current value is to be used 10 6 and what type
of surplus results from the corporation's recognition of unrealized appreciation; 107 (h) if the accounting approach to asset valuation is considered
to be the appropriate valuation standard, whether numerous transactions
potentially affecting the corporation's surplus accounts have been
matched to the appropriate surplus account for purposes of the application
of the Model Act provisions; 108 (i) how these questions are affected if the
acquiring corporation is acquiring its own shares and has subsidiaries, 109
or if the acquiring corporation is a subsidiary corporation acquiring its
parent's shares; 1 0 and (j) what constitutes reasonable care by directors in
effecting such a transaction.1 11 If counsel decides that current value is the
Hackney, The FinancialProvisions of the Model Business CorporationAct, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1357,
1396 n. 175 (1957), and Rudolph, Accountingfor Treasury Shares Under the Model Business Corporation Act, 73 HARV. L. REv. 323, 328 (1959) (both arguing that the amount of restricted earned
surplus is restored to unrestricted earned surplus).
Other issues of almost equal complexity arise if the shares are resold for a price different than the
repurchase price, or if they are declared as a share dividend. See Hackney, supra, at 1394-97.
105. See Kummert, FinancialProvisions(pt. 2), supra note 85, at 124-28.
106. For an analysis of the choices involved and the difficulties in determining current value, see
Hackney, Accounting Principles in Corporation Law, 30 LAW & CONTEMP PROBS. 791, 819-21
(1965).
Corporations writing up assets to reflect current fair market value may incur significant costs apart
from lawyers' fees. See infra text accompanying note 180-84.
107. Compare I MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr ANN. § 2 2, at 35-36 (2d ed. 1971) (comment of
the Committee on Corporate Laws; concluding apparently that recognition of unrealized appreciation
by directors gives rise to capital surplus) with Seward, EarnedSurplus-Its Meaning and Use in the
Model Business CorporationAct, 28 VA L. REV. 435, 440-43 (1952) (arguing that earned surplus
includes unrealized appreciation). The issue may be academic for a small corporation because a simple majority of holders of shares entitled to vote can authorize the use of capital surplus for a repurchase of shares. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 6, para. I (1979).
108. See, e.g., Kummert, FinancialProvisions(pt. 2), supra note 85, at 168-71 (discussing the
appropriate treatment for watered stock).
109. See id. at 161-68. See also Hackney, FinancialAccounting ForParentsandSubsidiariesA New Approach to ConsolidatedStatements, 25 U. Prr. L. REV. 9 (1963); Legality of Dividends,
supra note 87, at 292-300.
110. See Kummert, FinancialProvisions(pt. 3), supra note 77, at 372 n.727.
11.
As noted supra text accompanying note 80, a director who votes for or assents to the purchase of the corporation's own shares contrary to the provisions of the Act is liable to the corporation
jointly and severally with all other directors so voting or assenting for the amount of the distribution
that is illegal unless he or she complies with the standard prescribed in the Act for the performance of
duties of directors. Section 35 of the Model Act requires a director to perform the duties of a director
in good faith in a manner he or she reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation,
and with such care as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 35, para. 2 (1979). Section 35 further states:
In performing his duties, a director shall be entitled to rely on information, opinions, reports or
statements, including financial statements and other financial data, in each case prepared or presented by:
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valuation standard for assets, the corporation is likely to incur additional
costs for studies by appraisers or accountants, or internal financial studies. Regardless of the resolution of the asset valuation issue, the corporation must incur the cost of an analysis of its short-term cash flows sufficient to illuminate the effect of the proposed repurchase on its ability to
2
meet its debts as they become due in the ordinary course of business. "1
Finally, a substantial amount of directors' time will presumably be expended analyzing lawyers', appraisers', and accountants' opinions, data
on cash flows, and the extent of directors' liability if the distribution is
subsequently found to have violated the statutory provisions. 113
The directors of some Model Act corporations, or, in the case of proposed repurchases of shares, some potential selling shareholders, after
considering the costs involved in determining the validity of a proposed
distribution and its unavoidable risks ,114 may decide not to make a distri(a) one or more officers or employees of the corporation whom the director reasonably believes to be reliable and competent in the matters presented,
(b) counsel, public accountants or other persons as to matters which the director reasonably
believes to be within such person's professional or expert competence, or
(c) a committee of the board upon which he does not serve, duly designated in accordance
with a provision of the articles of incorporation or the by-laws, as to matters within its designated authority, which committee the director reasonably believes to merit confidence,
but he shall not be considered to be acting in good faith if he has knowledge concerning the
matter in question that would cause such reliance to be unwarranted.
Id. Counsel may be called upon to advise directors as to the relationship of the reliance-on-information sentence to the general duty of care, and as to the meaning of such terms as "good faith,"
"care," "prudent person," and "reasonably believes."
112. That is, whether the payments required for the proposed repurchase can be made without
violating the insolvency limitation. See supranote 97.
On the determination of whether a distribution will render the corporation equitably insolvent, see
the helpful comment of the ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, infra note 318, and Murphy, Equity
Insolvency and The New Model Business CorporationAct, 15 U. RICH. L. REv. 839, 855-71 (1981).
Murphy raises, but does not resolve, a question counsel may have to address in providing instructions
to persons gathering the cash-flow information: how long after the distribution must a corporation be
solvent in order to escape operation of the statute?
113. It appears that a claim against directors for an illegal distribution would be covered by a
typical directors' and officers' liability insurance policy. See Comiskey, Directors' and Officers'
Liability Insurance-A Hypothetical Case, 43 INS. CouNsEL J. 34, 50-54 (1976). It is not clear
whether the possibility of such claims, given their infrequency, would increase the cost of such insurance.
114. By virtue of the director liability provisions in MODEL Buswss CORP. Acr §§ 35, 48
(1979), and the courts' general reluctance to find directors liable for breach of the duty of care, see,
e.g., Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of CorporateDirectors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078 (1968), directors have only a very small risk of liability on
any distribution in relation to which they rely in good faith on supportive opinions of counsel and an
appraiser. As previously noted, supranote 81, apparently even knowing recipients of an illegal share
repurchase are not liable for contribution to any director found liable on such repurchase. However,
such provisions may not prevent a court from imposing liability on such shareholders for the benefit
of creditors. See Reilly v. Segert, 31111. 2d 297, 201 N.E.2d 444 (1964) (so holding under Illinois
statute). Moreover, a shareholder making an installment sale of shares in the corporation has a much
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bution that would have been beneficial to most of the parties connected
with the corporation. The costs resulting from such decisions, apart from
the fees incurred to the point of abandonment, are likely to be hard to
measure. 11 5 Such costs may prove to be significant, however, if the aban16
doned distribution was a repurchase of shares by a small corporation"
and disharmony later develops between the shareholder desiring to leave
7
the corporation and the corporation's managers. "1
Model Act corporations, and their directors, shareholders, and creditors, participating in disputes over the impact of these provisions on proposed or consummated transactions, are likely to bear increased costs in
settling or litigating the disputes simply because of the complexity and
ambiguity of the provisions.118 While a limited number of such contromore substantial risk that his or her claim will be subordinated to the claims of unsecured creditors in
the event of later insolvency. The cases cited supra notes 99-100 suggest possible preventive measures to reduce this risk, but none of these authorities involved the current Model Act provisions.
115. In a publicly held corporation, a decision not to distribute a dividend warranted by financial
considerations will hurt shareholders with a preference for current distributions and may communicate inappropriate information about the corporation's prospects to shareholders or prospective shareholders for whom such information is an important factor in buying and selling shares. See Kummert,
supra note 10, at 366-68. Shareholders with a preference for retained earnings, senior security holders, trade creditors, and employees are likely to favor the decision not to distribute. See id. at 366-68,
373-76. Management will find its flexibility in making decisions impeded by the legal constraints.
See id. 376-79.
Because of the significant tax benefits to the corporation and its shareholders of share repurchases
and salaries as compared to dividends, see id. at 360-61, it appears that a decision even to consider
distributing a dividend to the shareholders of a closely held corporation would be due to anticipation
of unique benefits to shareholders from the distribution (e.g., a retum-of-capital distribution from a
corporation with no current or accumulated earnings and profits under I.R.C. §§ 301 & 316 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981)). Such shareholders will lose the prospective benefit as a result of the decision not to
distribute. But senior security holders, trade creditors, and employees of such a corporation are likely
to favor the decision.
116. A decision by a publicly held corporation not to repurchase shares when such distribution is
supportable by financial factors, see Kummert, supra note 10, at 381-91, will generally harm the
shareholders who would have sold their shares, and in some cases the remaining shareholders. Senior
security holders, trade creditors, and employees of the corporation would appear to prefer that the
corporation retain the funds, with the possible exception of a repurchase of shares held by shareholders when the costs of servicing such shareholders are excessive. See id. at 388-89. Management will
again find its flexibility impeded by legal constraints.
117. If such disharmony causes the corporation to be less profitable than it would have been had
the shareholder's stock been repurchased, it appears that all parties connected with the corporation
lose, with the possible exception of trade creditors. Even they may lose if the disharmony ultimately
leads to the corporation's insolvency. It seems unlikely that parties faced with significant losses will
be unable to fashion a method for removing the disruptive shareholder.
118. The increase in costs may be no more than the cost of dealing with another argument or
claim in a complicated proceeding which would have produced a controversy even if the state had no
statutory provisions on distributions. See, e.g., Georesearch, Inc. v. Morriss, 193 F. Supp. 163
(W.D. La. 1961) (involving a series of challenges to stock transfer restrictions), affd per curiam,
298 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1962). On the other hand, the argument or claim involving the state distribution restrictions may be the central issue in the controversy, and thus the primary factor giving rise to
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versies are likely to be resolved by litigation,' 19 the disputes finally presented to courts seem certain to require extra trial and appeal time for the
20
resolution of ambiguities in the provisions. 1
Current or prospective shareholders of publicly held Model Act corporations attempting to gauge prospects for the corporation's share prices
from changes (or lack thereof) in the corporation's dividend rate 1 2' may
suffer investment losses or bear additional information costs 122 because of
the complete lack of relationship between the amount of dividends permissible under the Act and the corporation's recent earnings perfor123
mance.
Common shareholders of Model Act corporations with more than one
class of shares attempting to reduce stated capital and thereby create capital surplus may be forced to yield unreasonable concessions to holders of
preferred or special classes of shares 124 in order to obtain the necessary
25
approval by classes of shares for the reduction. 1
iii.

Benefits Resultingfrom the Pre-1980Model Act Provisions

The costs set forth above appear to exceed by far the limited benefits
that either the groups interested in the amount of corporate financial distributions or the groups involved in the administration of the legal limitations receive from the operation of the provisions.
its costs. See, e.g., Teidje v. Aluminum Taper Milling Co., 46 Cal. 2d 450, 296 P.2d 554 (1956)
(involving the selling shareholders' right to void an illegal repurchase of shares).
119. See Kummert, supra note 10, at 394 nn.156-57 (indicating only 126 cases have involved
the corporation law restrictions since 1946).
120. Further litigation and court costs may result if lawyers or accountants involved in advising
the parties on the distribution are later charged with malpractice concerning that advice. See, e.g.,
Fisk v. Newsum, 9 Wn. App. 650, 513 P.2d 1035 (1973).
121. The difficulties in a shareholder accurately making such a prediction are discussed in Brudney, supra note 13, at 109-14.
The shareholders' task in this respect is not made any easier by virtue of the notice provided to
shareholders under § 46(e) of the Model Act concerning each distribution made by a corporation from
capital surplus. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Act § 46(e) (1979). Such notice would provide important
information to shareholders only if the distribution was being made because management believed the
corporation's future prospects were bright. Instead, it seems likely that many such distributions reflect management's desire either to pacify shareholders or to liquidate part of the corporation.
122. Such costs are one factor leading Professor Brudney to suggest that management should be
required to disclose the basis for each dividend action taken by a publicly held corporation. Brudney,
supra note 13, at 114-29.
123. It should be noted that it is precisely because of this lack of relationship that shareholders
desiring a stable dividend rate receive the benefit they desire under the Act. See infra text accompanying note 126.
124. See B. MANNING, supranote 9, at 88.
125. It seems likely that a reduction of stated capital attributable to either the preferred or special
class of shares or the common shares will give the holders of the preferred or special shares a class
vote under MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACt § 60(e) (1979). See D. HERwrrz. supranote 104, at 362-65.
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The Model Act provisions permit corporations to maintain stable dividend rates despite recent adverse earnings performance. Shareholders of
publicly held corporations appear to attach significant value to such stability, 126 and national economic policy may be aided in times of depression if significant numbers of corporations maintain dividend rates in the
face of declining earnings. 127
The Model Act provisions prohibit all types of financial distributions to
shareholders by corporations that would be unable to pay their debts as
they arise in the usual course of business after the distribution. 128 Trade
creditors of both publicly held and closely held corporations attach considerable importance to such protection. 129
The Model Act provisions cause corporations, and their creditors, and
shareholders, to expend significant amounts for the advice of lawyers,
accountants, and possibly appraisers on matters related to the operation of
the provisions. Such groups can thus be said to benefit significantly from
the existence of such provisions. 130
In view of the relative imbalance of costs and benefits resulting from
the operation of the Model Act provisions, it would appear that legislatures in Model Act states should consider alternate provisions, 131 and that
legislatures in other states1 32 should consider the pre-1980 Model Act
provisions only if their provisions result in greater cost-benefit imbal126. See Kummert, supra note 10, at 370-71.
127. See id. at 364.
128. The insolvency limitation is applied to dividends out of earned surplus, MODEL BUSINESS
CORP ACT § 45(a) (1979), dividends out of depletion reserves, id. §45(b), distributions out of capital
surplus, id. § 46(a), purchases of or payments for a corporation's shares, id. § 6, para. 4, and redemptions or purchases of redeemable shares, id. § 66.
129. See Kummert, supra note 10. at 375-76.
130. B. MANNING. supra note 9, at 108, seems to suggest that lawyers, accountants, law students, and teachers have a net cost as a result of the operation of the provisions. It seems doubtful that
most lawyers and accountants will expend significant amounts of time studying such provisions absent questions presented by a paying client. Law teachers and law students currently expend the time
to study such provisions in major part because of the demand for lawyers with such skills.
131. At least two states have recently moved from pre-1980 Model Act provisions to Amended
Model Act provisions. See MONT CODE ANN. § 35-1-711 (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-44
(1983). In addition, Oregon has made substantial modifications in its pre-1980 Model Act provisions.
See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 57.004, .035 (1983).
At the same time, South Carolina reenacted provisions based on the pre-1980 Model Act provisions. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-9-150, -170, -180, -190 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); Haynsworth,
The 1981 Revision of the South CarolinaBusiness CorporationAct: A Critiqueand Agenda for Further Reform, 33 S.C.L. REV. 449, 452-56 (1982).
132. Minnesota recently reconsidered its provisions and opted for provisions modeled in part on
the Amended Model Act. See infra Part IIIA2ci.
It should also be noted, however, that at least two states that have made recent major revisions in
their corporation statutes have moved to the pre-1980 Model Act provisions. See IDAHO CODE § 301-6, -45, -46, -66 (Supp. 1982-83); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN §§ 293-A:6, :45, :46, :66 (Supp. 1983).
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ances than those resulting under the Model Act. Subsequent analysis will
show that no set of provisions results in such imbalance.
b.

The BalanceSheet Surplus Approach

Sixteen states1 33 and the District of Columbia 34 use balance sheet surplus as the central concept in their regulation of financial distributions by
corporations to shareholders. The provisions in the recently adopted
Michigan Business Corporation Act 135 are exemplary of the statutory systems using this approach and provide a suitable vrehicle for analyzing the
costs and benefits of this system.
i.

Summary of the MichiganProvisions

A Michigan corporation may declare and pay dividends or make other
distributions on its outstanding shares in cash, bonds, 136 or property, including the shares or bonds of other corporations. It may not take'any of
such actions when the corporation is insolvent or would thereby be made
insolvent, nor when the proposed action would be contrary to any restriction contained in the corporation's articles of incorporation. 137 Dividends
133. See COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 7-3-102(1), -5-110(1)(d), -6-102 (1973 & Supp. 1982); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 160, 170 (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 607.017, .137, .201 (1981); HAWAII REV.
STAT. §§ 416-28, -65, -91 (1976 & Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 157.6, .41, .58 (SmithHurd 1954 & Supp. 1983-84); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 496A.5, .41, .63 (West 1963); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 17-6410, -6420 (1981); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:55, :63 (West 1963); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS
CODE ANN. §§ 2-309, -311 (1975 & Supp. 1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 450.1351,.1365(1) (MICH.
STAT. ANN. §§ 21.200(351), (365)(1) (Callaghan 1983)); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 351.210, .220, .390
(Vernon 1966); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 78.070(3)(a), .290 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:7-14, -16
(West 1969); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 510, 513 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1982-83); OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. §§ 1701.33, .35(B) (Page 1978); VA. CODE §§ 13.1-4, -43(a), -62 (1978 & Supp. 1983).
134. See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-305, -340, -341, -359(b) (1981).
135. The revised Michigan Business Corporation Act became effective January 1, 1973. MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 450.2099 (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(1099) (Callaghan 1983)).
The Michigan provisions are modeled on, and make improvements to, the provisions in the New
York and New Jersey Acts. See MICHIGAN LAW REVISION COMM'N, FIFrH ANNUAL REPORT, SUPPLEMENT: BUSINESS CORPORATION Acr 7-8, 81-98 (1970) [hereinafter cited as LAW REVISION REPORT].
All three acts use surplus as the source for distributions, MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 450.1351, .1365
(MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 21.200(351), (365) (Callaghan 1983)); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:7-14(2), 16(1) (West 1969); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 510(b), 513 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1982-83),
instead of net assets in excess of stated capital, see, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.41 (SmithHurd 1954 & Supp. 1983-84), or an impairment of stated capital test, see, e.g., MD. CORPS. &
ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 2-309(b) (1975 & Supp. 1982). Of these three approaches, the use of surplus as
the source for distributions is preferable on the grounds of clarity. Similarly, even a casual comparison of the Michigan financial provisions with those in DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 160, 170 (1983),
should convince the reader that the former is a model of drafting compared to the latter.
136. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1105(5) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(105)(5) (Callaghan 1983))
defines "bonds" to include secured and unsecured bonds, debentures, and notes.
137. Id. § 450.1351(1) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(351)(1)).
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may be declared or paid, and other distributions may be made, only out of
surplus. 138 A dividend paid or any other distribution made in any part

from sources other than earned surplus must be accompanied by a written
notice disclosing the amounts by which the dividend or distribution af39
fects stated capital, capital surplus, and earned surplus. 1
A Michigan corporation generally may purchase its own shares only
out of surplus. 140 However, it may purchase its own shares out of stated
capital for the purposes of eliminating fractional shares, collecting or
compromising indebtedness to the corporation, and paying dissenting
shareholders entitled to payment for their shares. 141 It may also redeem or

purchase its redeemable shares out of stated capital, provided that after
such a redemption or purchase its net assets at least equal its stated capital
remaining after cancellation of such shares. 142
A Michigan corporation may not purchase or redeem its own shares
under the following conditions: (a) when such action would be contrary to
a restriction contained in its articles of incorporation; (b) when the corporation is insolvent or by such action would be rendered insolvent; (c) unless after the purchase or redemption there remain outstanding one or
more classes or series of shares possessing among them voting rights and
unlimited residual rights to dividends and distribution of assets on liquidation; and (d) in the case of redeemable shares and within the period of
their redeemability, if the price to be paid is greater than the applicable
redemption price plus, in the case of shares entitled to cumulative dividends, the dividends which would have accrued to the next dividend date
43
following the purchase or redemption. 1
138. Id.
139. Id. § 450.1351(3) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(351)(3)). If the amounts by which the dividend or distribution affects stated capital, capital surplus, and earned surplus are not determinable at
the time the dividend is paid or distribution is made, the notice must disclose the approximate effect
of the dividend or distribution upon such accounts and state that precise effects are not yet determinable.
140. Id. § 450.1365(1) (MICH STAT. ANN. § 21.200(365)(1)).
141. Id. § 450.1366(l) (MICH STAT. ANN. § 21.200(366)(1)).
142. Id. § 450.1366(2) (MICH. STAT ANN § 21.200(366)(2)). Subject to the limitation noted in
text accompanying this note, a corporation may also purchase its nonredeemable shares out of stated
capital if such shares have a preference over the shares of any other class or series in payment of
dividends or in distribution of assets upon liquidation. Id. § 450.1366(3) (MICH. STAT ANN §
21.200(366)(3)).
143. Id. § 450.1365(2) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(365)(2)). The placement of the four limitations in subparagraph (2) of § 365 leaves open the argument that purchases of shares out of stated
capital permitted under § 366 are not subject to the limitations. It does not appear that such result was
intended. The limitations in subparagraph (2) of § 365 also apply to redemptions of redeemable
shares, which are regulated by subparagraph (2) of § 366. Id. §§ 450.1365(2),. .1366(2) (MICH. STAT
ANN. §§ 21.200(365)(2), (366)(2)). The source provision for both sections, N.J. STAT. ANN. §
14A:7-16 (West 1969), combines the material in §§ 365-67 of the Michigan Act into a single section
and apparently applies the limitations to all purchases.
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A Michigan corporation which has purchased its own shares out of surplus may defer payment for the shares over a period agreed to by it and
the selling shareholder. The obligation so created constitutes an ordinary
debt of the corporation and the validity of any payment made upon the
debt is not affected by the absence of surplus at the time of payment. 144
The Michigan Act defines "surplus" as "the excess of the net assets of
a corporation over its stated capital.'1 45 "Stated capital" is defined as
follows:
"Stated capital" means the sum of (a) the par value of all shares with par
value that have been issued, (b) the amount of consideration received for all
shares without par value that have been issued, except such part of the consideration therefor as has been allocated to surplus in a manner permitted by
law, and (c) such amounts not included in classes (a) and (b) as have been
transferred to stated capital, whether upon the issuance of shares or otherwise, less reductions from such sum as have been effected in a manner per46
mitted by law. 1
"Net assets" is defined as "the amount by which the total assets of a
corporation, defined [by statute], exceeds its total liabilities as determined
in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles." 147 "Total
assets" is defined as "the total of the properties and rights entered upon
the books of a corporation in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, or the current fair market value of such properties and
48
rights." 1
"Earned surplus" is defined as that "portion of the surplus of a corporation that represents the accumulated net earnings, gains and profits,
after deduction of all losses, that has not been distributed to shareholders
as dividends or transferred to stated capital or capital surplus, or applied
to other purposes permitted by law," 149 as determined under accounting
rules prescribed in another section of the Act. 150 "Capital surplus" is de144. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1367 (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(367) (Callaghan 1983)).
145. Id. § 450.1109(4) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(109)(4)).
146. Id. § 450.1109(3) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(109)(3)).
147. Id. § 450.1108(1) (MICH.STAT. ANN. § 21.200(108)(1)). The subsection adds that stated
capital and surplus are not liabilities. Id.
148. Id. § 450.1110(l) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(1 10)(1)).
149. Id. § 450.1107(1) (MICH.STAT. ANN. § 21.200(107)(1)). The primary application of such
surplus is to the acquisition of treasury shares. See id. § 450.1381(1)(d) (MICH. STAT. ANN. §
21.200(381)(1)(d)).
150. Section 381(l)(a) provides that the amount of earned surplus may be computed by a corporation either from the date of formation or from the latest date when a deficit was eliminated by
application of the corporation's capital surplus. Id. § 450.1381(I)(a) (MICH. STAT. ANN. §
21.200(381)(1)(a)). However, when two or more corporations consolidate by purchase or other
method, the amount of the earned surplus of the surviving corporation must not exceed the aggregate
net earned surplus of the component corporations, reduced by distributions to shareholders and trans-
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fined as "the entire surplus of a corporation other than its earned surplus." 151 "Capital surplus" is intended to include unrealized apprecia152
tion of assets resulting from appraisal write-ups of assets.
"Insolvent" is defined as "being unable to pay debts as they become
53
due in the usual course of a debtor's business." 1
"Treasury shares" are defined as "shares which have been issued,
have been subsequently acquired by a corporation, and have not been
cancelled. Treasury shares are issued shares, but not outstanding shares,
154
and are not assets."
55
Shares reacquired by a corporation out of stated capital are cancelled
56
at the time of reacquisition. 1 Other shares reacquired by a corporation
may be retained as treasury shares or may be cancelled by the board of
directors at any time. 157
The corporation's stated capital is not affected by the retention of reacquired shares as treasury shares, the distribution of such shares to shareholders, or the disposition of such shares for consideration. 158 When treasury shares are disposed of for consideration, generally the corporation's
capital surplus is increased by the full amount of the consideration received. 159 However, if the corporation applied earned surplus to the acquisition of the treasury shares, it may restore to earned surplus, out of
the consideration received from the disposition and on an appropriate
basis per share, any part of the amount by which earned surplus was re60
duced at the time of acquisition. 1
A corporation's stated capital is reduced when reacquired shares are
fers of earned surplus to stated capital or capital surplus made at the time of consolidation. See also
id. § 450.1342 (MICH STAT. ANN. § 21.200(342)).
Section 381 further provides:
When a corporation has applied earned surplus to the acquisition of treasury shares and the
shares are subsequently disposed of for a consideration, the corporation may restore to earned
surplus, out of the consideration received and on an appropriate basis per share, any part of the
amount by which earned surplus was reduced at the time of acquisition of the shares. If the
consideration received exceeds the amount by which earned surplus was reduced with respect to
the shares, the excess shall be capital surplus.
Id. § 450.138 1(1)(d) (MICH STAT ANN. § 21.200(381)(1)(d)).
151. Id. § 450.1106(1) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(106)(1)).
152. See LAW REVISION REPORT, supra note 135, at 7-8, 83.
153. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1107(3) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(107)(3) (Callaghan 1983)).
154. Id. § 450.1110(2) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(110)(2)).
155. Id. § 450.1371(1) (MICH. STAT ANN. § 21.200(371)(1)). Converted shares, or shares required by the corporation's articles of incorporation to be cancelled upon reacquisition, are also cancelled.
156. This requirement is not set forth in § 371, but seems implicit in subparagraph (1). See id.
157. Id. § 450.1371(2) (MICH.STAT. ANN. § 21.200(371)(2)).
158. Id. § 450.1372(1) (MICH.STAT. ANN. § 21.200(372)(1)).
159. Id.
160. Id. §§ 450.1372(1),. 1381(1)(d) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(372)(1), (381)(1)(d)).
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cancelled. 161 It may also be reduced by a resolution of the board of directors to eliminate from stated capital amounts previously transferred from
surplus to stated capital and not allocated to a designated class or series of
shares, to eliminate any amount of stated capital represented by issued
shares with par value, to the extent such stated capital exceeds the aggregate par value of such shares, or to reduce the amount of stated capital
represented by issued shares without par value.162 A reduction of stated
capital may not be made through such a resolution unless the stated capital after the reduction exceeds the aggregate preferential amounts payable
upon involuntary liquidation upon all issued shares having preferential
rights in the assets plus the par value of all other issued shares with par
value. 163 Finally, a Michigan corporation can reduce its stated capital by
an amendment to its articles of incorporation which reduces the par value
of issued shares having par value, or changes issued shares, with or without par value, into a different number of shares of the same class, or into
the same or a different number of shares of any one or more classes or
series in a manner that results in a reduction of stated capital. 164
161. Id. § 450.1372(2) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(372)(2)). The amount of the reduction is
equal to the amount of stated capital then represented by the shares plus any stated capital not theretofore allocated to a designated class or series which is thereupon allocated to the shares cancelled. Id.
The amount of such reduction during a stated period of time must be disclosed to all of the corporation's shareholders in the next financial statement covering such period furnished to the shareholders,
or in the first notice of dividend or share distribution furnished to holders of each class or series of its
shares, if earlier, but in any case within 15 months after the reduction. Id.
Reacquired shares that are converted shares, and thus cancelled under § 371, are exempted from §
372. See id. 88 450.1371, .1372 (MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 21.200(371), (372)). Under §313, consideration for the shares issued on the conversion of shares shall be any one or more of the following, as
determined by the board of directors: the stated capital then represented by the shares converted; any
stated capital not theretofore allocated to a designated class or series of shares which is thereupon
allocated to the new shares; any surplus transferred to stated capital upon issuance of the shares for
the shares converted; or any additional consideration paid to the corporation upon the issuance of
shares for the shares converted. Id. § 450.1313 (MICH. STAT. ANN. §21.200(313)). Thus, if the par or
stated value of the shares issued for the shares converted is less than the stated capital represented by
the shares converted, and the directors choose the second, third, or fourth sources as consideration for
the shares issued in conversion, a reduction of stated capital may result from a conversion of shares.
162. Id. § 450.1376(1) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(376)(1)). The resolution must state the
amount of the proposed reduction, the manner in which the reduction is to be effected, and the date
upon which the reduction becomes effective. Id. The amount of any such reduction must be disclosed
to shareholders in accord with the time constraints set forth supra note 161. Id. § 450.1377 (MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 21.200(377)).
163. Id. § 450.1376(2) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(376)(2)).
164. See Howbert, CorporateFinance, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 979, 995 (1972); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 450.1602(e), (h), (i) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(602)(e), (h), (i) (Callaghan 1983)). Such reductions are effective at the time the certificate of amendment is endorsed by the state administrator (or
such later date, not to exceed 90 days after date of delivery, as is specified in the amendment). Id. §
450.1131(2) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(131)(2)); see also id. § 450.1631(2) (MICH. STAT. ANN. §
21.200(631)(2)).
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Surplus arising from any reduction of stated capital is capital surplus. 165 A corporation may, by resolution of its board of directors, apply
capital surplus to the reduction or elimination of any deficit in earned surplus. 166

Directors of a Michigan corporation who vote for, or concur in, 167 the
68
declaration of a dividend or other distribution of assets to shareholders, 1
or purchase of shares of the corporation, 169 contrary to these provisions or

to any restriction in the corporation's articles of incorporation or bylaws, 170 and who have not complied with the Act's standard of performance in so doing, 17 1 are jointly and severally liable to the corporation
72
for an amount not to exceed the amount unlawfully paid or distributed. 1
165. Id. § 450.1381()(c) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(381)(1)(c)).
166. Id. § 450.1381(2) (MICH. STAT. ANN, § 21.200(381)(2)). Any such application of capital
surplus must be disclosed to the corporation's shareholders within six months of the date of such
action. Id.
Under Michigan Corporation Law § 355, a corporation, subject to any restriction contained in its
articles of incorporation, may pay a dividend in its own shares. Id. § 450.1355 (MIcH STAT. ANN §
21.200(355)). If the share dividend is paid in authorized but unissued shares, the corporation must
transfer to stated capital an amount of surplus equal to: (1) if the dividend is payable in shares having
a par value, at least the aggregate par value thereof; (2) if the dividend is payable in shares without
par value, the amount fixed as stated capital by the board of directors or shareholders for such shares.
Id. § 450.1355(2) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(355)(2)). If the share dividend is paid in treasury
shares, a transfer from surplus to stated capital need not be made. Id. § 450.1355(3) (MIcH. STAT
ANN. § 21.200(355)(3)). A split-up or division of issued shares of a class or series into a greater
number of shares of the same class or series without increasing the stated capital of the corporation is
not a share dividend for purposes of these provisions. Id. § 450.1355(4) (MICH. STAT ANN §
21.200(355)(4)).
A share dividend or other distribution of shares of a corporation must be accompanied by a written
notice disclosing the amounts by which the distribution affects stated capital, capital surplus, and
earned surplus. Id. § 450.1356 (MICH STAT. ANN. § 21.200(356)). If such amounts are not determinable at the time of notice, the notice must set forth the approximate effects of the distribution on such
accounts and a statement that the amounts are not yet determinable. Id..
167. As to when a director is presumed to concur in board action, see id. § 450.1553 (MtcH
STAT. ANN § 21.200(553)).
168. Id. § 450.1551(1)(a) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(551)(1)(a)). This phraseology leaves
open the question of whether directors are liable for an illegal share dividend. See supra note 77.
169. Id. § 450.1551(1)(b) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(551)(1)(b)). It is not clear from the statute whether directors are liable for an illegal redemption of shares.
170. Id. § 450.1551(1)(a), (b) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(551)(1)(a), (b)). The imposition of
liability for the declaration of a dividend, distribution of assets, or purchase of shares contrary to any
restriction in the corporation's bylaws is puzzling, to say the least. None of the operative limitations
in the Michigan Act refers to restrictions in the bylaws. See id. §§ 450.1351, .1355, .1365, .1366
(MICH STAT. ANN §§ 21.200(351), (355), (365), (366)). The report of the Law Revision Commission provides no insight on the point, other than a reference to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-12 (West
1969) as the source provision (which does not refer to bylaw restrictions). MtCH STAT. ANN §
21.200(551) source note (Callaghan 1983).
171. MICH COMP. LAWS § 450.1551(2) (MICH. STAT. ANN § 21.200(551)(2) (Callaghan 1983)).
172. The directors' liability may be less than the amount unlawfully paid or distributed in the
event that the legally recoverable injuries suffered by the corporation's creditors and shareholders as a
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A shareholder who accepts or receives a dividend or distribution with
knowledge of facts indicating it is not authorized by the Act is liable to
the corporation for the amount accepted or received. 173
A director against whom a claim is successfully asserted for an illegal
dividend distribution or purchase is entitled to contribution from the other
directors who voted for, or concurred in, such action. 174 Upon payment to
the corporation of any amount of an improper dividend or distribution,
such a director is entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the corporation
against shareholders who received the dividend or distribution in proportion to the ainounts received by them. 175 Upon payment to the corporation
of any amount of the purchase price of an illegal purchase of shares, such
a director is entitled either to have the corporation rescind the purchase
and recover for the director's benefit the amount of the purchase price
from any seller who sold such shares with knowledge that such purchase
was illegal, or to have the corporation assign to such director such shares
76
and any claim against the seller. 1
ii.

CostImplications of the Michigan Provisions

These provisions appear to impose on the groups interested in the
amount of corporate financial distributions 177 and the groups involved in
result of the illegal action are less than the amount paid. See id. § 450.1551(1) (MICH. STAT. ANN. §
21.200(551)(1)).
173. Id. § 450.1551(3) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(551)(3)). Note that a shareholder is not by
this language liable to the corporation for an illegal purchase of the corporation's shares. But see id. §
450.1552(2)(b) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(552)(2)(b)), discussed infra note 176.
174. Id. § 450.1552(1) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(552)(1)).
175. Id. § 450.1552(2)(a) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(552)(2)(a)). This subsection does not
refer, as does the one immediately following, to shareholders who have received illegal dividends
with knowledge of their illegality. Such limitation, however, is imposed by § 551(3), which defines
the shareholders liable to the corporation for illegal dividends in terms of knowledge of their illegality. Id. § 450.1551(3) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(551)(3)). See Sullivan & Young, Officers and
Directors,18 WAYNE L. REv. 951, 958 n.50 (1972).
176. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1552(2)(b) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(552)(2)(b) (Callaghan
1983)). In the event the corporation recovers for the director's benefit, the director bears the cost of
such recovery. Id. Although the language is not entirely clear on the matter, it appears that the subsection intends purchases of shares that may be partially valid to result in-shareholder liability only to
the extent of the illegal portion of the purchase. Moreover, it is not clear under the language whether
the corporation's recovery is limited to the amount the director has paid to the corporation. Finally, if
the director pursues the option of assignment of the corporation's claim to the director, it is not clear
what the source of the corporation's claim is.
177. It appears that the Michigan Corporation Law provisions will cause a slightly larger loss of
revenue for governmental units that tax income than would result from the operation of the Model Act
provisions. The Michigan provisions permit the same recycling of surplus on share repurchases permitted under the Model Act, see supra note 83, and thus have the same bias toward share repurchases. But share repurchases may be less expensive to consummate in Michigan, see infra text
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the administration of the provisions costs that are somewhat less than
those resulting for such groups from the operation of the pre- 1980 Model
Act provisions.
Most Michigan corporations will incur essentially 178 the same costs in
determining the appropriate accounting treatment for transactions affecting their shareholders' equity accounts that they would have incurred had
they been incorporated in a Model Act state. 179 Any Michigan corporation writing up assets to reflect current fair market values' 80 and basing its
accompanying notes 186-96, than in a Model Act state, and thus more repurchases may occur as a
result of the Michigan provisions.
178. The accounting for transactions involving treasury shares under the reduction technique
used in the Michigan Act is both simpler and more certain than under the restriction technique in the
Model Act. See also de Capriles & McAniff, The FinancialProvisionsof the New (1961) New York
Business CorporationLaw, 36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1260-61 & n.166 (1961) (discussing similar
New York provisions).
179. A rapid reading of the Michigan provisions may lead one to conclude that the emphasis in
the dividend and share repurchase provisions on "surplus," rather than on "earned" or "capital"
surplus as under the Model Act, will result in less time being spent by accountants determining for
Michigan corporations which surplus account ought to be charged in connection with a transaction.
However, the notice required by Michigan Corporation Law § 351(3) in connection with dividends
from any source other than earned surplus clearly requires the same degree of accounting effort to
segregate transaction effects that is required under the Model Act. MICH. COMP LAWS § 450.1351(3)
(MIcH. STAT. ANN.§ 21.200(351)(3) (Callaghan 1983)). See also de Capriles & McAniff, supra note
178, at 1265-66 (discussing of a similar New York provision).
180. It appears the Michigan Law Revision Commission thought that unrealized appreciation
must be entered on the corporation's books before it could be the source of a dividend or share
repurchase. See LAW REVISION REPORT, supra note 135, at 83 ("definitions [of] .. . earned surplus,
capital surplus, and total assets . . .clearly permit appraisal write-ups of assets and assign these
increases to capital surplus"). Support for this position may be found in a liberal reading of MICH
CowP LAWS § 450.1110(1) (MICH. STAT. ANN § 21.200(1 10)(1) (Callaghan 1983)) (" 'Total Assets' means the total of the properties and rights entered upon the books of a corporation in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, or the current fair market value of such properties and rights."). However, the sentence following the Law Revision Commission quotation above
says "the new law clearly adopts the principle of Randall v. Bailey," 23 N.Y.S.2d 173 (Sup. Ct.
1940), affd mem., 262 A.D. 844, 29 N.Y.S.2d 512 (1941), affd, 288 N.Y. 280, 43 N.E.2d 43
(1942). LAW REVISION REPORT, supra note 135, at 83. The supreme court opinion in Randall assumes
that unrealized appreciation can be the source of a dividend even if it is not entered on the corporation's books. Randall, 23 N.Y.S.2d at 184.
If the Michigan Act can be construed to permit a dividend to be distributed out of unrealized
appreciation that is not entered on the corporation's books, it is not clear how the corporation would
account for the dividend. One possibility is that the corporation would simply debit capital surplus for
the amount of the dividend and show a deficit in capital surplus upon its financial statements. Such
treatment may be contrary to the rather vague accounting principle that distributions identified as
dividends ought to be charged to retained earnings. See FASB AccouNTING STANDARDS, JUNE 1973,
supra note 84, at 24 (Accounting Research Bull. No. 43, ch. 7B, 9 10, issued June 1953) (concerning
the appropriate accounting for small stock dividends). It is not clear whether the deviation is significant enough to require reviewing accountants to give a qualified or adverse opinion on the corporation's financial statements. It is also not clear whether the SEC would object to this presentation,
assuming that the corporation has no earned surplus and that the notes to the financial statements
adequately explain the transaction. Cf. L. RAPPAPORT, supra note 103, at 18.32-.33.
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financial statements on such values' 8' can expect to receive an adverse
opinion from any certified public accountant asked to review its financial
statements 182 and to incur increased future accounting costs 183 related to
184
the written-up assets.
181. It is possible that a corporation could write up assets on its books, but would prepare its
financial statements on the basis of generally accepted accounting principles. It would presumably
account for any dividends paid out of unrealized appreciation in the manner described supra note
180. If such accounting did not result in reviewing accountants rendering a qualified opinion, possibly the book write-up and financial statements based on generally accepted principles would also
avoid such an opinion. It is not clear, however, that preparing statements in this fashion would be in
accord with generally accepted accounting principles. Compare FASB AccoUTrNo STANDARDS,
JUNE 1973, supra note 84, at 127 (APB Opinion No. 6, 17, issued Oct. 1965) ("Whenever appreciation has been recorded on the books, income should be charged with depreciation computed on the
written up amounts." (emphasis added)) with its predecessor, FASB ACCOUNTING STANDARDS, JUNE
1973, supra note 84, at 32 (Accounting Research Bull. No. 43, ch. 9B, 2, issued June 1953) which
states, immediately after the sentence just quoted:
A company should not at the same time claim larger property valuations in its statementof assets
and provide for the amortization of only smaller amounts in its statement of income. When a
company has made representations as to an increased valuation of plant, depreciation accounting
and periodic income determination thereafter should be based on such higher amounts.
Id. (emphasis added).
182. The rules of ethics of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants make it generally unethical for a member to
express an opinion that financial statements are presented in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles if such statements contain any departure from an accounting principle promulgated by the [Accounting Principles Board and by the Financial Accounting Standards
Board] which has a material effect on the statements taken as a whole.
AMERICAN INST. OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANrs, PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS vol. B, 4581-82,
Code of Professional Ethics Rule 203 (1983). The rules contain an exception where the member can
demonstrate that due to unusual circumstances the financial statements would otherwise have been
misleading. Id.
The Accounting Principles Board has stated that "property, plant and equipment should not be
written up by an entity to reflect appraisal, market or current values which are above cost to the
entity." FASB ACCOUNTING STANDARDS, JUNE 1973, supra note 84, at 127 (APB Opinion No. 6,
17, issued Oct. 1965). See also FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING STANDARDS,
ORIGINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS, JULY 1973-JuNE 1, 1983, at 1138 (1983) (Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 12, 1 29, issued Dec. 1975) [hereinafter cited as FASB ACCOUNTING STANDARDS. 1973-1983], in which the Board excluded from its consideration market value as the only
determinant for the carrying value of certain marketable securities and adopted as a general rule that
marketable securities should be carried at the lower of cost or market, determined as of the balance
sheet date. Note that these positions are not changed by FASB AccotrTrING STANDARDS, 1973-1983,
supra, at 1400-01 (Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 33, 29-38, issued Sept.
1979), which requires large enterprises to present as supplementary information in annual reports
current cost information on inventory and property, plant, and equipment. That statement made no
change in the primary financial statements produced by those enterprises.
It thus appears that barring unusual circumstances, a corporation writing up assets for appreciation
in value must receive an adverse opinion from any reviewing certified public accountant (i.e., that the
statements are not fairly presented in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles). See
Fiflis, CurrentProblems ofAccountants' Responsibilitiesto Third Parties,28 VAND. L. REv. 31, 42
(1975).
183. When unrealized appreciation has been recorded on the corporation's books and used in the
preparation of its financial statements, the corporation must thereafter determine income using the
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Michigan corporations wishing to obtain a large or long-term loan will
incur somewhat greater costs in arranging such loans than they would
18 5
have incurred had they been incorporated in a Model Act state.
appreciated value as the accounting cost for the asset. Thus, for example, future depreciation deductions on an asset subject to depreciation would be based on the appreciated amount. See FASB AcCOUNTING STANDARDS, JUNE 1973, supra note 84, at 127 (APB Opinion No. 6,
17, issued Oct.
1965). But some controversy exists as to whether the unrealized appreciation is ultimately transferred
to earned surplus, either gradually as depreciation is taken on the appreciated asset, or in a lump sum
when the asset is retired. See D. HERWITZ. supra note 104. at 339 ed. note.
Additional accounting costs are likely to be incurred in the event the corporation desires to make a
public offering of its securities. The SEC is firmly opposed to the writing-up of assets above their cost
for purposes of preparation of prospectuses for such offerings. See L. RAPPAPORT. supra note 103, at
3.27. Thus, a corporation that has recognized unrealized appreciation presumably will be forced to
restate its accounts for such purpose.
184. There are likely to be costs other than accounting costs that result from recognition of
unrealized appreciation and from the receipt of adverse opinions on the corporation's financial statements. If the corporation has shares listed in the New York Stock Exchange, preparation of annual
financial statements not in accoro with generally accepted accounting principles appears to be a violation of the Exchange's listing agreement which could lead to delisting. See NEW YORK STOCK ExCHANGE. COMPANY MANUAL B-44 & A-294 (1968). If the corporation has securities registered with
the SEC, financial statements based on current value (and thus not prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles) filed with the Commission will be presumed to be misleading,
despite footnote or other disclosures. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-01(a)(1) (1983). Such a finding may
ultimately lead the Commission to suspend trading in the security or to impose other sanctions on the
corporation. See H. BLOOMENTHAL & S. WING. SECURITIES LAW 3-67 to -74 (1973). Credit-rating
services will almost certainly call the accountants' opinion to the attention of prospective creditors
and the corporation may thereafter encounter more difficulty in securing credit. Long-term creditors
asking for such financial statements may refuse to grant credit or may attach more stringent conditions on any loan.
185. The issue is whether long-term or large creditors dealing with Michigan corporations will
impose protective covenants either more stringently or more frequently than they would have imposed had the corporate debtors been incorporated in a Model Act state. It seems doubtful that creditors will impose more stringent covenants on Michigan corporations. The survey of listed corporations earlier noted that most covenants limit distributions to shareholders to earnings since the date of
the loan and possibly by means of a working capital test. See Kummert, supra note 10, at 374 n.63.
Such covenants, which are designed to protect creditors against the most permissive financial provisions, operate to protect creditors of Michigan corporations just as effectively as they protect creditors of Model Act corporations. It is possible, however, that creditors will impose protective covenants more often in Michigan. They may perceive certain features in the Michigan Act (e.g.,
relatively free use of capital surplus for distributions; clear authority to use unrealized appreciation)
as being more permissive than the analogous Model Act provisions. But even if creditors react in this
fashion, costs should not be significantly increased for Michigan corporations because it appears that
such covenants already turn up in many loan agreements. See id.
Preferred shareholders receive somewhat less protection under the Michigan Act than under the
Model Act. The Model Act contains a number of provisions that cause the corporations to retain net
assets in an amount at least equal to the liquidation preference of any outstanding preferred shares.
See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. CODE § 46 (1979). Under the Michigan Act, such protection exists
only to the extent that the liquidation preference of the preferred shares is less than the stated capital
of the outstanding shares in the corporation. That fact may lead counsel for new issues of preferred
shares to insert covenants protecting the shares' liquidation preference. Such covenants, however, are
not strong protection for the interest of the preferred shareholders. Moreover, the earlier survey of
preferred covenants (showing few protections of any type), see Kummert, supra note 10, at 374 n.63,
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Michigan corporations considering a proposed financial distribution to
shareholders will generally bear less cost in determining whether the distribution can be legally made than they would have incurred had they
been incorporated in a Model Act state. Consider the costs involved for a
small Michigan corporation in consummating an installment repurchase
of shares. 186 Counsel for such a corporation must resolve most of the following questions: 187 (a) how the insolvency limitation l88 applies to installment repurchases of shares; 189 (b) whether capital surplus may be reseems to indicate that counsel for the shareholders are not aggressive in seeking protections in any
event.
Trade creditors' costs in granting credit should not be any greater in extending credit to Michigan
corporations than to Model Act corporations. See supranote 88.
186. The first case interpreting the Michigan provisions involves the enforceability of a stock
purchase agreement. Davis v. Brydges, 122 Mich. App. 768, 333 N.W.2d 127 (1983).
A proposed dividend appears to raise only the following issues for counsel under the Michigan Act:
(1) if current valuation of assets is elected by the corporation, what approach to determining current
value should be used; (2) whether transactions affecting the corporation's surplus accounts have been
appropriately matched to a surplus account (so that the corporation can determine whether notice is
required under MIcH. COMp. LAWS § 450.1351(3) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(351)(3) (Callaghan
1983)); and (3) what constitutes reasonable care by the directors in effecting the dividend.
187. The following issues that counsel advising a Model Act corporation on such a transaction
might face are resolved or irrelevant under the Michigan Act: (a) whether application of the insolvency test is affected by use of a negotiable instrument or a security device (irrelevant since the
insolvency limitation is applied only at the outset, see infra note 189); (b) how the surplus test is
applied to installment repurchases of shares (resolved, outset test, by MIcH. COMp. LAws § 450.1367
(MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(367) (Callaghan 1983)); see LAW REVISION REPORT, supra note 135, at
91; (c) how the corporation's surplus is affected if the reacquired shares are cancelled (resolved,
capital surplus is created, under MICH. COMp. LAws §§ 450.1372(2), .1381(l)(c) (MIcH. STAT. ANN.
§§ 21.200(372)(2), (381)(1)(c) (Callaghan 1983)); (d) what valuation standard is to be used in valuing a corporation's assets, and thus in determining its surplus (resolved, current fair market value is
acceptable, under id. § 450.1110(1) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(110)(1)); and (e) what type of
surplus results from the corporation's recognition of unrealized appreciation (resolved, capital surplus, id. §§ 450.1106(1), .1107(1) (MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 21.200(106)(1), (107)(1)); see LAW REviSION REPORT, supra note 135, at 7-8.
If generally accepted accounting principles are used by the corporation to determine the value of its
assets, the Michigan provisions reduce the relevance in connection with share repurchases of whether
transactions affecting the corporation's surplus accounts have been appropriately matched to a surplus account. Michigan attaches no special procedures to the use of capital surplus on share repurchases. Thus, a repurchase can be effected with no concern as to whether the respective balances in
earned and capital surplus are correct (assuming total surplus is correct). However, the respective
balances still have relevance in connection with dividend distributions because of the notice requirement in Michigan Corporation Laws § 351(3) on dividends from sources other than earned surplus.
MICH. COMP. LAws § 450.1351(3) (MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(351)(3) (Callaghan 1983)). It thus
seems likely that careful counsel will continuously monitor transactions affecting the respective balances.
188. See MICH. COMp. LAWS § 450.1365(2) (MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(365)(2) (Callaghan
1983)) (restricting purchases of a corporation's own shares when the corporation is insolvent or when
the purchase would render it insolvent); id. § 450.1107(3) (MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(107)(3))
(defining insolvency).
189. The answer can be obtained from a careful reading of the statutory provisions. The insolvency limitation prohibits purchasesof a corporation's own shares when the corporation is insolvent
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duced in connection with a repurchase even though the corporation also
has earned surplus; 190 (c) if current fair market valuation is used to determine the value of the corporation's assets, and thus its surplus, what approach to determining current value is to be used; 19 1 (d) how these questions are affected if the acquiring corporation has subsidiaries, 192 or if the
or when the purchase would render the corporation insolvent. Id. § 450.1365(2) (MICH. STAT. ANN §
21.200(365)(2)). Under § 367, a corporation which has purchased its own shares out of surplus may
defer payment for the shares as agreed by it and the selling shareholder. Id. § 450.1367 (MIcH STAT.
ANN. § 21.200(367)). This statement implies that a purchase occurs at the time the shares were reacquired. It would therefore follow that under § 365 the insolvency limitation applies only at such time
(and not to later payments). Id. § 450.1365 (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(365)). Such conclusion is
buttressed by the next sentence in § 367 which states that the deferred payment obligation "constitutes
an ordinary debt of the corporation and the validity of any payment upon the debt so created is
not affected by the absence of surplus at the time of payment." Id. § 450.1367 (MICH. STAT. ANN. §
21.200(367)) (emphasis added).
The conclusion is also supported by the comments of the drafters of N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14A:7-16(6) (West 1969), the source provision for § 367 of the Michigan Corporation Laws. MICH.
STAT ANN. § 21.200(367) source note (Callaghan 1983). See also LAW REVISION REPORT, supra note
135, at 91. The New Jersey Corporation Law Revision Commission stated concerning § 14A:7-16(6):
Under subsection (6), if a purchase, otherwise lawful, is made out of surplus, any deferred
payment obligation may be treated as an ordinary liability and surplus may be charged immediately. The lawfulness of payment of such an obligation thereafter does not depend upon the
fortunes of the corporation between the time of purchase, i.e., when the shares were reacquired,
and the time of payment. So long as the corporation is solvent at the time of payment, the state
of the net worth accounts is irrelevant. The effect of insolvency upon the lawfulness of such a
payment is considered by the Commission to be the same as in the case of any other debt of the
corporation, subject to the application of settled equitable principles, and is not determined by
this Act.
N.J. STAT. ANN § 14A:7-16(6) comment (West 1969). Earlier in its discussion, the commission
announced its desire to return the law in New Jersey to the view expressed in Wolff v. Heidritter
Lumber Co., 112 N.J. Eq. 34, 163 A. 140 (1932), which also supports the conclusion stated above.
190. The Michigan Act does not specify that shares repurchased (or, for that matter, dividends)
out of surplus shall first be deducted from any earned surplus the corporation has. Moreover, the Act
does not require notice to be provided to shareholders when shares are repurchased out of capital
surplus. Such notice is required on dividends paid out of capital surplus, see MICH. COMP. LAWS §
450.1351(3) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(351)(3) (Callaghan 1983)), and is thought to encourage
exhaustion of earned surplus before dividends are charged to capital surplus. See de Capriles &
McAniff, supra note 178, at 1259. The requirement of notice on dividend payments out of capital
surplus and the lack thereof on share repurchases from the same source will encourage corporations to
charge share repurchases to capital surplus whenever possible. Such accounting may provoke a reaction from the SEC and from some accountants. See L. RAPPAPORT. supra note 103, at 18.32-.33.
191. See Hackney, supra note 106, at 819-21 (discussing the choices).
192. A Michigan corporation choosing to determine its "total assets" in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles must report its investment in a subsidiary under the equity accounting method in any case in which the corporation has significant influence over the operating and
financial policies of the investor. FASB ACCOUNTING STANDARDS. JUNE 1973, supra note 84, at 262
(APB Opinion No. 18,
17, issued March 1971). Under that method, the investor's share of the
investee's income will be included in the investor's earned surplus. Id. at 260. It is not clear whether
the investor's share of the investee's income is meant to be included within earned surplus for purposes of MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1107(1) (MICH. STAT ANN. § 21.200(107)(1) (Callaghan 1983)).
However, such amount would in any event be "capital surplus." See id. §§ 450.1106(1), .1108(a),
.1109(4) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(106)(1), (108)(a), (109)(4)). Given the relative freedom under
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acquiring corporation is a subsidiary corporation acquiring its parent's
stock; 193 and (e) what constitutes reasonable care by directors in effecting
such a transaction. 194 If the corporation elects to use current value as the
valuation standard for its assets, it probably will incur additional costs for
studies by appraisers 195 to determine current values. The corporation
must also incur the cost of an analysis of its short-term cash flows in order
to determine the effect of the proposed repurchase on its ability to pay its
debts as they become due in the usual course of its business. 196 Finally,
the Act to use capital surplus for repurchases, see supranote 190, the issue therefore is mainly related
to notice problems on future dividend payments. Id.
A Michigan corporation choosing to determine its "total assets" by determining the current fair
market value of its properties would recognize any excess of the fair market value of its investment
over its carrying value as capital surplus. See supra text accompanying note 152.
193. The issues appear to be the same as those discussed in Kummert, FinancialProvisions(pt.
3), supra note 77, at 372 n.727.
194. Section 551(2) of the Michigan Corporation Laws exempts from its provisions imposing
liability on directors for illegal dividends and share repurchases directors who have complied with §
541, its standard of care provision. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 450.1541(1), .1551(2) (MICH. STAT. ANN.
§§ 21.200(541)(1), (551)(2) (Callaghan 1983)). Section 541(1) states:
A director or an officer shall discharge the duties of his position in good faith and with that
degree of diligence, care'and skill which an ordinarily prudent man would exercise under similar
circumstances in a like position. In discharging his duties, a director or an officer, when acting
in good faith, may rely upon the opinion of counsel for the corporation, upon the report of an
independent appraiser selected with reasonable care by the board, or upon financial statements
of the corporation represented to him to be correct by the president or the officer of the corporation having charge of its books of account, or stated in a written report by an independent public
or certified public accountant or firm of such accountants fairly to reflect the financial condition
of the corporation.
Id. § 450.1541(1) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(541)(1)). The questions counsel generally must address under such provisions are virtually the same as those noted under the Model Act provisions, see
supra note 111. In the event the corporation chooses to value its assets in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles (an acceptable standard under § 110), counsel will have to reconcile
the language in the last two clauses of § 541 with that in § 110. Id. §§ 450.1110, .1541 (MICH. STAT.
ANN. §§ 21.200(110), (541)).
A recent case, Libco Corp. v. Leigh (In re Reliable Mfg. Corp.), 703 F.2d 996 (7th Cir. 1983),
suggests another issue that may arise in balance sheet surplus jurisdictions. That case involved a
purchase by Libco Corp. of all of the stock of the two individual shareholders of Reliable Manufacturing Corp. where Reliable was caused to execute a security agreement and guarantee of the purchasing company's obligation. Reliable later argued that the guarantee was unenforceable as a repurchase of its own shares which would impair its capital under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160 (1983).
Reliable, 703 F.2d at 1000-03. The court concluded that § 160 did not apply, in part because "the
policies underlying Section 160 are not implicated in this case," id. at 1002, and in part because the
corporation's capital was not at the time of the execution of the guarantee, nor by virtue of such
execution, impaired, id. at 1002-03. The court never discussed whether the execution of the guarantee constituted a dividend-i.e., incurring a debt only for the benefit of a shareholder-nor whether
the effects of such a dividend ought to be measured at the time of entry of the guarantee.
195. Note that under the second sentence of MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1541(1) (MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 21.200(541)(1) (Callaghan 1983)), apparently only appraisers can help directors on this issue.
196. That is, whether the repurchase can be made without violating the insolvency limitation.
See id. §§ 450.1365(2)(b), .1107(3) (MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 21.200(365)(2)(b), (107)(3)).
On the determination of insolvency, see the helpful comment of the ABA Committee on Corporate
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the corporation will bear the cost of directors' time devoted to the study of
lawyers' opinions, appraisals, data on cash flows, and the possibility of
directors' liability if the distribution is subsequently found to have been
illegal. Such costs should be less for a Michigan corporation than they
would have been for a Model Act corporation.
General, unsecured creditors of Michigan corporations that have made
installment repurchases of shares and that have become insolvent before
the repurchase obligation is satisfied are likely to suffer greater losses
under these provisions than they would have suffered had the corporations been incorporated under the Model Act. Under the Model Act, the
obligation to the selling shareholder is subordinated to obligations to general, unsecured creditors in the event of later insolvency. 197 But under the
Michigan Act, the obligation to the selling shareholder is accorded parity
with obligations to general, unsecured creditors if surplus at the time of
purchase equalled the purchase price. 198 If such status is honored in bankruptcy, 199 and if, as is typical, available assets in such event are less than
corporate indebtedness to general, unsecured creditors, 200 payments to
the selling shareholder by virtue of the operation of the Michigan provision serve to increase the losses suffered by general, unsecured creditors.
Because the costs involved in determining the validity of a proposed
distribution and the risks 20 1 connected with such distribution are less than
they would have been had the corporation been incorporated in a Model
Act state, costs for parties in the corporate solution related to abandoned
distributions should therefore generally be less for Michigan corporations
than for Model Act corporations. Similarly, parties connected with disputes over the impact of the Michigan provisions are likely to incur less
cost in settling or litigating a dispute than they would have incurred had
the corporation involved been a Model Act corporation. Because of the
clear availability of unrealized appreciation, common shareholders of
Michigan corporations with more than one class of shares may have fewer
Laws, infra at note 318, and Murphy, supra note 112, 855-71. Murphy raises, but does not resolve,
a question counsel may have to address in providing instruction to persons gathering cash-flow information: how long must a corporation be solvent after the distribution to escape operation of the statute?
197.

See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 6 (1979).

198. See MicH. COMP LAWS § 450.1367 (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(367) (Callaghan 1983)),
and supra note 189, concerning the operation of the insolvency limitation.
199. The incurring of such obligation may be a fraudulent conveyance under the federal bankruptcy statute or state fraudulent conveyance law. See infra Part IIIBI. If it is such, the trustee in
bankruptcy, or creditors of the corporation, can have the obligation avoided.
200. See Kummert, supra note 10, at 375 n.67.
201. See supra note 114. Note that under the Michigan Act the selling shareholder apparently is
not exposed to subordination of his or her claim in the event the corporation becomes insolvent after
(and not as a result of) the repurchase. See supra note 189.
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occasions to seek a reduction of stated capital than common shareholders
of Model Act corporations. Thus, the cost such shareholders may bear to
gain approval of such reductions should be less for shareholders of Michigan corporations than for Model Act corporations. Finally, current or prospective shareholders of publicly held corporations incorporated in Michigan attempting to gauge prospects for share prices from changes in the
corporation's dividend rate are likely to bear the same investment losses
or additional information costs they would have borne had the corporations been incorporated in a Model Act state.
iii. Benefits Resultingfrom the MichiganProvisions
These costs, although lower than the costs arising from the operation of
the Model Act provisions, produce almost precisely the same benefits that
groups interested in the amount of corporate financial distributions and
groups involved in the administration of the legal limitations received
from the operation of the Model Act provisions. 202 Such costs appear to
far exceed the benefits.
In view of the relative imbalance of costs and benefits resulting from
the operation of balance sheet surplus provisions, legislatures in states
with provisions based on that concept should consider alternative provisions 203 with more favorable cost-benefit comparisons. The next section
studies three alternatives, all of which are based on concepts other than
legal capital, and all of which provide more favorable cost-benefit comparisons.

202. The only difference in benefits received appears to be that professionals as a class will
receive somewhat smaller benefits under the balance sheet surplus provisions than under the Model
Act provisions. Lawyers as a group should receive less work as a result of the operation of the balance sheet surplus provisions than they would receive as a result of the operation of the Model Act
provisions. Appraisers should receive more work as a result of the balance sheet surplus provisions
than they would receive as a result of the Model Act provisions.
203. Recently two writers have urged that balance sheet surplus provisions in effect in their jurisdictions be amended to adopt the Amended Model Act provisions. See Note, The 1980 Amendments
to the Financial Provisions of the Model Business Corporation Act: A PositiveAlternative to the New
York Statutory Approach, 47 ALB. L. REv. 1019 (1983); Cohn, CapitalStructure, Dividends and
Redemption-Time for a Change to Florida's Corporate Code, 56 FLA. B.J. 574 (1982). See also
Note, The New York Corporate Finance Provisions: Some Problem Areas and A Need For Reform,
43 ALB. L. REV. 903 (1979) (arguing that the new Brazilian corporate financial provisions could serve
as a model for reform of the New York provisions).
Hawaii appears to be considering adoption of the Model Act provisions. See The HawaiiBusiness
Corporation Act, 3 U. HAWAII L. REV. 169, 206, 221-22,227 (1981).
A recent description of a proposed comprehensive revision of the Illinois Business Corporation Act
does not mention changes in that state's financial provisions. See Kjellenberg, 1983 Illinois Business
Corporation ActNears Completion, 71 ILL. B.J. 365 (1983).
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California imposes a series of restrictions on "distributions" by a corporation to its shareholders. 204 Distributions are defined 205 as transfers of
cash or property 206 by a corporation to its shareholders without consideration, whether by way of dividend, 207 purchase, or redemption of its
204. Alaska is considering adopting distribution provisions similar to those in California. See
Alaska H.B. 343, § 10.06.358, .360, 13th Leg., 1st Sess. (1983) (currently in the Alaska House
Labor and Commerce Committee); ALASKA H. & S.J. JOURNAL Supp. No. 11, at 64-75 (Apr. 8,
1983) (commentary on proposed Alaska Corporations Code).
205. CAL. CORP CODE § 166 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983).
206. California does not (as do the Amended Model Act, see infra note 278, and Minnesota Act,
see infra note 335) specifically include as a form of distribution the incurrence of debt by the corporation. Presumably a distribution of the corporation's long-term debt to its shareholders as a dividend
is, for purposes of the statute, a "distribution" of the corporation's property, the effect of which is
measured on the date of declaration by the corporation's board of directors. See infra text accompanying note 229.
207. Section 166 of the California Corporations Code excepts from its definition "a dividend in
shares of the corporation." CAL. CORP CODE § 166 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983). This exception was
apparently inserted lest a court be misled into believing that such a dividend represented a transfer of
property by the corporation to its shareholders. See 2 H. MARSH, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAW 130
(2d ed. 1983) (Mr. Marsh was the principal author of the California General Corporation Law taking
effect January, 1977. See I id. 9.). By analogy, shares issued in connection with a stock split also
should not be considered a "distribution." See I H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING. CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAWS 8-95 (R. Clark 4th ed. 1981). Also, by analogy, it would seem that a voluntary exchange of shares in the corporation-a recapitalization-is not a distribution. See CAL- CORP. CODE §
409(a)(2) (West 1977 & Supp. 1983) (equating such transactions with share dividends for purposes of
consideration required).
The term "share dividend" is not defined in the statute. Such dividends are distinguished in id. §
188 (West 1977) from a "stock split," which is defined as a pro rata division, other than by share
dividend, of all the outstanding shares of a class into a greater number of shares of the same class by
an amendment to the articles of incorporation stating the effect on the shares. The procedures in the
statute for share dividends requiring an increase in the number of authorized shares are different from
those for a stock split requiring a similar increase. See Ackerman & Sterrett, California'sNew Approach to Dividends and Reacquisitions of Shares, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1052, 1055 (1976). Accounting for share dividends and stock splits is left to accountants to be determined under generally
accepted accounting principles. See 2 H. MARSH, supra, at 190.
Accounting principles for stock dividends and split-ups are set forth in FASB AccOUNTING STANDARDS, JUNE 1973, supra note 84, at 22-26 (Accounting Research Bull. No. 43, ch. 7B, issued June
1953). That bulletin distinguishes between the two primarily on the basis of the desire of management
to effect a material reduction in the market price per share by means of a significant increase in
outstanding shares. See id. at 23-24, § Bl, B2, B13. If such intent exists, the issuance of shares is a
stock split and no transfer from earned surplus to capital surplus or stated capital is required other
"than to the extent occasioned by legal requirements." See id. at 25, § B 15. California has no such
legal requirements, see CAL. CORP. CODE § 409(a)(2) (West 1977 & Supp. 1983), and thus no entries
would be made. If the intent to effect a material reduction in price does not exist, the issuance is a
stock dividend for accounting purposes and a transfer equal to the fair market value of the shares must
be made from earned surplus to stated capital and capital surplus. See FASB AccoUNTING STAN-
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shares, or otherwise. 208 The term also includes such transfers to the share209
holders of a corporation by its subsidiary.
A California 2 10 corporation 21 ' with a single class of shares may not
make a proposed distribution to its shareholders unless it meets one of
two alternative tests, and meets an insolvency limitation, with respect to
the distribution. 212 A proposed distribution may not be made by a corporation unless either: (a) the corporation, immediately prior to the proposed distribution, has retained earnings at least equal to the amount of
the distribution; 2 13 or (b) the corporation, after giving effect to the proDARDS. JUNE 1973, supra note 84, at 24 (Accounting Research Bull. No. 43, ch. 7B, § BI0, issued
June 1953). Such a requirement does not apply to closely held corporations, see id. § B12, nor to
issuances of shares of a different class, see id. at 23, § B3.
Marsh reports that the drafting committees received pointed objections to the incorporation into the
statute of the treatment required by generally accepted accounting principles for share dividends. He
states that the committees made no attempt to change the accounting treatment of such dividends
because such treatment had the support of the SEC and because there was no principled basis on
which to prescribe accounting for certain transactions and not others. See 2 H. MARSH, supra, at 136.
208. The words "or otherwise" apparently were included in the statute to ensure regulation of all
transactions whereby the corporation transfers assets to shareholders and does not receive in return an
equivalent consideration in the form of assets equally available for the prior claims of creditors or
preferred shareholders. Thus, a purported salary paid to a shareholder who had rendered no services
to the corporation would be a distribution, as would a transfer of the corporation's assets to its shareholders pursuant to an informal liquidation. See 2 H. MARSH, supranote 207, at 129-30.
209. CAL. CORP. CODE § 189(a) (West 1977) defines a subsidiary for this purpose as a corporation in which shares constituting more than 50% of the voting power of that corporation are owned
directly, or indirectly through one or more subsidiaries, by another corporation. "Voting power" is
defined in id. § 194.5 as the power to vote for the election of directors at the time any determination
of voting power is made and does not include contingent voting rights.
Marsh states that the last phrase in id. § 166 and in the parallel prohibitions on distributions by
subsidiaries in id. §§ 500-503, have relevance only for purchases by the subsidiary of the parent's
shares. 2 H. MARSH, supra note 207, at 146. The validity of such purchases is determined by applying the tests discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 210-15 to consolidated statements for the
parent company and such subsidiaries as are required to be included in such statements under generally accepted accounting principles. See infra text accompanying note 226.
210. Section 2115 of the California Corporations Code applies its rules on distributions to corporations incorporated under the laws of other states which do a significant part of their business in
California and the shares of which are owned in substantial part by persons having addresses in the
state. CAL. COR'. CODE § 2115 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983). A number of issues raised by this provision in connection with planning distributions are discussed in Halloran & Hammer, Section 2115 of
the New California General CorporationLaw-the Application of California CorporationLaw to
Foreign Corporations,23 U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 1282, 1307-12 (1976). A number of constitutional
issues raised by the provision are discussed in Comment, California's New General Corporation
Law: Quasi-ForeignCorporations,7 PAc. L.J. 673,693-98 (1976).
211. The limitations in CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 500-501 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983) also apply to
any subsidiaries of the corporation. As noted supra at note 209, such a result also comes about by the
definition of a "distribution."
212. CAL. CORP. CODE § 505 (West 1977) expressly permits corporations to impose additional
restrictions upon distributions in their articles of incorporation or bylaws, or in any indenture or other
agreement entered into by the corporation.
213. Id. § 500(a) (West 1977 & Supp. 1983).
As discussed infra text accompanying notes 225 & 228, a corporation's retained earnings are deter-
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posed distribution, would have both (1) total assets (excluding goodwill,
capitalized research and development expenses, and deferred charges) at
least equal to 1 4 times its liabilities2 14 (excluding deferred taxes, de-

ferred income, and other deferred credits), and (2) current assets at least
equal to its current liabilities.
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A corporation meeting either the retained

earnings test or both of the remaining assets tests with respect to a proposed distribution may not make the distribution 21 6 if it is, or as a result of
the distribution would be, likely to be unable to meet its liabilities (except
those whose payment is otherwise adequately provided for) as they ma-

ture.217
mined in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles. The time of a distribution by way
of dividend is the date of the declaration of the distribution by the corporation's board of directors. If
such date is a significant period after the date of preparation for the corporation's most recent financial statements, directors presumably must make reasonable inquiry into events in the interim with
significant effect on the corporation's retained earnings in order to eliminate possible liability for an
illegal distribution. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 309, 316(a)(l) (West 1977 & Supp. 1983).
214. Dreyfuss, Distributions to Shareholders Under the New California General Corporation
Law, 9 Loy L. REV 839, 842 & n.16 (1976), notes that this ratio could have been expressed as a
requirement of a debt-to-equity ratio of four to one.
215. CAL CORP. CODE § 500(b)(l), (2) (West 1977 & Supp. 1983). If the average of the corporation's earnings before taxes on income and interest expense for the two preceding fiscal years was less
than the average of the corporation's interest expense for such years, current assets after giving effect
to the distribution must equal at least 1V times the corporation's current liabilities. Id. § 500(b)(2).
Difficulties in making these calculations, and possible manipulations of data, are discussed in BenDror, An Empirical Study' of Distribution Rules Under California CorporationsCode § 500: Are
CreditorsAdequately Protected?, 16 U.C.D. L. REv. 375, 385-86 & nn.53-58 (1983).
Neither of the current asset tests in California Corporations Code § 500(b)(2) applies to a corporation which under generally accepted accounting principles does not classify its assets into current and
fixed assets. Examples of such businesses are banks and real estate sales corporations. See 2 H.
MARSH. supra note 207, at 142-43.

The provisions of § 500 do not apply to any dividend declared by a regulated investment company
to the extent that such dividend is necessary to maintain the status of the company as a regulated
investment company under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. CAL. CORP. CODE § 504
(West 1977).
216. CAL. CORP. CODE § 501 (West 1977) applies to the corporation and any of its subsidiaries
considering a distribution to the corporation's shareholders. If a subsidiary is considering such a
distribution, § 501 prohibits the distribution if either the corporation or the subsidiary is, or would as
a result of the distribution become, insolvent. But even if the parent corporation is insolvent, a solvent subsidiary corporation can make a distribution to its shareholders.
217. Id. The limitation also applies to any subsidiary of the corporation attempting to make a
distribution to the corporation's shareholders.
The statute provides no enlightenment as to when a corporation (or its subsidiary) is "likely" to be
unable to meet its liabilities, or as to when liabilities are "adequately provided for." Marsh interprets
the statute as calling for an objective determination of equitable insolvency. 2 H. MARSH. supra note
207, at 148-49. He also gives as an example of a liability that is "adequately provided for" a debt
that is adequately secured. Id. at 150. He states that the definition of "adequately provided for" in
the former California act ("if payment thereof has been assured or guaranteed in good faith by a
financially responsible person") was omitted to eliminate the automatic exclusion of debts which
have been assumed or guaranteed by someone else. Id. at 151. He further states:
Of course, if it can be proven as a matter of fact that the other person assuming or guaranteeing
the debt has assumed primaryresponsibility for its payment as between him and the corporation,
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California corporations with an outstanding class or series of shares
senior to shares of another class or series with respect to either distribution of assets in liquidation or payment of dividends must satisfy additional limitations before distributions may be made to holders of the junior class or series of shares. Such corporations may not make a
distribution to holders of shares of any class or series junior to outstanding shares of any other class or series with respect to distribution of assets
on liquidation, if, after giving effect to the proposed distribution, the excess of its assets (excluding goodwill, capitalized research and development expenses, and deferred charges) over its liabilities (excluding deferred taxes, deferred income, and other deferred credits) would be less
than the liquidation preference of all shares having a preference on liquidation over the class or series to which the distribution is to be made. 218
Further, such corporations may not make a distribution to holders of
shares junior to outstanding shares of any other class or series with respect to payment of dividends unless the corporation's retained earnings
immediately prior thereto at least equal the amount of the proposed distribution plus the aggregate amount of cumulative dividends in arrears on all
shares having a preference with respect to payment of dividends over the
2 19
class or series of shares to which the distribution is to be made.
These tests and limitations do not apply to a purchase or redemption of
shares from a deceased shareholder to the extent that such reacquisition is
made from any excess of proceeds received by the corporation from inand is in fact going to pay it, then the determination of the factual issue as to whether the corporation is likely to be able to meet its liabilities as they mature can properly take cognizance of
that situation.
Id. at 151. But see Ackerman & Sterrett, supra note 207, at 1059 (arguing the former definition
should continue to be applied); H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 207, at 8-14 (arguing that
the definition of "adequately provided for" in California's corporate dissolution provisions, CAL.
CORP. CODE § 2005 (West 1977), ought to be applied to § 501).
218. CAL. CORP. CODE § 502 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983). Such a limitation again applies to any
subsidiaries of the corporation. Section 502 also contains a clause governing computation of the
liabilities of a corporation making payments on an installment repurchase of shares. See infra note
225.
219. CAL. CORP. CODE § 503 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983). Such a limitation again applies to
subsidiaries of the corporation. Section 503 also contains a clause governing computation of the
retained earnings of a corporation making payments on an installment repurchase of shares. See infra
note 225.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 1306 (West 1977) provides that to the extent the provisions of its distributions
chapter prevent the payment to any holders of dissenting shares (this term is defined in id. § 1300(b)
(West 1977 & Supp. 1983)) of their fair market value, they shall become creditors of the corporation
for that amount plus interest at the legal rate on judgments until the date of payment. Such debt is to
be paid when permissible under the California distribution provisions and is subordinate to all other
creditors in any liquidation proceeding. Thus, contrary to the former California law (see former CAL.
CORP. CODE § 1706 (repealed 1975), which made an exception to the restrictions on repurchases of
shares for repurchases from dissenters), the distribution provisions now apply to corporate purchases
of dissenting shares.
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surance on the life of the shareholder over premiums paid by the corporation for such insurance and where such reacquisition executes an agreement between the corporation and the deceased shareholder to reacquire
the shares on the death of the shareholder. 220 Further, none of California's provisions regulating distributions apply to any proceeding for voluntary or involuntary dissolution. 22 1 Finally, notwithstanding the provisions set forth above, a negotiable instrument issued by a corporation for
the purchase or redemption of shares is enforceable by a holder in due
course without notice that it was issued for such purpose. 222
California corporations distributing dividends 223 that are not charged to
retained earnings must provide a notice to shareholders identifying the
dividend as having been made from a source other than retained earnings
4
and stating its accounting treatment. 22
California provides that all references to financial statements and to assets, liabilities, earnings, retained earnings, and similar accounting items
of a corporation mean such financial statements or items prepared or determined in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles
then applicable, fairly presenting in conformity with such principles the
matters they purport to present, subject to any specific accounting treatment required by a section of the law. 225 California further provides that
220. CAL CORP. CODE § 503.1 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983). This exception was enacted to prevent creditors from acquiring a "windfall" (i.e., the excess of the proceeds over the premiums paid)
thought to exist if, despite the existence of such an excess, the rules in id. §§ 500-503 prohibited the
purchase or redemption of the shares. See 2 H. MARSH. supra note 207, at 157. Marsh points out that
even though such distributions are thus freed of the insolvency limitation in § 501, the provisions of
the California (Uniform) Fraudulent Conveyance Act still apply and may prohibit the purchase or
redemption in the event of financial difficulty. Id.
221. CAL CORP. CODE § 508 (West 1977). The provisions in the distributions chapter, id. §§
500-511 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983), also do not apply to any purchase or redemption by an open-end
investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-I to 64 (1982), of shares redeemable at the option of the holder, as long as the right of redemption remains
unsuspended under the provisions of that Act and the bylaws of the corporation. CAL CORP. CODE §

504 (West 1977).
222. CAL. CORP. CODE § 511 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983). A person who acquires the instrument
through such a holder may also enforce it.
223. All forms of distribution other than dividends are free of this requirement. See id. § 507
(West 1977). Marsh states that repurchases of shares, the most common non-dividend form of distribution, will normally be reflected in the corporation's financial statements. 2 H. MARSH. supra note
207, at 190. California requires that financial statements be distributed to shareholders of most corporations. See CAL. CORP- CODE § 1501 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983).
224. CAL CORP. CODE § 507 (West 1977). The notice must either accompany the dividend or be
given within three months after the end of the fiscal year in which the dividend is paid.
225. Id. § 114 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983). Marsh states that the drafting committees decided to
use generally accepted accounting principles to define accounting items in the statute in order to avoid
the need for corporations to maintain a special set of accounting records for use in distribution decisions. 2 H. MARSH. supra note 207, at 132-33.

The California statute specifies required accounting treatment in the following sections: (a) sections 500(b)( 1) (the first part of the alternate remaining assets test, see supra text accompanying note

Restrictions on Corporate Distributions
unless otherwise stated, all references in its law to financial statements for
214) and 502 (the limitation for corporations that have shares with a liquidation preference outstanding, see supra text accompanying note 218) provide that in determining the corporation's assets,
goodwill, capitalized research and development expenses, and deferred charges are excluded; (b) the
same sections provide that in determining the corporation's liabilities, deferred taxes, deferred income, and other deferred credits are excluded; (c)section 500 (the retained earnings test, and both
remaining assets tests) provides that in determining the amount of the assets of the corporation, profits Jerived from an exchange of assets are excluded unless the assets received are currently realizable
in cash; (d) section 500 also provides that in determining a corporation's current assets, the corporation may include net amounts which the board of directors has determined in good faith may reasonably be expected to be received from customers during the 12-month period used in calculating current liabilities pursuant to existing contractual relationships obligating such customers to make fixed
or periodic payments during the term of the contract, or in the case of public utilities, pursuant to
service connections with customers, after in each case giving effect to future costs not then included
in current liabilities but reasonably expected to be incurred by the corporation in performing such
contracts or providing service to utility customers; (e)sections 500 and 503 (the limitation for corporations that have shares with a dividend preference outstanding) provide that for purposes of the
application of the respective sections to a distribution of cash or property by a corporation in partial or
complete payment of an obligation incurred in a repurchase of shares, the corporation's retained
earnings shall be increased by the lesser of (1)any deduction from retained earnings made when the
obligation was incurred, or (2) the unpaid principal of the obligation immediately prior to the distribution; and (f)
sections 500 and 502 provide that for purposes of the application of the respective
sections to a distribution of cash or property by a corporation in partial or complete payment of an
obligation incurred in a repurchase of shares, the amount of the corporation's liabilities shall be reduced by the lesser of (1)any addition to its liabilities made when the obligation was incurred, or (2)
the principal balance of the obligation remaining unpaid after the distribution. CAL. CORP.CODE §§
500-503 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983).
The assets specified in id. §§ 500(b)(1) and 502 are excluded because "they are of no value to
creditors if there should have to be a liquidation of the corporation." 2 H. MARSH,supra note 207, at
138. The liabilities specified in the same sections are excluded "because they do not represent any
obligation of the corporation actually to pay money to anyone at any time." Id. Profits derived from
an exchange of assets are excluded apparently because of their resemblance to recognition of unrealized appreciation. Id. at 141. (It
is unclear whether such exclusion applies to both the retained earnings test and the remaining assets tests. Marsh interprets the exclusion as applying only to the latter.
Id. at 140. But in H. BALLANTiNE & STERLING, supra note 207, at 8-13, it is suggested that the
exclusion may also apply to the retained earnings test.) Profits to be derived in the next 12 months as
a result of existing contracts or service connections may be included as a current asset "to deal
realistically with certain types of corporations [e.g., one renting residential property] that may have
accrued liabilities in substantial amounts, which are reasonably expected to be discharged out of
payments from customers under contracts." Id. at 8-12. The calculations specified for the retained
earnings and liabilities of a corporation making payments on an installment repurchase of shares are
made to reverse accounting entries which may have been made at the time the promissory note was
issued (which otherwise would have resulted in a reduction of retained earnings and an increase in
liabilities). Such action was thought to be necessary to avoid "any duplication of the amount of
retained earnings or net worth required to satisfy those tests [those stated in §§ 500-503]." 2 H.
MARSH, supra note 207, at 136.
Present § 500, as originally enacted, stated that in determining the amount of the assets of a corporation no appreciation in value should in any event be included, except with respect to readily marketable securities. See Act of Sept. 12, 1975, ch. 682, sec. 7, § 500(b), 1975 Cal. Stat. 1514, 1555.
Such provision was deleted by a 1977 amendment, Act of July 7, 1977, § 5.7, 1977 Cal. Stat. 1041,
1054, because "generally accepted accounting principles do not in any event permit the write-up of
the value of assets on the basis of appraised values, and it was thought that the exception relating to
marketable securities might be too broad." 2 H. MARSH. supranote 207, at 140-40.1.
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a corporation mean, in the case of a corporation with subsidiaries, consolidated statements of the corporation and such of its subsidiaries as are
required to be included in such statements under generally accepted accounting principles then applicable. References to accounting items for
such corporations mean such items determined on a consolidated basis in
226
accordance with such consolidated financial statements.
The amount of any distribution payable in property is deemed to be the
value at which the property is carried on the corporation's financial state227
ments in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.
The time of any distribution by way of dividend is the date of its declaration by the corporation's board of directors. 228 The time of any distribution by purchase or redemption of shares is generally the date cash or
property is transferred by the corporation, whether or not pursuant to an
earlier contract. 229 However, where a negotiable debt security 230 is issued
by the corporation in exchange for shares, the time of such distribution is
23
the date when the corporation acquires the shares in such exchange. '
When a corporation acquires 232 its own shares, such shares generally
are restored to the status of authorized but unissued shares. 233 If, however, the corporation's articles of incorporation prohibit the reissuance of
acquired shares, the acquisition causes the authorized number of shares of
the class or series, if any, to which such shares belonged to be reduced by
the number of shares acquired. The corporation's articles of incorporation
2 34
must then be amended to reflect the reduction in authorized shares.

226. CAL. CORP CODE § 114 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983). These provisions also mean that a
subsidiary corporation, without subsidiaries of its own, must determine its ability to make distributions to its shareholders on the basis of its own financial statements.
227. Id. § 500 (West 1977).
228. Id. § 166.
229. Id. The section also states that a sinking fund payment in cash or property is deemed transferred for purposes of the section at the time it is delivered to a trustee for the holders of preferred
shares to be used for the redemption of such shares or physically segregated by the corporation in
trust for that purpose.
230. Section 166, id., incorporates by reference the definition of a "security" from CAL. CONI
CODE § 8102(1) (West 1977 & Supp. 1983) (i.e., an instrument in bearer or registered form, of a type
commonly dealt in upon securities exchanges or markets or commonly recognized as a medium for
investment, that is either one of a class or series or by its terms divisible into a class or series of
instruments).
231. CAL- CORP, CODE § 166 ( West 1977).
232. Id. § 5 10(a) (refers to purchases, redemptions, and other acquisitions of shares).
233. Id. This provision eliminates the concept of treasury shares from California law. See H.
BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, supra note 207, at 8-79.
234. CAL. CORP CODE § 510(b) (West 1977). If all of the authorized shares of any class or series
are acquired, and their reissue is prohibited, then the articles of incorporation must be amended to
eliminate any statement of rights related solely to such class or series.

232

Restrictions on Corporate Distributions
Directors of a California corporation who approve2 35 the making of a
distribution to its shareholders contrary to the California tests and limitations,236 and who have not performed their duties in accordance with the
California standard of performance 37 in so doing, are jointly and.severally liable to the corporation for the amount of the illegal distribution. 238
Shareholders who receive a distribution prohibited by the California provisions with knowledge of facts indicating the impropriety thereof are liable to the corporation for the amount so received.2 39
Directors sued for having made an illegal distribution may implead any
other directors liable therefor and compel contribution, either in the same
action or in an independent action. 240 Directors liable for an illegal distribution are also entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the corporation
against shareholders who received the distribution. 24 1
Any shareholder sued for knowingly having received an illegal distribution may implead all other shareholders liable therefor and may compel
contribution, either in the same action or in an independent action. 242
ii. Cost Implications of the CaliforniaProvisions
These provisions appear to impose on the groups interested in the
amount of corporate financial distributions, and the groups involved in
the administration of the provisions, costs that are less than those resulting for such groups from the operation of either the pre-1980 Model Act

provisions or the Michigan provisions.
235. Directors deemed to have approved the action are defined in id. § 316(a)(2) (West 1977 &
Supp. 1983).
236. Section 316(a)(1) refers specifically to the provisions in id. §§ 500-503. Id. § 316(a)(I).
237. The standard of performance is set forth in id. § 309 (West 1977). Subsection 309(c) absolves the director from liability if the director meets the standards in subsections (a) and (b).
238. Section 316(d) of the California Corporations Code limits damages recoverable from the
director to an amount not exceeding the liabilities of the corporation owed to nonconsenting creditors
at the time of the violation and the injury suffered by nonconsenting shareholders. Id. § 316(d) (West
1977 & Supp. 1983).
239. Id. § 506(e) (West 1977). The subsection limits such shareholder's liability to the liabilities
of the corporation owed to nonconsenting creditors at the time of the violation and the injury suffered
by nonconsenting shareholders.
Section 506(d) provides that nothing in this section affects any liability which a shareholder may
have under the provisions of the California (Uniform) Fraudulent Conveyance Act. Id. § 506(d).
Marsh states that "[t]his subdivision makes clear that these provisions [in the Corporations Code] are
separate and independent from the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act and that a plaintiff may sue
under either or both if he can assert a cause of action under either or both." 2 H. MARSH, supra note
207, at 17 1. Compare the position of the Amended Model Act, discussed infra at text accompanying
notes 295-96.
240. CAL. CoRP. CODE § 316(e) (West 1977 & Supp. 1983).
241. Id. § 316(0(1).
242. Id. § 506(c) (West 1977).
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As noted above, the California provisions mandate that, subject to any
specific accounting treatment required by a particular section, accounting
items necessary for application of the various tests and limitations are to
be prepared or determined in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.243 Relatively few of the mandated exceptions appear to
translate into a required accounting treatment for specified transactions
for purposes of financial statement preparation. 244 Thus, it would appear
that a California corporation requesting certification of its financial statements by a public accountant should incur little increased cost 245 in that
endeavor as a result of the operation of the California provisions.
It appears that lenders 246 will be slightly less inclined to impose protec243. Id. § 114 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983).
244. Thus, for example, none of the specified accounting treatments discussed supra at note 225
require, or are likely to cause, accountants to change the way the items specified are reported on
financial statements prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. Indeed,
some of the specified accounting items (e.g., the rules regarding calculation of retained earnings and
liabilities for corporations making payments on installment repurchases of shares) were inserted in
the statute to facilitate what accountants perceived as the generally accepted means of reporting a
transaction. See 2 H. MARSH. supra note 207, at 136. On the other hand, it is hard not to read the
statute as mandating that California corporations segregate shareholders' equity in a way that a corporation's retained earnings can be determined. It is true that generally accepted accounting principles
currently require such segregation, see supra note 84, but it seems that that requirement is a function
of a perceived legal requirement for such segregation and that accountants freed of such constraint
would not continue to make such segregation.
245. There are likely to be some costs incurred until accountants arrive at generally accepted
solutions for the reporting of certain types of distributions by California corporations. Generally accepted accounting principles provide no ready answer to such questions as: (a) what account should
be charged in the event a distribution is permissible and made under the remaining assets tests in §
500(b) (retained earnings, so as to create a deficit, or some other account); (b) what is the effect of a
distribution from consolidated retained earnings by a corporation with a subsidiary upon the subsidiary's separate statement retained earnings if such retained earnings are an important part of the consolidated retained earnings; (c) what account(s) is (are) charged if a purchase or redemption of shares is
made out of retained earnings (paid in capital and retained earnings, or just retained earnings)? It is
possible that such costs may be reduced if accountants accept simpler shareholder equity accounts in
response to the California provisions.
246. It appears that preferred shareholders (who in general appear to demand such covenants less
often than lenders, see Kummert, supra note 10, at 374 n.63), will demand such covenants about as
often from California corporations as from Model Act corporations. The protection afforded by CAL
CORP. CODE § 502 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983) to liquidation preferences of preferred shares covers all
forms of distribution (compare § 502 with MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 6 (1979), which affords no
such protection on repurchases of shares) and excludes specified intangible assets. It might therefore
appear that counsel would dispense with covenants preserving net assets equal to the liquidation
preference of the preferred shares. But counsel considering the protection offered by § 502 may still
impose a covenant designed to prevent distributions when the remaining net assets are less than the
liquidation preference of all shares having prior or equal rights on liquidation. See Ackerman &
Sterrett, supra note 207, at 1071-72. And counsel will discover that the protection afforded by § 503
not only suffers from the same defect but also does not approach the protection offered by a typical
limitation of distributions to earnings accruing after the shares have been issued. These factors should
lead careful California counsel to insert protective covenants in preferred share agreements just as
often as do counsel in Model Act states.

Restrictions on Corporate Distributions
tive covenants 247 in long-term debt indentures entered into by California
corporations than they would have been had the corporations involved
been incorporated in either a balance sheet surplus or a Model Act jurisdiction. Thus, costs related to the insertion and enforcement of such covenants should be slightly lower than such costs for corporations incorporated in either a balance sheet surplus or a Model Act state.
California corporations that do not regularly prepare financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles 248
247. Creditors probably do not place great weight on their perceptions of the permissiveness of
the law of the debtor's state of incorporation in deciding whether to require covenants. Economy in
such transactions requires covenants to be drafted for numerous transactions, and thus to cover transactions in the most permissive state. Credit losses and the availability of money obviously are also
major influences on the decision to require covenants.
Nevertheless, several factors point toward the mildly reduced use of protective covenants by lenders. First, the new financial tests (i.e., those in CAL. CORP. CODE § 500(b) (West 1977)) are said to
be modelled after restrictions placed on borrowers by institutional lenders, see Ackerman & Sterrett,
supra note 207, at 1053 & n.7, and to that extent may serve to reduce the number of covenants
inserted. Second, comparative analysis of the California provisions and the provisions in all other
states shows a number of significant protections for creditors in the California act that are absent
elsewhere (e.g., a conservative valuation standard-that prescribed by generally accepted accounting
principles-is used in California, which results in a prohibition of the use of unrealized appreciation
as a source for distributions; California subjects redemptions and purchases of shares to the same
limitations that are imposed on dividends; California eliminates exceptions for certain types of repurchases of shares found in most statutes; California eliminates "nimble" dividends and dividends by
wasting-asset corporations; and California eliminates possible distributions from surplus arising from
reduction of stated capital). All such changes should make creditors less likely to impose protective
covenants in cases where the cost-benefit analysis of such insertions was already fairly close prior to
the California amendments.
On the other hand, close analysis of the California provisions will reveal that on certain occasions
long-term lenders are not as well protected by the California Act as are preferred shareholders. See A.
FREY, J. CHOPER, N. LEECH & C. MORRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORU'ORATIONS 1056 (2d ed.
1977) (comparing permissible distributions by a corporation with substantial purchased goodwill and
some retained earnings using alternatively preferred shares or long-term debt for long-term financing). It can also be argued that the California provisions may result in more installment repurchases of
shares than would result under either the Model Act or the Michigan provisions. See infra notes
266-68. More importantly, the California provisions do not provide long-term creditors with the
most common protection appearing in protective covenants, i.e., a limitation of distributions to net
earnings after the loan in question. See Kummert, supra note 10, at 374. Furthermore, a recent empirical study demonstrates that the more stringent of the California tests, that of § 500(b), is a relatively poor predictor of whether the corporation will end up in bankruptcy. See Ben-Dror, supranote
215, at 387-404.
On balance, it appears that a mild reduction in the number of covenants imposed should nevertheless occur in those situations where the creditor is not regularly a long-term lender, where the debt
involved is not large, where the costs of preparing such a covenant bulk large because of the probability of infrequent use, and where the term of the debt is relatively short.
248. In 1 H. BALLANTrNE & G. STmRU G, supra note 207, at 8-18 (footnote omitted) it is advised:
In applying these meanings to the various terms and in determining whether a corporation can
make a distribution at any given time, however, the board of directors of a corporation (or anyone else attempting to determine whether a distribution can be made) should do so only on the
basis of financial data prepared by an accountant or other person having professional compe-
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must incur significant accounting costs 249 to prepare such statements be-

fore they can even begin to consider whether a proposed distribution can
be validly made. However, once those costs have been borne, such corporations, and those that already have recent financial statements based
on generally accepted accounting principles, should find that the cost of
advice concerning the legality of any proposed distribution other than an
installment repurchase of shares will be less than it would have been had
the corporation been incorporated in either Michigan or a Model Act
state.250
Counsel 25 1 providing advice on a proposed installment repurchase of
tence in accountancy, selected with reasonable care. Such person should be asked to advise
whether such data demonstrates that the corporation meets either the retained earnings or the
remaining assets test as of the time the distribution is deemed made, that so far as such person is
aware the corporation would meet the solvency test of Corp. C. § 501, and that other restrictions, if any, on the right to make distributions are not violated.
Such advice seems necessary to avoid liability for directors for an illegal distribution under CAL
CORP- CODE §§ 316(a)(1) & 309 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983).
249. The drafting committees received a number of objections to the reliance for accounting
items on generally accepted accounting principles, some of which focused on the costs involved for
small corporations that ordinarily did not keep their books on such a basis. See 2 H. MARSH. supra
note 207, at 135. The committees apparently decided that in view of the relative infrequency of
distributions by such corporations, such costs were less than those resulting for all corporations if a
different valuation standard were adopted. See id. at 132.
250. It appears that advice regarding dividends of cash or property, and redemptions or purchases of shares for cash or property, should be less costly for California corporations than advice on
such transactions for either a Model Act or a Michigan corporation. Once the corporation has recent
financial statements prepared in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles, it is advised in I H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING. supra note 207, at 8-18, that the corporation receive an
accountant's opinion as to the maximum amount distributable under each of the tests and limitations
in the California Act. The only issues for accountants in interpreting such tests and limitations appear
to be (a) determining items within the asset and liability exclusions in CAL. CORP CODE §§ 500(b)(1)
& 502 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983), (b) the amount of the corporation's interest expense for purposes
of id. § 500(b)(2), (c) expected receipts for the 12-month period used in calculating current liabilities
from contracts or service connections providing fixed or periodic payments, less expected costs related thereto not reflected in current liabilities, for purposes of id. § 500, and (d) transactions affected
by, and the resulting effect of, the exclusion from assets in id. § 500 of profits from an exchange of
assets not currently realizable in cash. See I H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING. supra note 207. at 8-22
to -29. Such matters should be considerably less costly to determine than the issues set forth supra at
notes 95 & 186. It is possible, however, that a previous installment repurchase may complicate these
questions. Assume the corporation has repurchased shares in an earlier accounting period in exchange
for a promissory note, the terms of which call for no installments of principal to be paid during the
current year. Assume also that the corporation on the advice of its accountants reduced retained earnings and increased its liabilities by the amount of the promissory note at the time of the repurchase.
See infra note 259. If the corporation is considering another distribution (e.g., a dividend to its shareholders), apparently the reversing entries provided in § 500 are not made (the language applies to "a
distribution . . . of cash or property in payment in whole or in part of" the repurchase obligation,
CAL CORP- CODE § 500 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983)). If this results, and if "proper" accounting for a
repurchase, see infra note 259, permits accounting for the repurchase in a way that avoids this result.
the operation of the statute will virtually force accountants to adopt acceptable accounting methods
other than the immediate reduction method.
251. It should be noted that while the issues presented on other forms of distribution are almost
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shares by a California corporation must resolve a number of difficult substantive and planning issues: 252 (a) whether any instrument issued to evidence the corporation's indebtedness on the repurchase should be negotiable, 253 and if so, how a later transfer of the instrument to a holder in due
course without notice 254 of the purpose for its issuance will affect the corporation's ability to make distributions under the California tests and limitations;25 5 (b) whether the lien created by a mortgage given by the corporation to secure its indebtedness under the repurchase agreement is
enforceable even though payments by the corporation on the indebtedness
exclusively within the accountant's area of expertise, see supra note 250, the issues presented by
installment repurchases of shares are almost exclusively legal.
252. The discussion that follows does not concern itself with those purchases or redemptions of
shares in which the corporation exchanges a negotiable debt security for such shares. CAL. CORP.
CODE § 166 (West 1977) provides that such distributions are tested at the outset-the time when the
shares are acquired. Apart from legal issues related to the determination of whether debt issued is a
negotiable debt security, see supranote 230, such distributions are in effect treated by the California
provisions as purchases or redemptions for property, and thus present issues like those discussed
supra at note 250.
253. It appears that most corporations would prefer that any such note be non-negotiable, particularly in view of the possible consequences of a transfer of a negotiable instrument to a holder in due
course without notice of the purpose for its issuance. See infra note 255. On the other hand, it appears
that most selling shareholders would prefer the instrument to benegotiable, as such status appears to
cost them little directly and provides obvious advantages in the event of later transfers. Given the
possible consequences of a later transfer to a holder in due course, however, some corporations might
pay less for the shares if the obligation is evidenced by a negotiable instrument.
254. It seems clear that corporations desiring to avoid the possibility of a transfer of a negotiable
instrument to a holder in due course without notice can do so simply by conspicuously noting on the
face of any such instrument that it was issued in connection with a repurchase of shares and that the
corporation's ability to perform its obligations under the instrument are regulated by CAL. CORP.
CODE § 500-503 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983). Such a statement appears to satisfy the "notice" required by CAL. COM. CODE § 1201(25) (West 1977 & Supp. 1983).
255. The California provisions provide no clear answer on this question. It is possible that the
legislature intended that the general rule in CAL. CORP. CODE § 166 (West 1977) (i.e., that the time of
a distribution by purchase or redemption of shares is the date cash or property is transferred by the
corporation) be applied as payments are made on the instrument, since no exception appears therein
for negotiable instruments transferred to holders in due course without notice. But that construction is
inconsistent with the treatment afforded by the same section to shares acquired in exchange for negotiable debt securities (i.e., the time of such a distribution is the date when the corporation acquires
shares in exchange for the debt securities). Marsh states that such outset treatment is necessary to
avoid misleading future purchasers of the debt securities regarding their status as owners of an unconditional liability of the corporation. See 2 H. MARSH, supranote 207, at 161. A negotiable instrument
issued in a repurchase transaction acquires the same unconditional status when it is assigned to a
holder in due course without notice.
The treatment of negotiable instrument transfers most consistent with the general California distribution scheme appears to be an immediate reduction of the corporation's ability to make a distribution by the amount of the corporation's liability on the repurchase obligation. The corporation's retained earnings should be reduced by such amount and the obligation should be recognized (if it was
not previously, see infra note 259) as a liability for purposes of the remaining assets test in CAL.
CORP. CODE § 500(b)(1) (West 1977 & Supp. 1983). It is less clear how one reaches such results
under the statute. Presumably one must find authority for such action in the implications of id. § 511,
for such results are hard to square with the language in id. 88 166 & 500.
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would be prohibited by one or more of the California tests and limitations;
(c) what types of provisions to insert in the repurchase agreement concerning the status of the selling shareholder 257 in the event of extended
default by the corporation on the repurchase obligation resulting from its
inability to meet the California tests and limitations on required installments; 258 (d) how to account for installment repurchases under the California provisions; 259 and (e) what constitutes reasonable care by directors
256

256. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in Walsh v. Patema (In re
National Tile & Terrazzo Co.), 537 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1976), that a mortgage of real property given
to secure a promissory note for a repurchase of shares was enforceable in the subsequent bankruptcy
of the corporation even though the prior California law prohibited payments on the note itself. Marsh
argues that the view of the dissent in NationalTile is a more accurate statement of prior law (that the
arrangment was a device "to take the risk out of risk capital to the prejudice of present and future
creditors") and that there was no intention on the part of the drafting committees to relax prior law on
the subject. 2 H. MARSH. supra note 207, at 160.
Note that if a mortgage lien can be enforced despite statutory prohibitions against making payments on the underlying indebtedness, counsel must then face the question of what effect creation of
the lien had on the corporation's ability to make distributions. See supra note 255.
257. The California Act provides no assistance on the question of the status of the selling shareholder during the term of the repurchase agreement. Marsh states that the selling shareholder holds
"something other than an unconditional liability of the corporation." 2 H. MARSH, supra note 207, at
161.
The Act is somewhat clearer on the status of the selling shareholder's shares during the term of the
agreement. CAL. CORP. CODE § 510 (West 1977) provides that when a corporation purchases or otherwise acquires its own shares, such shares are restored to the status of authorized, unissued shares
(unless the articles of incorporation require cancellation thereof). However, the Act is not clear as to
when a corporation purchases or acquires shares under an installment repurchase contract. It appears
that given the conditional nature of the corporation's liability, the shares usually would not be purchased or acquired until its obligation is satisfied. But the repurchase agreement can, of course, specify an earlier transfer of the shares to the corporation.
258. In Herwitz, supra note 98, at 314-15, the problem is discussed in the context of a former
50% shareholder faced with a surplus cut-off provision and possible planning techniques are suggested. Herwitz points out that the planning task becomes considerably less important if the cut-off
involved is an insolvency limitation. Id. at 314. See also the valuable discussion of the problem under
the Model Act in Neimark v. Mel Kramer Sales, Inc., 102 Wis. 2d 282, 306 N.W.2d 278, 284-85
(1981).
259. The 1982 amendments to §§ 500, 502, and 503 of the California Corporations Code were
made to accommodate the accounting entries that some accountants asserted were required by generally accepted accounting principles for a repurchase of shares for a promissory note: a reduction of
the corporation's retained earnings, and an increase of the corporation's liabilities, both equal to the
amount of the note. See 2 H. MARSH. supra note 207, at 136. Marsh states that "it was not certain
that all accountants would agree with this treatment, or that it was the proper accounting treatment in
light of the California statutory provisions." Id.
The "proper" accounting entries for the repurchase transaction itself are in doubt. Marsh's statement, quoted supra note 257, assumes that the corporation has a conditional liability on the repurchase. It is a fairly easy series of steps from that assumption to the accounting entries with which
Marsh disagrees. Conditional liabilities fall within the category of what accountants call "contingent
liabilities" (those dependent upon the occurrence of one or more future events to confirm their existence). Contingent liabilities are recorded as liabilities if information available at the time indicates
that it is probable that a liability has been incurred and if the amount thereof can be reasonably
estimated. See FASB ACCOUNTING STANDARDS, 1973-1983, supra note 182, at 1033 (Statement No.

238

Restrictions on Corporate Distributions
in effecting such a transaction. 260 These costs for advice may bulk as
large as those for a Michigan corporation on such a transaction, but they
should be less than such costs for a Model Act corporation on such a
transaction.
A California corporation considering a proposed distribution must incur the cost of an analysis of its short-term cash flows to determine
whether the proposed distribution may result in the corporation likely being unable to meet its liabilities as they mature. 26 1 They must also bear
5, issued March 1975). The balancing debit, which in the past might have been made to "treasury
shares," under the California system is ultimately made to retained earnings. While such an entry
would set up the possibility of double charges to retained earnings (once at the time of the transaction,
and again as payments are made) which the 1982 amendments were designed to avoid, it may provide
a more realistic picture of the corporation's ability to make other distributions.
It is unfortunate that Marsh offers no hint as to what is "proper" accounting treatment of an installment repurchase. Assuming the method described above is incorrect, one is left with two other approaches. The first would adopt an alternate way of viewing the transaction and treat it as if it were a
series of independent purchases in which the corporation's liability on a particular purchase did not
come into being until the corporation was able to satisfy the distribution limitations for that purchase.
This view is consistent with the timing provisions in CAL. CORP. CODE § 166 (West 1977) and does
not appear to cause problems with the application of the tests and limitations in id. § 500-503 (West
1977 & Supp. 1983) to the transaction. But even assuming that extensive disclosure is made in the
corporation's financial statements regarding the transaction, such an approach appears to understate
significantly the corporation's long-term liabilities on its financial statements, and in most cases, is
quite inconsistent with the expectations of all shareholders in the corporation concerning when the
shares are acquired, what the parties' rights are in the event of default, whether the shares vote, what
the corporation's ability is to make other distributions, etc.
A second approach would adopt the first view of the transaction, but with different entries. It
appears appropriate to recognize the corporation's liability at the time the transaction is entered into.
However, the charge to retained earnings, given later reductions thereof as payments are made, perhaps should be replaced by a debit to a negative shareholder equity account (under some title like
"shares subject to conditional repurchase obligation"). Pursuant to the amendment of id. § 500, the
liability would be disregarded for application of the remaining assets tests.
260. Directors will be relying on opinions of counsel and independent accountants in entering
into such transactions. Under CAL. CORP. CODE § 309 (West 1977), directors may rely on such opinions in matters the directors believe to be within the professional's competence, as long as they "act
in good faith, after reasonable inquiry when the need therefor is indicated by the circumstances and
without knowledge that would cause such reliance to be unwarranted." The issues presented above
may require special inquiry into the professional's competence to deal with them in order to satisfy
the duty of reasonable inquiry.
261. Section 501 appears to raise issues not presented by the definitions of insolvency appearing
in the Model Act (see supra text accompanying note 59) and the Michigan Act (see supra text accompanying note 153). Id. § 501. Thus, there may be some substantive difference in asking (as California
does) whether as a result of a proposed distribution the corporation would be likely to be unable to
meet its liabilities as they mature, rather than asking (as both the Model Act and the Michigan Act do)
whether as a result of the distribution the corporation would be unable to meet its debts as they
become due in the ordinary course of the corporation's business. And, as previously noted (see supra
note 217), there is a clear issue as to when payment of liabilities is "adequately provided for" under
the California statute. But neither issue should result in substantial increases in counsel costs for
corporations. The first at most means that a slightly lower probability of insolvency will trigger the
California provision than is required for the other provisions. The second by itself should be productive of few disputes in operation. As Marsh points out, if a creditor has security for a debt, and thus
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the cost of directors' time devoted to the study of accountants' reports,
lawyers' opinions, data on cash flows, and the possibility of directors'
liability if the distribution is subsequently found to have been illegal.
Such costs should be less than they would have been had the corporations
been incorporated in either a balance sheet surplus or a Model Act state.
It appears that the costs for parties in the corporate solution related to
proposed distributions abandoned after study should be less for California
corporations than they would have been had such corporations been incorporated in either a balance sheet surplus or a Model Act state. The

most significant of such costs are likely to arise in abandoned installment
repurchases of shares. 262 California's installment-by-installment test for

most of such repurchases 263 is easier to satisfy at the time of the making
of the contract than the tests under either the Model Act 264 or the Michigan Act. 265 On the other hand, the California test also presents the selling
shareholder with increased risks during the period of performance on the
contract, 266 as compared with the risks faced by a selling shareholder durthe debt is adequately provided for, the collateral for the secured creditor's debt is not available to
meet liabilities of other creditors. 2 H. MARSH. supra note 207, at 150. Thus, a finding that a liability
is adequately provided for may increase the probability of equitable insolvency. In any event, such
issues must also be resolved under either the Model Act or the Michigan Act whenever secured creditors are in the picture.
On the general subject of the determination of whether a distribution will render the corporation
insolvent, see the helpful comment of the ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, infra note 318, and
Murphy, supra note 112, at 855-71.
262. See supra text accompanying note 114.
263. This test results from the definitions of the time of distribution appearing in CAL. CORP
CODE § 166 (West 1977). See supra text accompanying note 229.
264. This statement assumes that the Model Act is interpreted to impose its surplus test at the
'outset" (i.e., the time when the repurchase obligation is entered into). See supra note 102. A requirement that the corporation have a sufficient surplus at the outset to cover its entire repurchase
obligation should generally be more difficult to meet than the California requirement of meeting its
tests and limitations at the outset for only the down payment on the repurchase obligation.
265. Section 367 of the Michigan Corporations Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1367 (MIcH
STAT ANN. § 21.200(367) (Callaghan 1983)), mandates that its surplus test be applied at the outset to
installment repurchases. Thus, the analysis discussed supra at note 264 also applies to comparison of
an installment repurchase under Michigan's provisions and under the California provisions.
266. Assume that the installment obligation is not negotiable (or contains clear notice of the
underlying transaction) and that the court's interpretation in Walsh v. Paterna (In re National Tile &
Terrazzo Co.), 537 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1976) regarding the enforceability of a mortgage given as
security for the repurchase obligation is incorrect. See supra note 256. A selling shareholder entering
into such a repurchase transaction with a California corporation faces the risk that either the limitations in CAL. CORP. CODE § 500 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983) (retained earnings, remaining assets
alternative tests) or in id. § 501 (West 1977) (insolvency limitation) will prevent the corporation from
performing on the obligation. But the shareholder's ultimate financial position may differ significantly depending on which provision prevents performance. If the insolvency limitation prevents the
corporation from performing, the corporation probably will not survive. In such event, the shareholder, as holder of a claim subordinated to outside creditors, will probably realize nothing. On the
other hand, if the corporation cannot satisfy either the retained earnings or the remaining assets tests
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ing such period under either the Model Act 267 or the Michigan Act. 268 As
between these two factors, the first appears to be more significant in terms
of its influence on the parties' decisionmaking.269 Thus, it would appear
that fewer repurchases will be abandoned after study in California than
would have been abandoned had the corporations involved been incorporated in either Michigan or a Model Act state.
Parties to a dispute over the impact of the California provisions on pro270
posed or consummated distributions appear likely to incur similar costs
in settling or litigating such disputes to those that would have been in271
curred had the corporation involved been a Michigan corporation.
Current or prospective shareholders of publicly held California corporations attempting to gauge prospects for the corporation's share price
from changes in the corporation's dividend rate are likely to bear the same
investment losses or additional information costs they would have borne
had the corporations been incorporated in either a Michigan or a Model
Act state.
in connection with a particular installment, the corporation may well survive, with the ultimate possibility that the shareholder may finally collect the repurchase obligation.
267. Again, assume that the installment obligation is not negotiable, that a mortgage does not
improve the selling shareholder's position, and that the Model Act applies the surplus test at the
outset. Under such facts, the only risk the selling shareholder faces is the insolvency limitation (under
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 6 (1979) the insolvency limitation applies as each payment is made in
the installment obligation). In the event of corporate insolvency, the shareholder's fate is the same
under the Model Act provisions as under California provisions. See supranote 266. Thus, the selling
shareholder dealing with a California corporation faces the increased risk (as compared to the risk
presented by such a transaction with a Model Act corporation) that the tests in CAL. CORP. CODE § 500
(West 1977 & Supp. 1983) may prevent the corporation from performing. But since such circumstances are not likely to be permanently disabling to the corporation, such risk appears only mildly
increased over the risk the shareholder would have had in a transaction with a Model Act corporation.
268. It appears that the Michigan Act applies both its surplus and its insolvency tests to an installment repurchase at the time of the making of the contract. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1367 (MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 21.200(367) (Callaghan 1983)); discussion supra note 189. Assuming that the repurchase was validly made, the selling shareholder during the period of performance on the contract has
no greater risk than that borne by any other long-term creditor of the corporation. Such risks are much
less than those borne by a selling shareholder under the California scheme. See supra note 266.
269. The insolvency limitation has long been recognized to present risk to the selling shareholder
in such transactions. See Herwitz, supra note 98, at 305-11. Despite such risk, many repurchase
transactions have been entered into, apparently because the parties believed that insolvency would
not befall the corporation. Such action suggests that hurdles to entry into such transactions are more
important than the possibility of later cut-offs.
270. Although the California provisions have relatively few ambiguities, they nevertheless present the potential for numerous disputes involving how some unusual transaction ought to be handled
under generally accepted accounting principles. See B. MANNING, supranote 9, at 165 ("it is hard to
muster confidence in a future role of California state courts as accounting tribunals"). Such issues
appear generally analogous, in terms of litigation difficulty, to those presented when a Michigan
corporation elects to use current value as the basis for a distribution.
271. As previously noted, see supra text accompanying note 201, such costs for a Michigan
corporation should be less than they would be if the corporation had been incorporated in a Model Act
jurisdiction.
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iii. Benefits Resulting from the CaliforniaProvisions

The California provisions appear to provide greater benefits for the
groups interested in the amount of corporate financial distributions and to
groups involved in the administration of the legal limitations than are provided by either the Model Act or the Michigan Act. Senior security holders and creditors of a California corporation not subject to contractual
distribution limitations2 72 are clearly better protected than they would
have been had the corporation involved been incorporated in either Michigan or a Model Act state. Shareholders in publicly held California corporations appear to have the same prospects for stable dividends that they
would have had if the corporations involved had been incorporated in ei273
ther Michigan or a Model Act state.
These benefits appear to be less than the costs incurred by various parties as a result of the operation of the California provisions described
above. But the relative balance of costs and benefits appears to be much
closer under the California provisions than it is under either the Michigan
or Model Act provisions. Thus, for most legislatures, they appear to be a
viable alternative to distribution restrictions currently in operation.
b.

Amended Model Business CorporationAct

i.

Summary ofAmended Model Act Provisions
The Amended Model Business Corporation Act2 74 imposes limitations

272.
tion).
273.

See supra note 247 (discussion of aspects of California provisions pointing in such direcIn terms of management flexibility to make distributions, California is a distant third behind

the Michigan provisions and the Model Act provisions, respectively. Nevertheless, the presence of

the alternative tests in CAL. CORP CODE § 500(a) & (b) (West 1977 & Supp. 1983) appears to ensure
that publicly held corporations pursuing the lagged-target payout approach discussed in Kummert,
supra note 10, at 370-71, should be able to continue a target payout despite several years' adverse
earnings history.
274. The amendments to the financial provisions of the Model Business Corporation Act appear
in Changes in the Model Business CorporationAct-Amendments to FinancialProvisions, 34 Bus.
LAW. 1867 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Amendments (1979)]. The amendments were adopted by the

Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of Corporation, Banking, and Business Law, American
Bar Association, at its meeting on December 8, 1979. See Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act-Amendments to FinancialProvisions, 35 Bus LAW. 1365 (1980).

The Committee on Corporate Laws has finished a complete revision of the Model Act. See Goldstein & Hamilton, The Revised Model Business CorporationAct, 38 Bus. LAW. 1019 (1983). The

authors say very little about the financial provisions in the Amended Model Act, implying that few
changes are likely to be made in the amended financial provisions adopted in December, 1979. Id. at
1021-22.
Citations in the notes following will be to the Model Act, as amended in December, 1979, as set
out in Amendments (1979), supra. Citations to sections of the Model Act not amended in 1979 are to
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on the power of a corporation to make a "distribution" to its shareholders. A distribution is defined 275 as a direct or indirect 276 transfer of money
or other property, 277 or incurrence of indebtedness, 278 by a corporation to
MODEL BusINEss CORP. Acr (1979). Note that the Amended Model Act, when published in full, will
change the section numbering of the Act.
The Amended Model Act's financial provisions have thus far been enacted in only Montana and
New Mexico. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-711 (1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-44 (1983). Oregon has modified pre-1980 Model Act provisions with some of the Amended Model Act concepts.
See OR. REv. STAT. §§ 57.004, .035 (1983).
275. AMENDED MODEL BusINEss CORP. Acr § 2(i), Amendments (1979), supra note 274, at
1869.
276. The Committee Comments cite as an example of an indirect distribution a purchase by a
subsidiary of parent company stock where the subsidiary's actions are controlled by the parent. See
Amendments (1979), supra note 274, at 1868, 1878. Such purchases are said to be by the parent
corporation.
The word "indirect" is also said to make "the definition apply to any other transaction in which
the substance is clearly the same as a typical dividend or stock repurchase." Id. at 1878. Somewhat
the same thought appears in the final words of the definition of a distribution (i.e., the words including as a form of distribution dividends, acquisitions of shares, or otherwise). Id. at 1869.
277. Section 2(i) of the Amended Model Act at this point excepts from the term "distribution"
transfers of the corporation's own shares. AMENDED MODEL BusINESs CORP. ACr § 2(i), Amendments
(1979), supranote 274, at 1869. The Committee Comments indicate that the exception is intended to
exclude from the definition stock dividends, stock splits, and other "mere changes in the unit of
interest." Amendments (1979), supra note 274, at 1878. The last phrase in this statement suggests
that stock dividends for purposes of the exception may be limited to distributions of shares that effect
"mere changes in the unit of interest,"-i.e., possibly only distributions of common shares upon
common shares, or distributions of shares that do not change the proportionate interest of any existing
class of shareholders of the corporation. But the amendments elsewhere appear to consider as "stock
dividends" distributions of shares of a different class than that held by recipients. For example, §
18(b) of the Amended Model Act provides specific procedures to guard against effectuating changes
in proportionate interests of classes by stock dividends. AMENDED MODEL BusINEss CORP. Acr §
18(b), Amendments (1979), supra note 274, at 1871. Thus, it appears that the reference to stock
dividends in the comment is intended to be relatively broad.
The Committee Comments leave the characterization of transfers of shares upon conversion or
exchange of shares in doubt. Are such transfers to be excepted from treatment as "distributions"
only when they effect "mere changes in the unit of interest"? Two arguments may be offered against
such a conclusion. First, if one accepts that distributions of shares affecting shareholders' proportionate interests are not statutory "distributions," it is hard to erect arguments as to why conversions or
exchanges of shares should not also be excepted; the substantive consequences of conversions or
exchanges of shares are virtually identical with disproportionate share distributions. Second, the
amendments to § 18(b) described above appear to equate share dividends with conversions and exchanges of shares. Id.
The conclusion that all types of share dividends, and conversions and exchanges of shares, are not
considered to be statutory "distributions" is supported by the general thrust of the definition of that
term. The statute seeks to regulate transfers of cash and property and incurrence of debt by corporations. Viewed from the perspective of a creditor, paper shifts within the shareholders' equity section
are in neither category. On the other hand, the arguments for permitting reshuffling of shareholder
interests when the corporation is equitably insolvent (the condition in AMENDED MODEL BuSINESs
CORP. Acr § 45(a), Amendments (1979), supra note 274, at 1872) or has liabilities in excess of assets
(the condition in id. § 45(b), Amendments (1979), supranote 274, at 1872) is scarcely compelling.
278. The Committee Comments indicate that inclusion of such a clause not only assures that
distribution of a corporation's promissory obligations as a dividend will be treated as a distribution,
but also indicates that on an installment repurchase of shares the incurrence of the indebtedness is the

243

Washington Law Review

Vol. 59:187, 1984

or for the benefit 279 of any of its shareholders in respect of any of its
shares. A distribution may be in the form of a dividend, purchase, re2 80
demption or other acquisition of shares, or otherwise.
Under the Amended Model Act, a corporation may not make a proposed distribution 28 1 if, after giving it effect, either: (a) the corporation
would be unable to pay its debts as they become due in the usual course of
business; 282 or (b) the corporation's total assets would be less than the
sum of its total liabilities 283 and the maximum amount that then would be
event which constitutes the distribution (rather than subsequent payment of the debt). Amendments
(1979), supra note 274, at 1878. See also AMENDED MODEL BUSINESS CORP AcT § 45, para. 3,
Amendments (1979), supra note 274, at 1872.
279. For a discussion of the meaning of distributions "for the benefit of" shareholders, see infra
note 335.
280. The Committee Comments state that the definition encompasses distributions in liquidation,
including partial or complete and voluntary or involuntary liquidation. Amendments (1979), supra
note 274, at 1878.
The amendments also change § 48 of the Model Act to delete subparagraph (c) (which imposed
liability on directors for distributing assets during liquidation without the payment and discharge of.
or making adequate provision for, all known liabilities of the corporation, see MODEL BUSINESS CORP
ACT § 48(c) (1979)) and prescribe liability for directors who assent to any distribution contrary to the
provisions of the Act and who do not comply with the standard of care prescribed in the Act.
AMENDED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 48, Amendments (1979), supra note 274, at 1873. See also
infra text accompanying notes 297-99. But the amendments make no change in § 87 of the Model
Act, which continues to require that a corporation intending to dissolve to pay or adequately provide
for the payment of its obligations before distributing assets to shareholders. MODEL BUSINESS CORP
AcT § 87 (1979). Thus, under the Amended Model Act, directors considering a distribution in liquidation must satisfy both the provisions of amended § 45 and § 87 before the distribution can be
validly made.
281. AMENDED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 45, para. 1, Amendments (1979), supra note 274,
at 1872, states at the outset that "[s]ubject to any restrictions in the articles of incorporation, the
board of directors may authorize and the corporation may make distributions." Amended § 48 imposes liability on assenting directors who have not complied with the standard of care prescribed in
the Act in causing the corporation to make a distribution contrary to any restrictions contained in the
corporation's articles of incorporation. Id. § 48, Amendments (1979), supra note 274, at 1873. Thus,
such restrictions have the same force as the limitations described in infra text accompanying notes
282-84.
Under § 45 of the Amended Model Act, id. § 45, Amendments (1979), supra note 274, at 1872,
directors apparently may authorize (subject to restrictions in the corporation's articles of incorporation) a distribution that the corporation may not legally make due to the limitations in subparagraphs
(a) and (b). It is not clear why such authority is granted directors, apart from permitting the corporation to enter into conditional agreements for the repurchase of shares.
282. Id. § 45(a), Amendments (1979), supra note 274, at 1872. The Committee Comments describe the equitable insolvency test as "the most important and fundamental test for the permissibility
of distributions." Amendments (1979), supra note 274, at 1881.
283. Section 45(b) of the Amended Model Act inserts at this point the parenthetical phrase "unless the articles of incorporation otherwise permit." AMENDED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 45(b),
Amendments (1979), supra note 274, at 1872. The Committee Comments do not address the phrase.
Its apparent purpose is to permit persons drafting the terms of shares with a liquidation preference to
eliminate this protection. There is some reason to believe that such persons are not vigorous representatives on behalf of the interests of preferred shareholders (recall that preferred stock agreements had
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payable in any liquidation in respect of all outstanding shares having pre284
ferential rights in liquidation.
A corporation's board of directors may choose 285 to base determinations of its assets and liabilities for purposes of the second test upon either
(i) financial statements prepared on the basis of accounting practices and
principles that are reasonable in the circumstances, 286 or (ii) a fair valuation or other method that is reasonable in the circumstances. 287
The date on which a distribution by purchase, redemption, or other
acquisition of the corporation's own shares is tested 288 under these provisions is the earlier of the dates on which money or other property is trans-

many fewer protective provisions than appeared in long-term loans, see Kummert, supra note 10, at
374 n.63). Thus, the case for the exception does not appear to be a strong one.
284. AMENDED MODEL BustNEss CORP. Acr § 45(b), Amendments (1979), supra note 274, at
1872. Note that the result of this provision is that a corporation must be able to satisfy both tests in
order to make a proposed distribution.
285. See id. at 1883. It appears that the directors' choice between determining assets and liabilities upon the basis of financial statements prepared on the basis of reasonable accounting principles
and a fair valuation is not itself subject to a determination of reasonableness.
The Committee Comments, although they describe this approach as "a departure from existing
statutory provisions," id. at 1868, offer little justification for its approach beyond attempted clarification of uncertainties existing in many jurisdictions concerning the permissible way to determine assets and liabilities. Id. at 1883.
286. As to the difficulty in making this determination, see infra text accompanying notes
315-16.
287. The Committee Comments state that "the statute accordingly specifically authorizes departures from historical cost accounting and sanctions the utilization of appraisal methods for the purpose of determining the fund available for distributions." Amendments (1979), supra note 274, at
1885.
On the choice of approaches to determining current value, the Committee Comments state:
[I]t is inappropriate to apply a "quick sale" liquidation value to an enterprise in most cases,
particularly with respect to the payment of normal dividends. On the other hand, a quick sale
valuation might be appropriate in certain circumstances, for example, for an enterprise in the
course of liquidation or course of reducing its asset or business base to a material degree. In most
cases, a fair valuation method on a going concern basis would likely be appropriate, if expectations are that the enterprise will continue as a viable going concern.
Id. The last phrase in Amended Model Act § 45, second paragraph (i.e., the acceptability of such
other methods of valuation as are reasonable in the circumstances), was inserted to "comprehend the
wide variety of possibilities that might not be deemed to fall under a 'fair valuation' but would be
reasonable in the circumstances of a particular case." Id. No examples are offered.
288. AMENDED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 45, para. 3, Amendments (1979), supranote 274,
at 1872, says that the "effect of [such] a distribution shall be measured as of" the earlier of the dates
it then describes. The Committee Comments state that it recognized the "need to specify the time at
which the two tests imposed by section 45 should be measured." Amendments (1979), supra note
274, at 1885.
The Comments go on to say that "where shares of the corporation are acquired by it, a date approximating the earlier of the payment date or the date the shareholder ceases to be a shareholder with
respect to such shares is to be used as the measuring date." Id. There appears to be no room in the
statutory language for an interpretation accepting a date approximating the dates stated.
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ferred, or debt is incurred, by the corporation, 289 or the shareholder
ceases to be a shareholder with respect to such shares. 290 The date on
which all other distributions are tested depends on how soon payment is
made following authorization of the distribution: if payment occurs 120
days or less after the date of authorization, the distribution is tested on the
date of authorization; if payment occurs more than 120 days after the date
of authorization, the distribution is tested on the date of payment. 2 9'
Indebtedness 292 incurred or issued by a corporation to a shareholder in
a distribution that satisfies the tests prescribed in these provisions is, except to the extent subordinated by agreement, on a parity with corporate
indebtedness to general, unsecured creditors. 293
Shares of a corporation's own stock acquired by it become authorizedbut-unissued shares, unless the corporation's articles of incorporation
289. The Committee Comments state the following concerning the application of the tests to an
installment repurchase of shares:
[I]n applying each of the tests of section 45, the legality of the distribution must be measured at
the time of the issuance or incurrence of the debt, not at a later date when the debt is actually
paid-though of course in some circumstances, such payment could constitute a preferential
payment among creditors. In any later challenge arising out of the corporation's subsequent
insolvency, if the test of section 45 was properly met at the time of the incurrence or issuance of
the debt, the directors would be entitled to rely fully upon the good faith business judgment rule
of section 35, as discussed above.
Amendments (1979), supra note 274, at 1886.
290. In most purchases of a corporation's own shares, it would appear to be a most unusual
transaction when the dates on which the corporation transferred money or other property to the shareholder, or incurred indebtedness to the shareholder, were not earlier than, or identical to, the date
when the shareholder ceased to be a shareholder with respect to such shares. The clearest case where
the latter date is earlier would be presented by a call for redemption of preferred shares, coupled with
the deposit of funds with a transfer agent to be used for such redemption, where the preferred shares'
agreement provides that such actions effect a cessation of the shareholder's rights as a shareholder.
291. AMENDED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 45, para. 3, Amendments (1979), supra note 274,
at 1872. The Committee Comments provide no insight as to the significance attached to a 120-day
gap between authorization and payment. Perhaps the provision is designed to force review by directors of current financial information in cases of an extended period between authorization and payment. But another result of the provision is to empower directors to authorize a conditional dividend
simply by postponing the payment date more than 120 days. It is not evident what benefits are derived
from such power.
It is not clear how these provisions are to be applied if the distribution involves a dividend of the
corporation's long-term debt to its shareholders. If the word "payment" is interpreted to mean the
time at which money or other property is transferred by the corporation, then distributions of longterm debt would be measured at dates well beyond those apparently contemplated by the typical
dividend pattern. Moreover, such postponed recognition of the debt would be directly contrary to the
treatment mandated for repurchase debt (which is recognized much earlier under § 45 of the
Amended Model Act). Perhaps for this purpose the word "payment" should be interpreted to include
the making of the distribution, i.e., the date the debt is distributed to shareholders.
292. Although the Committee Comments do not so state, it appears that the section must be
referring to unsecured indebtedness incurred or issued by a corporation in a distribution.
293. AMENDED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 45, para. 4, Amendments (1979), supra note 274,
at 1869.
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prohibit their reissue. If the articles so provide, shares acquired are cancelled on acquisition, and the number of the corporation's authorized
shares is reduced by the number of shares acquired. The corporation must
thereafter file a statement of cancellation with the Secretary of State
2 94
showing the reduction in its authorized shares.
295
Finally, the Amended Model Act offers adopting states the option of
providing that in circumstances to which the distribution provisions of the
Act are applicable, such provisions supersede the applicability of any
other statutes 296 of the state with respect to the legality of distributions.
Directors who vote for, or assent to, 297 any distribution contrary to
these provisions or to any restrictions contained in the corporation's articles of incorporation, and who have not complied with the Act's standard
for performance of the duties of directors in so doing, 2 98 are jointly and
severally liable to the corporation for the amount of the distribution ille299
gally made.
Any director held liable for making an illegal distribution is entitled to
contribution from the shareholders who accepted or received any such
distribution knowing it to have been made in violation of the Act, in pro294. Id. § 6, Amendments (1979), supra note 274, at 1869. The statement of cancellation must
be filed not later than the time the corporation files its next annual report with the Secretary of State.
295. Id. § 152, Amendments (1979), supra note 274, at 1877. The provision is a new section.
Former § 152 has been renumbered as § 153.
Of the two states that have thus far adopted the financial provisions in the Amended Model Act,
New Mexico has adopted the optional provision, see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-44(E) (1983), and
Montana has not, see Act of Apr. 21, 1981, ch. 475, 1981 Mont. Laws 876. Both states have the
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act in effect. See 7A U.L.A. 161 (1978), 31 (Supp. 1983).
296. The Committee Comments state:
The Committee does not believe, however, that it is appropriate for the Model Act to attempt
directly to deal with a different uniform statute. In addition, if a corporation should become
involved in proceedings under the federal bankruptcy laws following a distribution, the fraudulent conveyance provisions of section 67d (§ 548 effective October 1, 1979) of the federal Bankruptcy Act could become applicable to the transaction. It should be recognized that, while the
Committee questions the desirability of inconsistency between the Model Act, on the one hand,
and the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act and the Bankruptcy Act, on the other, the Model
Act deals fundamentally with the responsibility of directors, and failure to follow the standard of
the Model Act results in potential liability for directors under section 48. In contrast, there is no
provision in either the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act or in the federal Bankruptcy Act for
liability of directors; rather, the effect of those acts is to enable the trustee or other representative
to recapture for the benefit of creditors funds distributed to others in some circumstances. Accordingly, considerations of public policy may justify the application of different standards in
these two different sets of statutes.
Amendments (1979), supra note 274, at 1883.
297. Directors who are deemed to have assented to an action are defined in MODEL BusINeSS
CorP,. Act § 35, para. 3 (1979).
298. See id. § 35, para. 2.
299. AMENDED MODEL BusINEss CORP. AcT § 48, para. 1, Amendments (1979), supra note 274,
at 1873.
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portion to the amounts received by them. 30 Any director against whom a
claim is asserted regarding an illegal distribution is entitled to contribution from other directors who voted for, or assented to, the action, and
who did not comply with the Act's standard of performance for duties of
30 1
directors in so doing.
ii.

Cost Implications of the Amended Model Act Provisions

The Amended Model Act provisions appear to impose on the groups
interested in the amount of corporate financial distributions and the
groups involved in the administration of the provisions costs that are less
than those resulting for such groups from the provisions of any of the
previously discussed acts.
Some Amended Model Act corporations that choose to expand their
ability to make distributions 302 by valuing assets on a basis other than
generally accepted accounting principles are likely to bear increased costs
in the event they seek certification of their financial statements. If the
distribution would not have been permissible if assets had been valued
under generally accepted accounting principles, 303 it appears that such
corporations face a difficult choice in the event the distribution is made:
either their financial statements will show a deficit in their shareholders'
equity account, 304 or their financial statements will receive an adverse
opinion for containing asset write-ups on items not treated in accordance
with generally accepted accounting principles. 305 It appears that most
such corporations will opt for the former and thus will bear only mildly
300. Id. § 48, para. 2.
301. Id. § 48, para. 3.
302. It appears that in most cases the decision to use a basis other than generally accepted accounting principles will be made to expand the corporation's ability to make distributions. But on
occasion such a decision may result in contracting the corporation's ability. Thus, a small corporation
using the cash method of accounting may use that method even though it produces a smaller fund for
distribution than that produced by the generally accepted accrual method. Such a corporation might
conclude that the expense of preparing statements using generally accepted accounting principles was
too great as compared to the benefits to be derived from having a larger fund for distribution.
303. This statement assumes that the equitable insolvency test is met on the distribution.
304. This statement assumes that the corporation has a single shareholders' equity account
(which seems to be the hope of one of the drafters of the Amended Model Act provisions, see B.
MANNING. supra note 9, at 179-80). But even for a corporation with a single class of shares, it is not
clear that accountants will produce statements with a single "shareholders equity" section. See B.
MELCHER. supra note 84, at 116-17 (rejecting a single account in favor of separate accounts for
shareholders' contributions and earnings retained in the business). If two accounts are maintained,
and if distributions are charged to retained earnings, a distribution in excess of the entire shareholders' equity (i.e., one not permissible if assets had been valued under generally accepted accounting
principles) will result in a deficit in retained earnings that is larger than the amount of shareholders'
contributions, and in an overall deficit in the shareholders' equity section.
305. See supra note 182.

Restrictions on Corporate Distributions
increased costs in securing credit and in procuring new shareholders. 306
Such costs appear to be less than accounting costs resulting from any of
the previously discussed acts.
Amended Model Act corporations should incur slightly greater costs
related to the insertion and enforcement of contractual distribution limitations than would have been incurred had the corporations been incorporated under any of the previously discussed acts. 307 Creditors308 and preferred shareholders 309 are likely to perceive that they receive less
protection under the Act than under other acts, 3 10 particularly if states

adopting its provisions generally accept its optional provision preempting
306. See supra note 184.
307. The Committee Comments make no reference to the impact of its provisions upon the need
for contractual limitations. But Bayless Manning, a member of the subcommittee that drafted the
revised provisions, has previously argued that such limitations are more effective in protecting creditors' interests than statutory legal capital machinery. See B. MANNING, supra note 9, at 106-08.
308. The provision in the Amended Model Act resulting in the primary reduction in the protection of creditors is the authorization in amended § 45(b), Amendments (1979), supra note 274, at
1872, of distributions by corporations so long as the corporation's assets (valued at either financial
statement or fair valuation) exceed the corporation's liabilities (assuming a corporation with a single
class of stock). This provision permits corporations to distribute the shareholders' contributions to the
corporation, a possibility that is not directly authorized under any of the previously discussed acts.
As to whether the Amended Model Act provisions are likely to effect a real reduction in the protection afforded creditors as compared to their status under the previously discussed acts, see infra note
310.
309. As previously noted, supra note 281, AMENDED MODEL BusINEss CORP. Acr § 45(b),
Amendments (1979), supra note 274, at 1872, authorizes provisions in a corporation's articles of
incorporation that permit a distribution to be made even though the corporation's net assets after the
distribution has been made will be less than the liquidation preference of preferred shares outstanding. Protections for the liquidation preference of such shares in previously discussed acts are not
subject to this possibility. See supratext accompanying notes 46, 53, 73 & 163; text accompanying
notes 217-19. Further, under all acts previously discussed, preferred shareholders had the protection
of the retention in the corporation of assets equal to the stated capital attributed to common stock
issued by the corporation. As noted above, supranote 308, the Amended Model Act takes away that
protection.
310. It has been argued that at least under statutory systems based on legal capital, creditors
receive no real protection because of the control that common shareholders have over the corporation's stated capital. See B. MANNING, supranote 9, at 84-88. But Manning also states:
The statutory provisions on stated capital and distributions to equity investors are expressions of
a general norm of behavior to which the business community subscribes in principle ....
Perhaps it may be argued that the statutes hang today in precisely the right balance. They
announce a general and salutary principle which commands wide assent; but they are so feebly
constructed and loosely enforced that a corporation's financial managers, lawyers, and accountants can move as they wish when it is necessary to do so, as everyone agrees one should be able
to do. If this line of thought is valid, creditors do, in some general sense, benefit from the
statutory scheme to the extent that the stated capital provisions contribute to an atmosphere in
which corporate managements psychologically feel themselves inhibited from distributing assets
to shareholders indiscriminately.
Id. at 89 (footnote omitted). In time, managers operating under the Amended Model Act will no
longer feel inhibited.
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operation of their fraudulent conveyance statutes. 3 1' It can be anticipated
that counsel representing such persons, in recognition of this fact, will
more often insist on contractual distribution limitations (and possibly
more stringent limitations) from Amended Model Act corporations than
would have been the case had the corporations involved been incorporated under any of the previously discussed acts. Thus, costs related to
such limitations should be higher for Amended Model Act corporations.
An Amended Model Act corporation should incur lower costs in determining the validity of a proposed distribution than it would have incurred
had it been incorporated under any of the previously discussed acts.
Counsel advising such a corporation on the most troublesome form of
distribution under the Amended Model Act-an installment repurchase of
shares-must resolve only the following issues in providing advice: 3 12 (a)
how to apply the Act's equitable insolvency

3 13

and remaining assets 3 14

311. The Committee Comments, see supra note 296, concerning the optional provision are notable in the sense that while the Committee apparently would prefer that fraudulent conveyance statutes
be superseded by corporate statutes, most of its statement argues against such a step. Indeed, nothing
in the Committee Comments explain its desire for preemption apart from the need for directors to
consider the different definition of insolvency set forth in UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 2,
7A U.L.A. 176 (1978). See Amendments (1979), supranote 274, at 1882.
The merits of the preemption section are discussed infra at note 354. But it seems clear that states
adopting the Amended Model Act with the preemption section have significantly reduced protection
of creditors.
312. The Committee Comments acknowledge the past difficulty in planning such transactions.
See Amendments (1979), supra note 274, at 1886.
313. As previously noted, see supra note 276, the purchase of parent company stock by a subsidiary whose actions are controlled by the parent is an indirect distribution by the parent corporation.
If, however, one reads AMENDED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 45(a), Amendments (1979), supra
note 274, at 1872, to apply only to the parent corporation, an insolvent subsidiary could purchase the
shares of a solvent parent corporation-surely a result that ought to be prohibited. Thus, it appears
that amended § 45(a) ought to be interpreted to mean that indirect distributions by a subsidiary to the
parent's shareholders are prohibited whenever either the parent or the subsidiary would be equitably
insolvent after giving effect to the distribution.
314. The Committee Comments contain the following statement on the issue in its discussion of
financial statement determinations of assets and liabilities:
Normally, a board of directors would use the corporation's separate "'parent company" financial statements for such determinations of distributions. In the view of the Committee, a board of
directors could properly use the equity method of accounting as set forth in APB No. 18 as to all
of the corporation's investee corporations, including corporate joint ventures and subsidiaries, in
the case of unconsolidated parent financial statements, although other evidence would be relevant in the total determination. Consolidated retained earnings (or "earned surplus") are usually
the same as the parent company's retained earnings following such equity method of accounting
under current accounting standards.
Amendments (1979), supra note 274, at 1884. The first word of this quotation seems to indicate that
in the Committee's view the choice of financial statements (i.e., the choice between parent company
statements and consolidated statements) to be used in such circumstances is left to directors to determine according to the "reasonable in the circumstances" standard. The substantive content of that
standard is discussed infra note 315.
The Committee's focus on retained earnings in the comment seems peculiar since that term appears
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tests to an installment repurchase of a parent corporation's shares by its
subsidiary; (b) what guidelines to provide to directors for use in assessing
whether the application of a particular set of accounting principles in
preparation of financial statements, 315 or of a particular valuation
nowhere in AMENDED MODEL BusINEss CORP. Acr § 45, Amendments (1979), supra note 274, at
1872. Furthermore, the statement appears to be inaccurate in any case in which the parent owns less
than all of the stock in the subsidiary. That same qualification is necessary if one examines the effect
of using parent-only financial statements (as compared to using consolidated statements) on the assets
liabilities test present in id. § 45(b). But an even more basic problem in using parent-only statements
is that such statements contain receivables from and payables to the subsidiary, which are eliminated
in the process of preparing consolidated statements. See, e.g., W. MEIGS, A. MOSICH & E. LARsEN,
MODERN ADVANCED AccOUNTING 177-81 (1975). These factors indicate the choice may be more
difficult than the Comments suggest.
315. The Committee Comments state:
While the directors will normally be entitled to use generally accepted accounting principles
and to give presumptive weight to the advice of professional accountants with respect thereto, it
is important to recognize that the new Section requires the use of accounting practices and principles that are reasonable in the circumstances, and does not constitute a statutory enactment of
generally accepted accounting principles. In the view of the Committee, the widespread controversy concerning various accounting principles, and their constant reevaluation, requires a statutory standard of reasonableness, as a matter of law, recognizing that there may be equally acceptable alternative solutions to specific issues as well as areas requiring judgment in
interpreting such principles. This does not mean that the statute is intended to reject the use and
reliance upon generally accepted accounting principles; on the contrary, it is expected that their
use would be the basic rule in most cases. The statutory language does, however, require informed business judgment in the entire circumstances in applying particular accounting principles to the circumstances that exist at the time, for purposes of the ultimate legal measurement of
the validity of distributions.
If a corporation's financial statements are not presented in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles, however, a board of directors should normally carefully consider the extent to which the assets may not be fairly stated or the liabilities may be understated, to determine the fairness of the aggregate amount of assets and the aggregate amount of liabilities.
Amendments (1979), supra note 274, at 1884. Unfortunately, these statements do not shed much light
on what substantive standard is implicit in "reasonable in the circumstances" apart from the suggestion in the last paragraph that fairness of the aggregate totals may be an element. But even that
restatement leads one to ask, fairness from whose vantage-point? Creditors'? Shareholders'?
The questions become clearer in a specific context. Assume the corporation has prepared financial
statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and has consistently used the
first-in-first-out (FIFO) method of valuing its inventory, a method generally accepted if it most
clearly reflects the corporation's periodic income. See FASB AcCOUNTrNG STANDARDS, JUNE 1973,
supra note 84, at 16 (Accounting Research Bull. No. 43, ch. 4, statement 4, issued June 1953). That
method also results, in periods of rising prices, in a higher inventory value being shown on the corporation's balance sheet than would have appeared had the corporation used the last-in-first-out (LIFO)
method of inventory valuation. One construction of AMENDED MODEL BusiNEss CORP. Acr § 45,
Amendments (1979), supra note 274, at 1872, is that there must be some objective evidence to suggest that the use of the (FIFO) method was reasonable in the circumstances. Pursuing this view, the
reference to fairness in subpara. 2 of amended § 45, id., could be interpreted to mean that reasonable
people would agree that the valuation produced by FIFO was not excessive in the circumstances.
Presumably such a conclusion would be reached in this example, despite the fact that the FIFO valuation exceeded the inventory value that would be produced under LIFO or average cost assumptions,
because of the frequent use of FIFO by many different types of business enterprises.
There is, however, another more disturbing interpretation that can be placed upon reasonableness
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method, 316 for purposes of the remaining assets test is reasonable in the
circumstances; and (c) what constitutes reasonable care by directors in
effecting such a transaction. 3 17 In addition, the corporation must bear the
cost of an analysis of its short-term cash flows 318 to determine whether the
in the circumstances. The Committee Comments quoted above and elsewhere, see particularly
Amendments (1979), supra note 274, at 1868, connect the notion of the directors' informed business
judgment with determinations of the corporation's assets and liabilities under either the financial
statement or fair valuation basis. (The Comments define in another context such judgment as acting
"in good faith and with a reasonable basis for believing that the distribution authorized was permitted
by the statute, after due consideration of what they reasonably believed to be the relevant factors."
Id. at 1882.) The reasonableness in the circumstances language and the business judgment rule in
combination may mean that all determinations by directors of the accounting principles to be used in
applying the test in AMENDED MODEL BUSINESS CORP ACT § 45(b), Amendments (1979), supra note
274, at 1872, are reviewable only to the extent that the particular court is willing to investigate factors
supporting a judgment by directors on any business issue. In some jurisdictions, the use of this interpretation will produce virtually no review of any decision the directors make short of actual fraud.
See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Il. App. 2d 173, 237 N.E. 2d 776 (1968). Even if the court reads
more into the rule, as the Committee does in the quotation above, the court apparently will inquire
only into whether the directors have "reasonable basis" for believing that the accounting principle
they applied was "reasonable in the circumstances."
A task force recently appointed by the ABA Section of Corporation, Banking, and Business Law to
study a number of issues regarding legality of dividends appears to believe that the first construction
of the Amended Model Act was intended by the committee. See Legality of Dividends, supra note 87.
at 302. The task force questioned whether it is reasonable to require directors to make a judgment
among accounting principles. It recommended that where financial statements based on generally
accepted accounting principles are presented, they be conclusively presumed to be reasonable in the
circumstances without the necessity of further judgment by directors. Id. at 303.
316. This portion of the statute produces exactly the source interpretation problems presented in
connection with financial statement basis determinations. See supra note 315.
317. See generally MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 35, para. 2 (1979). The Committee Comments
state:
The directors' decision as to whether to authorize a distribution is to be judged on the basis of
the business judgment rule; that is. whether the directors acted in good faith and with a reasonable basis for believing that the distribution authorized was permitted by the statute, after due
consideration of what they reasonably believed to be the relevant factors.
Amendments (1979), supra note 274, at 1882. See also the Committee's description of directors'
deliberations on equitable insolvency, set forth infra at note 318.
318. Consider the thoughtful advice on the subject in the Committee Comments:
In determining whether or not a corporation is, or as a result of a proposed distribution would
be rendered, insolvent, the board of directors must exercise its collective business judgment as
to whether making the distribution in question will render the corporation unable to pay its debts
as they become due in the ordinary course of its business operations. In making this determination, the directors are required and entitled to make certain judgments as to the future course of
the corporation's business, including the likelihood that, based on existing and contemplated
demand for the corporation's products or services, it will be able to generate funds over a period
of time from its operations or from any contemplated orderly disposition of its assets sufficient to
satisfy its existing and reasonably anticipated obligations as they mature. The directors are entitled to expect that substantial indebtedness which matures in the near-term will be refinanced
where, on the basis of the corporation's financial condition and future prospects, and the general
availability of credit to businesses similarly situated, it is reasonable to assume that such refinancing may be accomplished. To the extent that the corporation may be subject to asserted or
unasserted contingent liabilities, the directors are required and entitled to make judgments as to
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proposed distribution will result in the corporation being able to meet its
debts as they become due in the usual course of business. The cost of such
an analysis should be no different for an Amended Model Act corporation
than for a corporation incorporated under any of the previously discussed
acts.
The features in the Amended Model Act that point toward a reduction
in the cost of obtaining advice for directors-a simple, relatively permissive statutory structure, relative freedom from critical ambiguities, reduced risks for directors 319 and shareholders 320-should also result in
the likelihood, amount and time of any recovery against the corporation, after giving consideration to the extent to which the corporation is insured or otherwise protected by others against
loss.
What is appropriate for an on-going business enterprise is a cash flow analysis based on a
business forecast and budget for a sufficient period of time to permit a conclusion that known
obligations of the corporation can reasonably be expected to be satisfied over the period of time
that they will mature rather than a simple measurement of current assets against current liabilities, or a determination that the present estimated "liquidation" value of the corporation's assets
would produce sufficient funds to satisfy the corporation's existing liabilities. In exercising their
judgment, the directors are entitled to rely on information, opinions, reports and statements
prepared by others, as contemplated by section 35.
Amendments (1979), supra note 274, at 1881-82. See also Murphy, supra note 112, at 855-71.
Murphy raises, but does not resolve, a question counsel may have to address in providing instructions
to persons gathering the cash-flow information: how long must a corporation be solvent after the
distribution to escape operation of the statute?
319. The probability that directors who have been reasonably well advised will be held liable
under the Amended Model Act for a corporate distribution appears extremely small. Well-advised
directors will be apprised of the factors and projections, see supra note 318, to consider in making a
determination, in their informed business judgment, of whether a proposed distribution will result in
the corporation becoming equitably insolvent. The statute protects directors against challenge on the
choice between financial statement basis and fair valuation basis for the determination of the corporation's assets and liabilities. If the statute is read to allow directors to use their business judgment in
selecting either particular accounting principles, or a particular valuation approach, see supra note
315, and if directors may use business judgment in determining the actual values resulting under such
methods (as the Committee so states, see Amendments (1979), supra note 274, at 1868), then a
plaintiff attempting to establish a claim against directors must convince the court to attach liability to
a decision entirely a matter of the business judgment of directors. Few courts are likely to do so.
The plaintiff's case is only slightly better if the directors' judgment concerning the use of particular
accounting principles or a particular valuation approach is subject to some objective standard of reasonableness. In such a case, if the directors rely in good faith on the opinion of a competent lawyer or
accountant that a particular treatment is reasonable in the circumstances, liability will not be imposed
under § 35 of the Model Act. MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. AcT § 35 (1979).
It also appears that directors who receive no advice in connection with a distribution are not likely
to be found liable on the distribution. If the directors read the statute, and if the entire process is
protected by the business judgment rule, it seems likely that directors would be liable only for distributions amounting to self-dealing transactions. The risk of director liability is increased if an objective standard of reasonableness is stated by the statute. If directors do not read the statute, it does not
appear likely that many will, absent self-dealing motives, authorize distributions that violate such
general tests as the equitable and (old) bankruptcy insolvency tests.
320. Under AMENDED MODEL BustNEsS CORP. Acr § 48, Amendments (1979), supranote 274, at
1873, any director held liable for making a distribution in violation of the Act is entitled to contribution from the shareholders who accepted or received the distribution knowing that it was made in
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lower costs for Amended Model Act corporations for directors' time related to distribution questions than would result under any of the previously discussed acts. The same features appear to have similar effects
upon the possible costs for parties in the corporate solution related to
transactions abandoned because of legal impediments or complexities and
to litigation over proposed or consummated distributions.
General, unsecured creditors of Amended Model Act corporations
which have made installment repurchases of shares and which have become insolvent before the repurchase obligations are satisfied are likely to
suffer larger losses under these provisions than they would have suffered
had the corporations been incorporated under either the pre-1980 Model
Act or the California Act. Under both of those Acts, the corporation's
obligation to the selling shareholder is subordinated to obligations to general, unsecured creditors in the event of insolvency. 3 2' But under the
Amended Model Act 322 (as under the Michigan Act), 323 the obligation to
the selling shareholder is accorded parity with obligations to general, unsecured creditors if at the time the obligation was incurred the distribution
satisfied the Act's tests. If such status is honored in bankruptcy, 324 and if,
as is typical, available corporate assets in such event are less than corporate indebtedness to general, unsecured creditors, 325 payments to the selling shareholder by virtue of the operation of the Amended Model Act
provision in such circumstances serve to reduce the amount received (and
326
to increase losses suffered) by general, unsecured creditors.
violation of the Act, in proportion to the amounts received by them. Thus, to the extent that the Act
has the effect of reducing the risks for directors, as is argued supra note 319, risks for shareholders
are also reduced. In addition, the Act reduces significantly the risks for the selling shareholder in an
installment repurchase of shares by eliminating any application of the insolvency test after the time of
the making of the contract. See supra text accompanying notes 292-93. While such action does not
insure that the selling shareholder will be paid in full, it does result (absent application of a fraudulent
conveyance rule) in such person's claim being treated on a par with general creditors' claims in the
event of insolvency-a very substantial enhancement of status as compared to the shareholder's position if subject to the insolvency limitation.
321. Such is the effect of the pre-1980 Model Act and California provisions prohibiting any
payment on a repurchase obligation that would render the corporation insolvent. See MODEL BUSI.
NESS
CORP. ACT § 6 (1979); CAL. CORP. CODE § 501 (West 1977); discussion supra notes 263-68.
322. AMENDED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 45, para. 4, Amendments (1979), supra note 274,
at 1872.
323. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1367 (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(367) (Callaghan 1983));
discussion supra note 189.
324. The Committee Comments recognize that in some circumstances payment of the debt to the
shareholder could constitute a preferential payment among creditors. See Amendments (1979), supra
note 274, at 1886. In addition, it appears that even if the optional preemption provision is enacted,
incurrence of such debt may be found to be a fraudulent conveyance under the Bankruptcy Act. See
infra text accompanying notes 383-91.
325. See data discussed in Kummert, supra note 10, at 375 n.67.
326. The Committee comment states:
General creditors are better off in such a situation [i.e., an installment repurchase of shares] than
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Current or prospective shareholders of publicly held Amended Model
Act corporations attempting to gauge prospects for the corporations'
share prices from changes in the corporations' dividend rates are likely to
bear the same investment losses or additional information costs they
would have borne had the corporations been incorporated under any of
the previously discussed acts.
iii. Benefits Resultingfrom the Amended Model Act Provisions
The principal benefits 327 received by parties in the corporate solution
from these provisions-the ability by corporations to maintain stable dividend rates despite recent adverse earnings performance, 328 and the prohibition of distributions that would jeopardize payment of debts in the ordithey would have been if cash or other property had been paid out for the shares, and no worse off
than if assets had been paid out to the shareholder, who had then promptly loaned the same to the
corporation and thereby became a creditor.
Amendments (1979), supranote 274, at 1886. This assumes that the corporation at the time of entry
into the repurchase obligation could have transferred cash or property to the shareholder for the shares
and still remained a viable operating entity. That assumption may be true in some installment repurchases, but it does not appear likely in the vast majority of such arrangements. Initially, it may be
noted that there is nothing in the operation of the Amended Model Act tests that suggests that a
corporation entering into a valid installment repurchase could have transferred the entire purchase
price in cash or property at the time of purchase. The corporation's ability to satisfy the equitable
insolvency test on any cash down payments made scarcely gives rise to the inference that the test
would have been satisfied had the entire purchase price been paid at the outset. With respect to the
possibility of transfers of property not affecting the corporation's ability to pay debts as they arise in
the ordinary course of business, the feasibility of such transfers is a function of the corporation's
ability to continue operating without the asset and the shareholder's willingness to become the owner
of an illiquid asset. Second, the assumption is contrary to the form in which the parties actually
arrange such transactions. While there may be occasions when legal or tax factors may cause the
parties to shift away from financially feasible forms of a transaction, such factors appear less significant in the setting of a typical share repurchase, i.e., one undertaken to terminate the shareholder's
participation in the enterprise. In such cases, the selling shareholder would ordinarily be delighted to
receive cash or reasonably liquid property in exchange for his or her shares; if the actual transaction
takes a different form, such result seems directly related to the corporation's desire not to transfer the
full purchase price at the outset. Third, even if general creditors as a group obtain some benefit from
the retention of assets by some corporations when they might have been transferred, it appears that
such benefit is more than offset by the prospect that controlling shareholders in financially troubled
enterprises will increasingly turn to installment repurchases to improve their positions with the onset
of financial difficulty. Such transactions offer shareholders in effect a form of option, because if the
enterprise survives the period of difficulty the agreement can simply be rescinded. See Herwitz, supra
note 98, at 309.
The Committee's second line of argument in the final analysis depends on exactly the same considerations. It is doubtful that transitory ownership of property by the shareholder has any effect on such
analysis. Cf. United States v. General Geophysical Co., 296 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 849 (1962).
327. Manning in effect argues that time saved by law teachers and law students (as compared to
the time required to study provisions based on legal capital) is also an important benefit of the provisions. B. MANNiNG. supranote 9, at 108.
328. As to the significance of such a benefit, see Kummert, supra note 10, at 370-71.
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nary course of business 329-are the same as those received by participants
from the operation of the pre-1980 Model Act and the Michigan provisions. These benefits appear to be less than the costs incurred by various
parties as a result of the operation of the provisions. But, like California,
the relative balance of costs and benefits appears much closer under the
Amended Model Act provisions than it is under either the pre-1980
Model Act or the Michigan provisions. Thus, for most legislatures, the
Amended Model Act provisions represent a viable alternative to distribution provisions currently in operation.
c.

MinnesotaBusiness CorporationAct

i.

Summary of the Minnesota Provisions
The Minnesota Act 330 imposes limitations on the power of a corpora-

tion's board of directors to authorize, and the corporation to make, a
"distribution." A distribution is defined 33 1 as a direct or indirect 332 transfer of money or other property 333 with or without consideration, 334 or an

329. As to the significance of such a benefit, see id. at 364.
330. The purpose of this subpart of the article is to examine the operation of statutory restrictions
on distributions based on the equitable insolvency test. In the United States currently there are two
states with such patterns, Massachusetts and Minnesota. See MASS. ANN LAWS ch. 1568, §§ 45, 61
(Michie/Law. Co-op. 1979 & Supp. 1983); MINN. STAT ANN. § 302A.551 (West Supp. 1983). The
Minnesota Act was chosen for analysis because of its use of the basic structure of the Amended
Model Business Corporation Act (i.e., par value is abolished; treasury shares are not recognized), its
recent adoption, and its more comprehensive treatment of the subject.
The Minnesota Business Corporation Act was enacted by Act of May 27, 1981, ch. 270, 1981
Minn. Laws 1141, effective July 1, 1981 (codified at MINN. STAT. ANN ch. 302A (West Supp.
1983).
331. MINN STAT ANN. § 302A.011(10) (West Supp. 1983). The definition is derived from
AMENDED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 2(i), Amendments (1979), supra note 274, at 1869. See
MINN. STAT ANN. § 302A.0 I1reporter's notes, subdivision 10 (West Supp. 1983).
332. For a discussion of the scope of indirect transfers under the source Amended Model Act
provision, see supra note 276.
333. The statute at this point states "other than its own shares." For a discussion of the scope of
similar language in the Amended Model Act, see supra note 277.
334. This clause (which does not appear in the Amended Model Act) requires some interpretation as to which transfers of money or other property by a corporation to any of its shareholders with
consideration are to be tested as "distributions" under the statute. The second sentence in MINN
STAT ANN § 302A.01 1(10) (West Supp. 1983) includes in that category transfers of money or other
property in which the corporation acquires its own shares. Determinations of whether other types of
transfers of money or other property with consideration are to be considered "distributions" apparently must be made by testing the transfer to see if it is "in respect of [the corporation's] shares." Id.
That phrase is quite similar to language appearing in I.R.C. § 31 l(a) (Supp. V 1981), and it is possible that authorities interpreting the latter may help give content to the Minnesota language. See B.
BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 7.21 (4th
ed. 1979).
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incurrence or issuance 335 of indebtedness, by a corporation to any of its
shareholders in respect of its shares. A distribution may be in the form of
a dividend or a distribution in liquidation, as consideration for the purchase, redemption, or other acquisition of the corporation's shares, or
336
otherwise.
The board of directors of a Minnesota corporation may authorize and
cause the corporation to make 337 a distribution only if the board determines that the corporation will be able to pay its debts in the ordinary
course of business after making the distribution, and the board does not
know before the distribution is made that the determination was or has
become erroneous. The corporation may make the distribution if it is able
to pay its debts in the ordinary course of business after making the distribution. 338
A determination by a corporation's board of directors that the corporation will be able to pay its debts in the ordinary course of business after
making a distribution is presumed to be proper if the determination is
made in compliance with the standard of conduct prescribed for directors
of Minnesota corporations 339 on the basis of financial information prepared in accordance with accounting methods, or a fair valuation or other
340
method, reasonable in the circumstances.
A distribution may be made to the holders of a class or series of shares
only if (a) all amounts payable to the holders of shares having a preference for the payment of that kind of distribution are paid; and (b) the
335. Act of Mar. 19, 1982, ch. 497, § 3, 1982 Minn. Laws 534, 535 added to MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 302A.011(10) (West Supp. 1983) the words "or issuance" and deleted the words "or for the
benefit of" that formerly followed "by a corporation to" and preceded "any of its shareholders."
The former change appears to have been made to avoid doubt as to the status of debt securities issued
by a corporation pursuant to Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The latter change deletes
words appearing in AMENDED MODEL BusINEss CORP. Acr § 2(i), Amendments (1979), supra note
274, at 1869. The ABA Committee Comments offer no insight as to the range of transactions thought
to be distributions as a result of the inclusion of the "for the benefit of" language. See Amendments
(1979), supra note 274, at 1878. But such language seems clearly intended to treat as a distribution
any transfer of money or other property, or incurrence of indebtedness, to a third party that increases
a shareholder's net worth. It is difficult to understand why such transactions should not be treated as
distributions. Perhaps the Minnesota legislature believes that such transactions are another type of
indirect transfer of money or other property to shareholders, and thus still are distributions.
336. MtNN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.01 1(10) (West Supp. 1983).
337. The right of the board to authorize, and the corporation to make, distributions may be prohibited, limited, or restricted by, the corporation's articles of incorporation or bylaws, or an agreement.
The rights and priorities of persons to receive distributions may also be established by any of such
documents. Id. § 302A.551(1).
338. Id.
339. The statute adds that no liability under either its provision stating the standard for directors'
conduct or its provision establishing liability of directors for illegal distributions will accrue if the
requirements of subdivision 2 are met. Id. § 302A.551(2).
340. Id.
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making of the distribution does not reduce the corporation's remaining

net assets below the aggregate preferential amount payable in the event of
liquidation to the holders of shares having preferential rights, unless the
distribution is made to those shareholders in the order and to the extent of
their respective priorities. If the money or property available for distribu-

tion is insufficient to satisfy all preferences, distributions must be made
pro rata according to the order of priority of preferences by classes and by

34 1
series within those classes.
The date on which the effect of a distribution by purchase, redemption,
or other acquisition of the corporation's own shares is measured is the
earliest of the dates on which money or other property is transferred, or
indebtedness payable in installments or otherwise is incurred, by the corporation, or on which the shareholder ceases to be a shareholder of the
corporation with respect to the shares. The date on which the effect of any
other distribution is measured is the date of its authorization if payment
occurs 120 days or less following the date of authorization, or as of the
date of payment if payment occurs more than 120 days following the date
of authorization. 342
341. Id. § 302A.551(4). The last sentence of § 551(4) appears contrary to the literal language of
the restriction labelled (a) in text accompanying this note. That restriction, if applied literally, prohibits distributions if all amounts payable to shares with a preference on that kind of distribution are not
paid. The last sentence, id. § 302A.551(4)(b), instructs how a distribution failing to meet this condition must be made. The conflict can be resolved by recognizing that the restriction labelled (a) is
ambiguous as to the result when more than one class or series of shares has a preference over common
shares. Assume a corporation has outstanding senior preferred shares entitled to receive a stated,
cumulative dividend before any dividend is paid on either junior preferred or common shares; junior
preferred shares entitled to receive a stated, cumulative dividend before any dividend is paid on common shares; and common shares. Also assume dividends have not been paid for some time on any
class of shares. If the corporation proposes to pay a dividend only to the holders of senior preferred
shares that will reduce, but not eliminate the arrearage to that class, can such a payment be made?
The answer is yes if the last sentence overrides the restriction labelled (a), or if the restriction labelled
(a) is read to permit distributions to holders of a class of shares if all amounts payable are paid to
holders of shares with a preference senior to that of the holders of the proposed recipient class. The
answer is no if the restriction is read literally and is thought to override the last sentence. It appears
that the affirmative answer was intended. Compare the exception in id. § 302A.551(4)(a)(2).
342. Id. § 302A.551(3)(a), (b). These provisions are substantively identical to the provisions in
the Amended Model Act. See supra text accompanying note 291. They present an ambiguity previously noted, see supra note 291, as to when the effect a distribution of the corporation's long-term
debt, not in connection with a reacquisition of shares, is measured. It was earlier argued that under
the Amended Model Act, the effect of such a distribution should be measured no later than the date
on which the debt is distributed to shareholders (i.e., that "payment" is synonymous with the making of the distribution for this purpose). See id. It is not clear that this is an appropriate construction of
the provisions as they appear in the Minnesota Act. If it were accepted as an appropriate construction
of the Minnesota Act, the effect of a distribution of long-term debt would be determined at the latest
on the date of making the distribution to the shareholders. But such determination would be irrelevant
because the distribution would have no current impact on the corporation's ability to meet its shortterm obligations. Thus, it would appear that "payment" for purposes of a test based only on cashflows ought to be interpreted in this context to mean the date on which cash or property (other than

Restrictions on Corporate Distributions
Indebtedness incurred or issued by a corporation in a qualifying 343 distribution to a shareholder, who as a result of the transaction is no longer a
shareholder, 344 is on a parity with the indebtedness of the corporation to
its general, unsecured creditors, except to the extent subordinated, agreed
to, or secured by a pledge of any assets of the corporation or a related
corporation, 345 or subject to any other agreement between the corporation
346
and the shareholder.
Shares of a corporation's own stock acquired by it become authorized
but unissued shares, unless the corporation's articles of incorporation procorporate debt) is transferred to persons in satisfaction of debt previously distributed as a dividend.
However, that result is contrary to the results for share reacquisition debt. See infra text accompanying notes 365-69.
It is possible that the issue is dealt with under MNN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.551(3)(c) (West Supp.
1983). That subsection may imply that all indebtedness issued in a distribution other than a reacquisition of shares is subordinated to general, unsecured creditors. See infra note 361.
343. For example, a distribution made in accordance with MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.551 (West
Supp. 1983).
344. The Reporter's Notes do not explain why the statute limits the parity clause to transactions
in which the shareholder's interest in the corporation is terminated. The remaining language in the
clause is taken from the Amended Model Act. See id. reporter's notes, at 191. One explanation may
be that such a requirement was inserted to prevent, at least, more egregious attempts by controlling
shareholders to provide themselves with an option of improving their position in event of insolvency
without effective surrender of control. See supranote 326.
One can anticipate some difficulty on the part of courts in determining whether a shareholder "as a
result of the transaction is no longer a shareholder." MniN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.551(3)(c) (West
Supp. 1983). Thus, there are likely to be issues as to whether transfers of shares to family members of
the shareholder close in time to the repurchase will be recognized, particularly if the former shareholder continues to participate in the corporation's control structure (the fact that such transfers might
result in payments on the repurchase being labelled dividends under I.R.C. § 302, 318 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981), might not dissuade a controlling shareholder from making such transfers in the face
of financial difficulty). A simpler issue relates to a repurchase transaction in which the shares are
retained as security for the obligation and thus are not acquired by the corporation at the time of
closing. If the status of the indebtedness has to be determined before the shares have been transferred
to the corporation, is the shareholder as a result of the transaction no longer a shareholder?
345. MimN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.011(25) (West Supp. 1983) defines a "related corporation" of a
specified corporation as a parent or subsidiary of the specified corporation or another subsidiary of a
parent of the specified corporation. Section 302A.01 1(21) defines the "parent" of a specified corporation as a corporation that directly, or indirectly through related corporations, owns more than 50%
of the voting power of shares entitled to vote for directors in the specified corporation. Id. §
302A.011(21). Section 302A.011(31) contains an analogous definition for "subsidiary." Id. §
302A.011(31).
Section 302A.551(3)(c) states that if indebtedness issued by a corporation to a shareholder in a
terminating reacquisition is secured by a pledge of a related corporation's assets, the indebtedness
will no longer be on a parity with the corporation's indebtedness to its general, unsecured creditors.
Id. § 302A.551(3)(c). It is by no means clear why such a pledge should have any impact on the status
of the debt within the corporation.
346. Id. § 302A.551(3)(c). Note that the Minnesota additions to the Amended Model Act language apparently resolve the ambiguity under the latter, see supranote 292, as to the status of indebtedness issued in a valid distribution that is secured. See MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.551 reporter's
notes, at 191, 196 (West Supp. 1983) (the latter indicating that the result in Tracy v. Perkins-Tracy
Printing Co., 278 Minn. 159, 153 N.W. 2d 241 (1967), will be followed under the new section).
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hibit their reissue. If the articles so provide, shares acquired are cancelled
on acquisition, and the number of the corporation's authorized shares is
reduced by the number of shares acquired. The corporation must thereafter file a statement of cancellation with the secretary of state showing the
347
reduction in its authorized shares.
Directors who are present at the meeting 348 and fail to vote against a
distribution made in violation of the Minnesota provisions, or in violation
of a restriction in the corporation articles or bylaws or in an agreement,
and who fail to comply with the Minnesota standard of conduct for directors,34 9 are jointly and severally liable to the corporation for the amount
of the distribution illegally paid. 350 Shareholders who receive a distribution made in violation of the Minnesota provisions are liable to the corporation to the extent that the distribution received by them exceeded the
35 1
amount that could have been legally paid.
A director against whom an action is brought for an illegal distribution
may implead all other directors who voted for, 352 or consented in writing,

to the distribution and may compel pro rata contribution from them. Any
such director may also implead all shareholders who received the distri353
bution and may compel pro rata contribution from them.

Finally, Minnesota provides that these provisions supersede all other
354
state statutes with respect to distributions.

347.

MINN. STAT. ANN § 302A.553 (West Supp. 1983).

348. Section 302A.559(l) also applies to directors who consent in writing to an illegal distribution. Id. § 302A.559(l). As to when a director may do so, see id. § 302A.233.
349. See id. §302A.251.
350. The directors' liability under id. § 302A.559(I) is limited "to the extent the distribution
exceeded the amount that properly could have been paid under section 302A.55 1." The latter section
validates additional restrictions in the corporation's articles or bylaws, or in an agreement, but does
not make such restrictions equivalent to statutory limitations. The statement in text seems to be what
the drafters intended.
351. The reference in id. § 302A.557(1) is to a distribution in violation of id. § 302A.55 1. Apparently shareholders are thus not liable for distributions made in violation of restrictions in the corporation's articles or bylaws, or in an agreement. Compare id. § 302A.559(l), which defines directors' liability.
352. Note that this clause of id. § 302A.559(2) does not include all directors liable for an illegal
distribution under id. § 302A.559(I) (i.e., those present at the meeting who fail to vote against or
who consent in writing to a distribution).
353. Section 302A.559(2) of the Minnesota Act continues by adding "to the extent provided in
section 302A.557, subdivision 1." Id. § 302A.559(2). The addition makes shareholders liable only
to the extent the distribution exceeds the amount permissible under id. § 302A.551. See supra note
351.
354. The statute specifically states that the provisions of the Minnesota (Uniform) Fraudulent
Conveyance Act (MINN STAT. ANN. §§ 513.20-.32 (West 1947)) do not apply to distributions made
by a corporation governed by the Business Corporation Act. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.551(3)(d)
(West Supp. 1983).

Restrictions on Corporate Distributions
ii. CostImplications of the MinnesotaProvisions
The Minnesota provisions appear to impose on the groups interested in
the amount of corporate financial distributions and the groups involved in
the administration of the provisions costs that are slightly greater than
those resulting for such groups from the Amended Model Act provisions,
but less than those resulting for such groups from the provisions of any
other previously discussed act.
The Minnesota provisions appear to raise only two issues for accountants asked to certify the financial statements of a Minnesota corporation:
how to account for distributions in excess of the corporation's shareholders' equity; 355 and how to account for an installment repurchase of shares
when the repurchase does not terminate the shareholder's interest in the
corporation. 356 Neither issue should significantly increase the corporation's cost of obtaining certified financial statements. But corporations
that make distributions in excess of shareholders' equity may incur increased costs in securing credit and in procuring new shareholders because of accountants' disclosures regarding such distributions. Such costs
should be about the same as the accounting costs incurred by Amended
Model Act corporations and less than such costs incurred by corporations
incorporated under any of the other acts previously discussed.
Minnesota corporations should incur greater costs related to the insertion and enforcement of contractual limitations on distributions than
would have been incurred had the corporations been incorporated under
any of the acts previously discussed. Creditors receive less protection
under the Minnesota Act than they would have received under any of the
previously discussed acts. 357 It thus appears likely that counsel advising
355. See supra note 304 (discussing the accounting options).
356. Apparently, indebtedness issued in such repurchases is subordinated in the event of insolvency to debt owed to general, unsecured creditors. See infra note 361. Such risk does not seem
sufficient to treat the transaction as a conditional purchase. It therefore appears that the only accounting reaction to such transactions will be to disclose the transaction giving rise to such indebtedness
and the status of the indebtedness in the event of insolvency.
357. A creditor's position under the Minnesota Act appears to be even weaker than it is under the
Amended Model Act (under which, as noted supra note 308, creditors receive considerably less
protection than under other statutory systems). Minnesota has opted for precluding application of its
fraudulent conveyances statute to corporate distributions. See supra note 354. Distributions may be
made by a corporation with a single class of stock that result in the corporation's liabilities exceeding
its assets, as long as the immediate cash out-flow does not cause the corporation to become equitably
insolvent. In the event of a distribution with such a result in connection with an installment repurchase of all of the shares owned by a shareholder (wherein the indebtedness is thereafter on a parity
with indebtedness to the corporation's general, unsecured creditors, see MINN. STAT. ANN. §
302A.551(3)(c) (West Supp. 1983)), creditors have been adversely affected as compared to their
position on the same transaction with an Amended Model Act corporation.
Creditors of a Minnesota corporation with an outstanding class of shares with a liquidation preference are protected against such risk from installment repurchases of shares (except where the repur-
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creditors dealing with Minnesota corporations will insist on contractual
limitations on distributions more often than they might have had the corporations involved been incorporated under any of the previously discussed acts. The result of such insistence should be higher costs related to

insertion and enforcement of such limitations.
A Minnesota corporation should incur costs in determining the validity
of a proposed distribution that are greater than it would have incurred had

it been incorporated under the Amended Model Act, but that are less than
it would have incurred had it been incorporated under any of the other
previously discussed acts. Counsel advising such a corporation on the

most troublesome form of distribution under the Minnesota act-an installment repurchase of shares-must resolve the following issues in providing advice: 358 (a) how the Act's provisions as to when the effect of a
distribution is to be measured relate to its provisions as to when a distribution is permissible; 359 (b) how the Act's equitable insolvency test applies
chase involves shares with a liquidation preference) by virtue of id. § 302A.551(4)(a)(2). But such
creditors are not quite as well protected as they would be under the Amended Model Act on distributions of cash or property. Under the latter, distributions may not be made (unless the articles of
incorporation permit) when the corporation's net assets are less than the aggregate liquidation preference of outstanding shares with such a preference. See AMENDED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 45,
Amendments (1979), supra note 274, at 1872 (discussed supra at text accompanying note 283). A
Minnesota corporation can make a distribution in such circumstances to holders of the preference
shares. See MINN. STAT. ANN- § 302A.551(4)(a)(2) (West Supp. 1983).
358. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.551 reporter's notes, at 195 (West Supp. 1983), which incorporates material from the Committee Comments on the Amended Model Act provisions on this
point. The Notes also make reference to Tracy v. Perkins-Tracy Printing Co., 278 Minn. 159, 153
N.W. 2d 241 (1967), a well-known case involving an installment repurchase of shares. MINN. STAT
ANN § 302A.551 reporter's notes, at 196 (West Supp. 1983).
359. MINN. STAT ANN. § 302A.551(3)(a) (West Supp. 1983) says that the effect of an installment repurchase of shares is to be measured as of the earliest of the dates on which money or other
property is transferred, or indebtedness is incurred, by the corporation, or the shareholder ceases to
be a shareholder with respect to the shares. In a typical installment repurchase involving a cash down
payment at the closing, with simultaneous incurrence of indebtedness for the remainder of the purchase price and termination of the shareholder's interest in the shares, all three dates coincide. Thus,
under the dictates of id. § 302A.551 (1) ("the corporation may make the distribution if it is able to pay
its debts in the ordinary course of business after making the distribution"), the effect of such an
installment repurchase on its equitable solvency is measured on that date.
That language may lead one to believe that the directors on the date of closing of a typical repurchase must investigate the effects of the distribution on the corporation's solvency. But id. §
302A.551 (1) apparently mandates a different result. Pursuant to the first sentence of subdivision 1. a
distinction is drawn between the directors' duties at the time the distribution is authorized and at the
time the distribution is made (i.e., the date on which the effect is measured). The board at the time of
authorization must make a determination, in accordance with § 302A.551(2) of the Minnesota Act,
"that the corporation will be able to pay its debts in the ordinary course of business after making the
distribution," id. § 302A.551(1) (i.e., after the measurement date of the distribution). Such a determination is presumed to be proper if made by the directors in good faith compliance with the Minnesota standard of care on the basis of a broad range of financial data. Id. § 302A.551(2). Consequently,, under the Minnesota standard, there is no liability of directors for an illegal distribution if
these requirements are met. Id. Section 302A.551(1) of the Minnesota Act further states that the
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to an installment repurchase of a parent corporation's shares by its subsidiary; 360 (c) what status indebtedness incurred in a repurchase of part of
a shareholder's shares has in the event of insolvency; 361 (d) what guidelines to provide to recipient shareholders as to circumstances in which
they will be liable in connection with a distribution; 362 (e) how long the
corporation must be able to pay its debts in the usual course of business
after making the distribution; 363 and (f) what constitutes reasonable care
by directors in effecting such a transaction. 364 In addition, the corporation
board must not know before the distribution is made that the determination was or has become erroneous. Id. § 302A.551(I). It does not appear, however, that such knowledge affects qualification under
the exculpatory subdivision (2), which looks only toward the determination that the corporation will
be able to pay its debts. As to whether recipient shareholders are liable in such circumstances, see
ipfranote 362.
360. The issue is the same as that presented under the Amended Model Act. See supra note 313.
361. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.551(3)(c) (West Supp. 1983) implies that such indebtedness is
always subordinated to indebtedness owed to the corporation's general, unsecured creditors. Even if
one views that subsection as inapplicable to indebtedness not resulting from complete termination of
a shareholder's interest, common law decisions on the same issue point to the same conclusion. See,
e.g., Robinson v. Wangemann, 75 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1936). Query, however, as to what result will
be obtained if such indebtedness is secured by a mortgage on the corporation's assets. Compare
Tracy v. Perkins-Tracy Printing Co., 278 Minn. 159, 153 N.W.2d 241 (1967) (mortgage given by
corporation to secure repurchase of all shares held by a shareholder held valid where, at the time
given, the corporation's surplus exceeded the purchase price).
362. MmNN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.557(l) (West Supp. 1983) provides that a shareholder who
receives a distribution in violation of id. § 302A.551 is liable to the corporation or to a director held
liable on the distribution.
There appear to be circumstances in which shareholders receiving a distribution may be liable to
the corporation even though directors were not liable to the corporation on the distribution. Assume
that the distribution is an installment repurchase of shares in which there is a gap in time between the
directors' authorization and the date of closing of the transaction. As a result of the complicated
relationship between id. § 302A.551(3)(a) & (b) and id. § 302A.551(1), see supranote 359, directors
on the date of authorization must make a determination of the corporation's solvency on the measurement date for the repurchase, typically the closing date. Assume that such a determination has been
made in good faith and with reasonable care, using appropriate financial information, and that the
directors cause the corporation to make the distribution on the closing date, not knowing that the
earlier determination has become erroneous. Section 302A.551(1) provides that such distribution is
illegal because on the date of measurement, the closing date, the corporation is not able to pay its
debts in the ordinary course of business after making the distribution. MINN. STAT. ANN. §
302A.551(1) (West Supp. 1983). In such circumstances, directors are not liable to the corporation.
Id. § 302A.551(2). But the shareholders are liable to the corporation, even though they did not know
that the distribution was illegal. See id. § 302A.557(1); id. § 302A.557 reporter's notes, at 198.
On the other hand, if the distribution did not involve an acquisition of the corporation's shares, and
was paid within 120 days of authorization, recipient shareholders apparently would be liable only in
the event that the directors are liable. In such a case the effect is measured at the date of authorization.
See supra note 359. If the conditions set forth above are met, neither directors nor shareholders are
liable on such a distribution. Id.
There is no apparent policy justification for such disparate treatment.
363. The issue is discussed in Murphy, supranote 112, at 870.
364. The Reporter's Notes quote from the thoughtful comment prepared to accompany the
Amended Model Act. See MrNN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.551 reporter's notes, at 192-93 (West Supp.
1983). That comment makes specific reference to "a cash flow analysis based on a business forecast
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must bear the cost of an analysis of its short-term cash flows to determine
that the corporation will be able to pay its debts in the ordinary course of
business after making the distribution.
The costs borne by Minnesota corporations and by parties in the corporate solution related to directors' time expended in connection with distributions and to transactions abandoned because of legal impediments or
complexities should also be slightly greater than they would have been
had the corporations been incorporated under the Amended Model Act.
However, such costs will be less than they would have been had the corporations been incorporated under any of the other acts previously discussed.
General, unsecured creditors of an insolvent Minnesota corporation
that has previously made and not satisfied an installment repurchase of
shares that terminates the shareholder's interest in the corporation are
likely to suffer larger losses under these provisions than they would have
suffered had the corporation been incorporated under any of the previously discussed acts. 365 Under the Minnesota Act, the obligation to such a
and budget for a sufficient period of time to permit a conclusion that known obligations of the corporation can reasonably be expected to be satisfied over the period of time that they will mature." See
Amendments (1979), supra note 274, at 1882. On the other hand, MINN. STAT ANN § 302A.551(2)
(West Supp. 1983) exculpates directors who have made a determination of solvency after the distribution in compliance with the Minnesota standard of conduct "on the basis of financial information
prepared in accordance with accounting methods, or a fair valuation or other method, reasonable in
the circumstances." That language appears to have been adapted from the Amended Model Act provision defining the permissible approaches for directors to valuing assets and liabilities for the remaining assets test. See AMENDED MODEL BUSINESS CORP Acr § 45(b), Amendments (1979), supra
note 274, at 1872. It appears that for the most part such language should be disregarded, apart from
"financial information prepared in accordance with [some] other method, reasonable in the circumstances." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.551(2) (West Supp. 1983).
Another practical problem in providing advice to directors concerns the Minnesota provision that
makes any distribution in violation of the provisions of any agreement a violation of statute. See id.
§§ 302A.551(l), .559(l). The problem relates to the need to establish a system whereby all agreements thought to impose such restrictions can be segregated for easy review in conjunction with the
decision to make a distribution. The problem is not presented by the more typical provision making
distributions in violation of provisions in the articles of incorporation a violation of statute. See, e.g.,
AMENDED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 45, para. 1, Amendments (1979), supra note 274, at 1872.
365. Installment repurchases of less than all of the shares owned by the selling shareholder can
also be made more freely under the Minnesota Act than under any of the previously discussed acts.
See infra text accompanying note 367. But obligations incurred in such repurchases apparently are
subject to subordination in the event of insolvency to claims of general, unsecured creditors. See
supra note 361. Such protection is generally analogous to that afforded by the insolvency cut-offs in
the Model Act, MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 6 (1979), and the California Act, CAL. CORP. CODE §
501 (West 1977). Such protection appears greater than that afforded by the parity rule in the
Amended Model Act, AMENDED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 45, para. 4, Amendments (1979),
supra note 274, at 1872, and the Michigan Act, MICH. COMp. LAWS § 450.1367 (MICH- STAT ANN §
21.200(367) (Callaghan 1983)), in similar circumstances, except that in both cases there is an outset
asset-liability test applied to the total repurchase. Thus, more non-terminating repurchases may occur
under the Minnesota Act than would occur under either the Amended Model Act or the Michigan
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selling shareholder is accorded parity with corporate obligations to general, unsecured creditors if as of the time for measuring the effect of the
repurchase 366 the corporation is able to pay its debts in the ordinary
course of business after making the repurchase. Because of the focus of
this test on the corporation's near-term cash flows and liabilities due in
near future, and because of the parity rule, only the cash down payment
on an installment repurchase of all of a shareholder's shares is ever subject to the test. Each of the acts previously discussed apply one or more
statutory limitations to the full purchase price in such a repurchase. 367 It
can therefore be anticipated that more installment repurchases will be entered into by Minnesota corporations than would have been entered into
had such corporations been incorporated in any other jurisdiction. It also
seems likely that a significant number of such repurchases will be by controlling shareholders of financially troubled corporations seeking only to
improve their claim against the corporation in the event of bankruptcy. If
the parity with general, unsecured creditors is recognized in bankruptcy, 368 and if the corporate assets available are less than the corporation's indebtedness to general, unsecured creditors, 369 payments to the
selling shareholder by virtue of the operation of the Minnesota provisions
will reduce amounts received, and thereby increase losses suffered, by
such creditors.
Current or prospective shareholders of a publicly held Minnesota corporation attempting to gauge prospects for the corporation's share prices
from changes in the corporation's dividend rates are likely to bear the
same investment losses or additional information costs they would have
borne had the corporation been incorporated under any of the previously
discussed acts.

Act, but creditors in event of insolvency are better protected under the Minnesota Act than they
would be under either of the other two acts.
366. For the meaning of the term, see supratext accompanying note 341.
367. Thus, under the Model Act the full purchase price is tested against the corporation's earned
surplus and each installment thereof is tested by the insolvency limitation. See MODEL BUsINEss
Copp. AcT § 6 (1979). Under the Michigan Act, the full purchase price is tested against the corporation's surplus. See MIcH. COMP. LAWS § 450.1365 (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(365) (Callaghan
1983)). Under the California Act, each payment on the full purchase price must meet either the retained earnings test or the remaining assets test, and must meet the insolvency test. See CAL. CORP.
CODE 88 166, 500-501 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983). Under the Amended Model Act, the full purchase
price is tested against-the corporation's net assets (i.e., total assets less total liabilities, including the
repurchase obligation). See AMENDED MODEL BusriEss CORP. Act § 45(b), Amendments (1979),
supra note 274, at 1872.
368. See supranote 324.
369. See data discussed in Kummert, supranote 10, at 375 n.67.
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Benefits Resultingfrom the MinnesotaProvisions

The principal benefits received by parties in the corporate solution from

the Minnesota provisions-the ability of corporations to maintain stable
dividend rates despite recent adverse earnings performance, 370 and the
prohibition of distributions that jeopardize payment of debts in the ordinary course of business 37'-appear to be less than the costs incurred by

such parties as a result of the operation of such provisions. In terms of the
relative gap between costs and benefits, both the California Act and the
Amended Model Act appear to have a closer balance of such items than
the Minnesota Act. Nevertheless, for most legislatures, the Minnesota
provisions represent a viable alternative to distribution provisions cur-

rently in operation.
B.

FraudulentConveyance Law Restrictionson FinancialDistributions

Financial distributions 372 by corporations to shareholders are also subject to a complex pattern of federal and state fraudulent conveyance law
provisions. Distributions by corporations voluntarily 373 or involuntarily 374 placed in bankruptcy may be recovered by the trustee in bankruptcy
from recipient shareholders in two situations: (a) the distributions were

fraudulent transfers under section 548 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act; or
(b) the distributions were voidable under some other state or federal law

by at least one unsecured creditor with an allowable claim against the
370. As to the significance of such a benefit, see id. at 370-71.
371. As to the significance of such a benefit, see id. at 364.
372. The cases discussed in footnotes throughout this part often do not characterize the transfer
of property or incurrence of indebtedness involved as a dividend or a share repurchase or redemption.
For purposes of discussion throughout this section, a "dividend" is deemed to have been paid by a
corporation if money or other property is transferred, or indebtedness incurred, directly or indirectly,
to or for the benefit of any of its shareholders without receipt of consideration. A share repurchase is
deemed to have occurred if in connection with such a transfer or incurrence the corporation acquires a
shareholder's shares.
373. 11U.S.C. § 301 (1982) requires that to commence a voluntary bankruptcy case, a petition
must be filed by an entity that may be a debtor under the chapter under which relief is sought. The
term "debtor" is defined generally in id. § 109(a), with further qualifications in id. § 109(b) & (d)for
petitions under id. chs. 7 (liquidation) & 11 (reorganization). Business corporations incorporated in
the United States can be "debtors" under either chapter. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY $ 109.01, at
109-4 to -5 (ch. 11)& 109.02, at 109-10 to -I1(ch. 7) (L. King 15th ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as
COLLIER].

There is no requirement that a debtor voluntarily filing a petition under 11 U.S.C. ch. 7 or ch. 11
(1982) be insolvent. See 2 COLLIER, supra, $ 101.26, at 101-43.
374. The rules for involuntary bankruptcy are for the most part contained in I I U.S.C. § 303
(1982). See generally 2 COLLIER, supra note 373, ch. 303. Creditors need only prove that the debtor
is "generally not paying [its] debts as [they] become due" or that a custodian was appointed or took
possession of substantially all of the debtor's property within the past 120 days in order to obtain
relief. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(h) (1982).

Restrictions on Corporate Distributions
corporation. 375 Two state laws are typically 376 invoked on behalf of such
unsecured creditors: (1) state statutory 377 or common law rules 378 on fraudulent conveyances; and (2) state corporation law restrictions on distributions. Creditors of financially troubled corporations, of course, assert precisely the same theories outside of bankruptcy.

379

The relationship between the fraudulent conveyance rules and state
corporation act restrictions on distributions has long been the subject of
controversy. 380 Debate on the issue was recently joined between Profes375. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1982). Creditors with certain claims not allowable may also be considered.
Section 544(b) is derived from former § 70e of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C. § 110(e) (repealed
1978)). See 4 COLLIER, supranote 373, 544.03, at 544-13.
376. See, e.g., Stanley v. Brock (In re Kettle Fried Chicken, Inc.), 513 F.2d 807 (6th Cir. 1975)
(under 11 U.S.C. § 70(e) (repealed 1978), trustee invoked the Delaware corporation statute limiting
repurchase of shares); McCulloch v. Williams (In re McCulloch & Son, Inc.), 30 Bankr. 7 (Bankr.
D. Or. 1983) (under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1982), trustee invoked both the Oregon fraudulent conveyance statute and the Oregon business corporation act to prevent performance of share repurchase
agreement); Gennet v. Silver (In re Harry Kaiser Assocs.), 14 Bankr. 107, 109 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1981) (under I1 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1982), trustee invoked the Florida fraudulent conveyance statute in
connection with dividends paid to major shareholder).
A third theory sometimes still invoked is the corporate trust fund theory. For a recent application,
see American Nat'l Bank v. MortgageAmerica Corp. (In re MortgageAmerica Corp.), 714 F.2d 1266
(5th Cir. 1983).
377. Most state fraudulent conveyance statutes are based on the UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE
ACT, 7A U.L.A. 161 (1978). The Uniform Act was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1918, see 7A U.L.A. 161 (1978), and is currently in effect in
26 states, see id. at 31 (Supp. 1983). In addition, 22 other states have statutes on fraudulent conveyances, most of which are modelled on 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1570) (i.e., the statutes declare transfers with
actual intent to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors to be fraudulent). ALA. CODE § 8-9-6 (1975);
ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.010 (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 68-1302 (1979); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-10117 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-552 (West 1960); FLA. STAT. § 726.01 (1981); GA. CODE
ANN. § 28-201 (Harrison Supp. 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 59, § 4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-84); IND.
CODE ANN. § 32-2-1-14 (Bums 1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 33-102 (1981); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
378.010 (Baldwin 1981); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1969 (West 1977); Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-3-3
(1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 428.020 (Vernon 1952); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-15 (1976); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 95.070 (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-16-1 (1969); S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-23-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976);
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.02 (Vernon 1968); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2281 (1970); VA.
CODE § 55-80 (1981); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 40-1-1 (Michie 1982).
378. Only three states, Hawaii, Iowa, and Maine, do not have statutes on fraudulent conveyances. Courts in Hawaii and Maine have held that 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1570) is part of their state's inherited common law. See Dee v. Foster, 21 Hawaii 1, 3 (1912); Butler v. Moore, 73 Me. 151, 154-55
(1882). The Iowa court appears to use a common law fraudulent conveyance rule. See, e.g., Rouse v.
Rouse, 174 N.W.2d 660 (Iowa 1970).
379. See, e.g., Crete Concrete Corp. v. Josephs, 66 Misc. 2d 837, 322 N.Y.S.2d 935 (Sup. Ct.
1971) (creditor invoked New York fraudulent conveyance statute and corporation law in connection
with asset transfers to a shareholder), modified, 39 A.D.2d 543, 332 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1972).
380. Compare 2 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 604, at 1043-47
(rev. ed. 1940) (arguing that recipients of dividends were not donees, and thus not within the theory
of fraudulent conveyances) and H. BALLANTiNE, CORPORATIONS § 255, at 601 (rev. ed. 1946) (arguing the primacy of state dividend statutes) with Powers v. Heggie, 268 Mass. 233, 167 N.E. 314
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sor Clark, arguing that the fraudulent conveyance rules at a minimum
should be interpreted to provide an additional set of restrictions on distributions, 38 ' and the ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, questioning the
desirability of inconsistency between the provisions in the Amended
Model Business Corporation Act and the fraudulent conveyance rules. 382
The remainder of this section will examine the bankruptcy fraudulent
transfer provisions and a typical state (the Uniform) fraudulent conveyance act. It will then attempt to assess the costs and benefits of imposing
the fraudulent conveyance rules as an additional set of restrictions on corporate distributions.
1. Bankruptcy FraudulentTransfer Provisions
Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act authorizes the trustee in
bankruptcy to avoid certain transfers383 of the debtor's property, or obligations incurred by the debtor, made or incurred within one year of the
date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 384 Specifically, the statute
authorizes the trustee to avoid any such transfer or obligation made or
incurred (1)with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor 385
(1929) (holding trustee in bankruptcy has power to recover dividends paid when corporation is insolvent and thus paid in violation of the Massachusetts (Uniform) fraudulent conveyance act).
Clark, The Duties of the CorporateDebtor to Its Creditors,90 HARV. L. REv. 505, 558 (1977),
suspects that some courts would wrongly decide that corporation law rules preempt application of the
general fraudulent conveyance law even in the absence of a preemptive statute. Relatively few of the
cases discussed in the following section have involved claims by plaintiffs alternatively stated under
state corporation law and under fraudulent conveyance law. None of the cases containing such alternative claims have held the corporation law to preempt application of the fraudulent conveyance law.
See Spanier v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 127 Ariz. 589, 623 P.2d 19 (Ct. App. 1980)
(transfer to former shareholders in connection with sale of shares held fraudulent conveyance; unnecessary to consider illegal dividend theory); Moseley v. Briggs Realty Co., 69 N.E.2d 7 (Mass. Jud.
Ct. 1946) (dividend held to have been distributed in violation of corporation statute; dividend also
gave rise to a cause of action for fraudulent conveyance, but statute of limitations had run); Crete
Concrete Corp. v. Josephs, 66 Misc. 2d 837, 322 N.Y.S.2d 935 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (dividends violated
both fraudulent conveyance law and state corporation law), modified, 39 A.D.2d 543, 332 N.Y.S.2d
601 (1972). See also United States v. 58th Street Plaza Theatre, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 475 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (dividends violated state fraudulent conveyance law and a similar provision then in New York
stock corporation law).
381. Clark, supra note 380, at 558.
382. Amendments (1979), supra note 274, at 1882-83.
383. I1 U.S.C. § 101(40) (1982) defines "transfer" for purposes of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
generally to mean "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary.
of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a
security interest."
384. Id. § 548(a).
385. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (1982) provides that both existing and future creditors of the debtor
are defrauded by a transfer made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud either class of creditor. See 4 COLLIER, supra note 373, 548.02[03] n.9.
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of the debtor; 386 or (2) without receipt of reasonably equivalent value387 if
the debtor: (a) was insolvent on the date the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result thereof; 388 (b) was en386. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (1982) is modelled on the first clause of former § 67e of the Bankruptcy Act, Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 67e, 30 Stat. 544, 564 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 107(e);
repealed 1978). Former § 67e provided that "all conveyances... made.., by a ... bankrupt...
within four months prior to the filing of the petition, with the intent and purpose on his part to hinder,
delay, or defraud his creditors.., shall be null and void as against the creditors of such debtor." Id.
See also 4 COLLER, supra note 373, 548.01[1] n.1.
Relatively few cases involving corporate distributions to shareholders have invoked the "actual
intent to defraud" clause, probably because of the relative level of difficulty in proving such intent as
compared to the difficulty in proving the elements for other fraudulent transfers. See Landers, A
Unified Approach to Parent,Subsidiary, andAffiliate Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHt. L. REv.
589, 595 (1975). Those that have been brought most frequently involve situations where the transferee was an officer, director, or major shareholder of the debtor corporation. See, as recent examples, Palmer v. Stokely, 255 F. Supp. 674, 680 (W.D. Okla. 1966) (dividend); In re Process-Manz
Press, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 333, 346-47 (N.D. I11.1964) (dividend), rev'don other grounds,369 F.2d
513 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 957 (1967); Pirrone v. Toboroff (In re Vaniman Int'l,
Inc.), 22 Bankr. 166, 182-85 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (dividend); Consove v. Cohen (In re Roco
Corp.), 15 Bankr. 813, 819 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1981) (share repurchase), aff'd, 21 Bankr. 429, 435-37
(Bankr. 1st Cir. 1982); Pereira v. Checkmate Communications Co. (In re Checkmate Stereo &
Elecs., Ltd.), 9 Bankr. 585, 625-26 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (dividend). Earlier cases are collected
in 4 COLLIER, supra note 373, 548.02[5] n.54.
387. This phrase in 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1982) replaces the phrase "without fair consideration" that appeared in former § 67d(2)(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 1,
sec. 67d(2)(a), 52 Stat. 840, 877 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(a); repealed 1978). Former §
67d(l)(e) of the Bankruptcy Act defined "fair consideration" to require good faith and receipt of
economically equivalent value to the property transferred or obligation incurred. Act of June 22,
1938, ch. 575, § 1, sec. 67d(1)(e), 52 Stat. 840, 877 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(a); repealed
1978). By virtue of the adoption of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, good faith is no longer required if
reasonably equivalent value is given. For a discussion of the effects of the change, see Macey,
Preferencesand Fraudulent Transfers Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 28 EMORY L.J.
685, 704 (1979).
388. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B)(i) (1982) was derived from former § 67d(2)(a) of the Bankruptcy
Act, Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 1, sec. 67d(2)(a), 52 Stat. 840, 877 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §
107(d)(2)(a); repealed 1978). Section 548(a)(2)(B)(i) omits the language in the former section to the
effect that such transfers were fraudulent only as to creditors existing at the time of transfer. 4 CoLLIER, supra note 373, 548.03[5], at 548-45.
Most of the cases applying the federal fraudulent transfer provisions to distributions by corporations to shareholders invoke this clause as at least one of the grounds for avoiding such transfers. See
Branch v. Steph, 389 F.2d 233, 235 (10th Cir. 1968) (dividend; alternative holding); Older v. Winslow (In re Winslow Plumbing, Heating & Contracting Co.), 424 F. Supp. 910, 915 (D. Conn. 1976)
(dividend); Inland Sec. Co. v. Estate of Kirshner, 382 F. Supp. 338, 343 (W.D. Mo. 1974) (dividend); In re Security Prods. Co., 310 F. Supp. 110, 119 (E.D. Mo. 1969) (dividend); Palmer v.
Stokely, 255 F. Supp. 674, 680 (W.D. Okla. 1966) (dividend; alternative holding); Louisiana Indus.
Coatings, Inc. v. Pertuit (In re Louisiana Indus. Coatings, Inc.), 31 Bankr. 688, 697-98 (Bankr.
E.D. La. 1983) (share repurchase; alternative holding); Flanigan v. DeFeo (In re DeFeo Fruit Co.),
24 Bankr. 220 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982) (share repurchase); O'Connell v. Hoban (In re Famous State
Fair Meat Prods., Inc.), 19 Bankr. 48, 50 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (dividends); Consove v. Cohen (In
re Roco Corp.), 15 Bankr. 813, 816 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1981) (share repurchase), affid, 21 Bankr. 429,
433 (Bankr. Ist Cir. 1982); Gennet v. Silver (In re Harry Kaiser Assocs.), 14 Bankr. 107, 109
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 198 1) (dividend); Goldberger v. Bross (In re Complete Drywall Contracting, Inc.),
11 Bankr. 697 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981) (dividends; dictum); Pereira-v. Checkmate Communications
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gaged in, or about to engage in, business for which the debtor's remaining property was an unreasonably small capital; 389 or (c) intended to
incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts beyond the debtor's
ability to pay as such matured. 390 The statute excepts, to the extent of
value given, transfers or obligations otherwise invalid under its provisions that the transferee or obligee has taken for value and in good
faith. 39 1
For purposes of section 548, a transfer is deemed to have been made
when it has been so far perfected that no bona fide purchaser from the
debtor would thereafter acquire any right in the property superior to rights
of the transferee. 392 "Value" is defined for purposes of the section as
Co. (In re Checkmate Stereo & Elecs., Ltd.), 9 Bankr. 585, 625-26 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (dividends; alternative holding).
389. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B)(ii) (1982) is derived from former § 67d(2)(b) of the Bankruptcy
Act, Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 1, sec. 67d(2)(b), 52 Stat. 840, 877 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §
107(d)(2)(b); repealed 1978). It protects not only creditors existing at the time of the transfer but also
those who become creditors during the continuance of the business. See 4 COLLIER, supra note 373,
548.04, at 548-47.
Cases applying this clause of the federal fraudulent transfer provisions to distributions by corporations to shareholders include: Branch v. Steph, 389 F.2d 233, 235 (10th Cir. 1968) (dividend; alternative holding); Wells Fargo Bank v. Desert View Bldg. Supplies, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 693, 696 (D.
Nev. 1978) (dividend); Palmer v. Stokely, 255 F. Supp. 674, 680 (W.D. Okla. 1966) (dividend;
alternative holding); In re Process-Manz Press, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 333, 346 (N.D. I11.1964) (dividend; alternative holding), rev'd on other grounds, 369 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 957 (1967); In re Atlas Foundry Co., 155 F. Supp. 615, 618 (D.N.J. 1957) (dividend); Louisiana Indus. Coatings, Inc. v. Pertuit (In re Louisiana Indus. Coatings, Inc.), 31 Bankr. 688, 697-98
(Bankr. E.D. La. 1983) (share repurchase; alternative holding); and Pereira v. Checkmate Communications Co. (In re Checkmate Stereo & Elecs., Ltd), 9 Bankr. 585 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (dividends; alternative holding).
390. I1 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(B)(iii) (1982) is derived from former § 67d(2)(c) of the Bankruptcy
Act, Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 1, sec. 67d(2)(c), 52 Stat. 840, 877 (codified at II U.S.C. §
107(d)(2)(c); repealed 1978).
The only case applying this clause of the federal fraudulent transfer provisions to distributions by a
corporation to its shareholders is In re Process-Manz Press, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 333, 346 (N.D. Ill.
1964) (dividend; alternative holding), rev'd on other grounds, 369 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 957 (1967).
391. 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (1982) is derived from former § 67d(6) of the Bankruptcy Act, Act of
June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 1, sec. 67d(6), 52 Stat. 840, 878 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §
107(d)(6); repealed 1978). See 4 COLLIER, supra note 373, 548.07[2], at 548-60. The current provision no longer requires, as the former § 67d(6) did, that value be given in a contemporaneous exchange.
Subsection 548(c) is principally involved only in those corporate distribution cases involving payments that represent disguised dividends to shareholders. See, e.g., Goldberger v. Bross (In re Complete Drywall Contracting, Inc.), 11 Bankr. 697, 699 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981). However, on occasion
the subsection is also invoked in response to the argument that a transfer of shares to the corporation
was in good faith and for value. See Consove v. Cohen (In re Roco Corp.), 21 Bankr. 429, 436
(Bankr. 1st Cir. 1982).
392. 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(1) (1982). The provision is substantively identical to former § 67d(5) of
the Bankruptcy Act, Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 1, sec. 67d(5), 52 Stat. 840, 878 (codified at I I
U.S.C. § 107(d)(5); repealed 1978). See 4 COLLIER, supra note 373, 548.08, at 548-82 to -84. Both
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property, or satisfaction or securing of a present or antecedent debt of the
debtor.

393

"Insolvent" is defined 394 generally in the Bankruptcy Reform Act as a
financial condition such that the sum of an entity's debts 395 is greater than
396
all of such entity's property at a fair valuation.
2.

Uniform FraudulentConveyance Act Provisions

The bankruptcy fraudulent transfer provisions were originally derived
from the provisions in the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act
(U.F.C.A.), 397 and thus there are numerous similarities between the two
provisions add to the statement in text that transfers not perfected as against a bona fide purchaser
before the commencement of the case are deemed to occur immediately before the date of the filing of
the petition.
393. 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A) (1982) is a substantial revision of the definition of "fair consideration" formerly contained in § 67d(l)(e) of the Bankruptcy Act, Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 1,
sec. 67d(1)(e), 52 Stat. 840, 877 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(1)(e); repealed 1978). See 4 CoLLIER, supra note 373, 548.09[l], at 548-90. 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A) (1982) continues by stating
that "value" does not include an unperformed promise to furnish support to the debtor or to a relative
of the debtor.
For cases involving corporate distributions interpreting the current statute, see Consove v. Cohen
(In re Roco Corp.), 21 Bankr. 429, 434 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1982) (holding that receipt of corporation's
shares in a repurchase transaction was not reasonably equivalent value for issuance of a note); Louisiana Indus. Coatings, Inc. v. Pertuit (In re Louisiana Indus. Coatings, Inc.), 31 Bankr. 688, 698
(Bankr. E.D. La. 1983) (same); Flanigan v. DeFeo (In re DeFeo Fruit Co.), 24 Bankr. 220, 225
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982) (same).
394. The definition, appearing in 11 U.S.C. § 101(26)(A) (1982), applies only to an entity other
than a partnership. The property to be valued excludes property transferred, concealed, or removed
with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud such entity's creditors and property that may be exempted
from property of the estate under I1 U.S.C. § 522 (1982). 11 U.S.C. § 101(26)(A) (1982).
The use by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of the general definition of insolvency in determining
fraudulent transfers supersedes the special definition of insolvency formerly found in § 67d(l)(d) of
the Bankruptcy Act, which was applicable only to fraudulent transfers. Act of June 22, 1938, ch.
575, § 1, sec. 67d(1)(d), 52 Stat. 840, 877 (codified at I1 U.S.C. § 107(d)(1)(d); repealed 1978).
The superseded defihition strongly resembled the current definition of insolvency under the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act (U.F.C.A.). See infra text accompanying note 408.
395. 11 U.S.C. § 101(11) (1982) defines "debt" as "liability on a claim." In turn, 11 U.S.C. §
101(4) (1982) defines "claim" to mean "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed,
legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured" and rights to an equitable remedy for breach of performance
that gives rise to a right of payment.
396. For a recent application of the current "insolvency" test to a corporate distribution, see
Consove v. Cohen (In re Roco Corp.), 21 Bankr. 429, 434-35 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1982). For a discussion of the earlier definition under former § 67d(l)(d) of the Bankruptcy Act, Act of June 22, 1938,
ch. 575, § I, sec. 67d(l)(d), 52 Stat. 840, 877 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(l)(d); repealed 1978),
see Inland Sec. Co. v. Estate of Kirshner, 382 F. Supp. 338, 344-46 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
397. UrNF. FRAutuLENT CoNvEYANcE Acr, 7A U.L.A. 161 (1978). See also Analysis of H.R.
12889, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 214 (1936), indicating that former § 67d of the Bankruptcy Act, Act of
June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 1, sec. 67d, 52 Stat. 840, 877 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 107(d);
partially repealed and renumbered 1978), was a condensation of the U.F.C.A. Current I1 U.S.C. §
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sets of provisions. Such differences as exist, however, relate to significant aspects of each set of provisions.
Under the Act, creditors are provided specified remedies 398 if a debtor
has made a conveyance, 399 or incurred an obligation, that is fraudulent as
40 0
to them. The Act contains no statute of limitations.
A conveyance or an obligation is fraudulent under the Act if made or
incurred (1) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud either present
or future creditors; 40 1 or (2) without receipt of a fair consideration 402 if the
548 (1982) makes few substantive changes in former § 67d. See 4 COLLIER. supra note 373, ,
548.01[1], at 548-8.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is considering a revision of the
U.F.C.A. See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Discussion Draft,
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (19--) (July 22-29, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Discussion
Draft]. Section 4(a) of the Discussion Draft, defining transfers fraudulent as to present and future
creditors, bears obvious resemblance to 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982).
398. The remedies specified vary depending upon whether the creditor's claim has matured or
has not yet matured. Creditors with matured claims may have the conveyance set aside or obligation
annulled to the extent necessary to satisfy their claims, or may disregard the conveyance and attach or
levy execution upon the property conveyed. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 9(1), 7A U.L.A.
304 (1978). As to whether a creditor holding a matured claim may bring an in personam action under
§ 9, see Damazo v. Wahby, 269 Md. 252, 305 A.2d 138 (1973) (holding yes). Creditors whose
claims have not matured may proceed against any person against whom the creditors could have
proceeded had the claim matured. In such actions, the court may restrain the defendant from disposing of the property, appoint a receiver to take charge of the property, set aside the conveyance or
annul the obligation, or make any other order the circumstances warrant. UNiF. FRAUDULENT CONVEY.
ANCE ACT § 10, 7A U.L.A. 358 (1978).
The proposed U.F.C.A. combines the two provisions and makes available to creditors with matured claims the full range of remedies currently available under § 10 to creditors holding claims not
matured. See Discussion Draft, supra note 397, § 6.
399. The Act defines "conveyance" to include "every payment of money, assignment, release,
transfer, lease, mortgage or pledge of tangible or intangible property, and also the creation of any lien
or encumbrance." UNiF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 1, 7A U.L.A. 164 (1978). This definition
is narrower than the definition of "transfer" in II U.S.C. § 548 (1982). See 4 COLLIER, supra note
373, $ 548.01, at 548-12 to -13. The proposed U.F.C.A. provisions apply to "transfers." See, e.g.,
Discussion Draft, supra note 397, § 4. The proposed provisions generally adopt the federal definition
of "transfer" (see supra note 383), but change the last clause to read "and includes a transfer to a
buyer that concurs with retention of title by the seller as a security interest." See Discussion Draft,
supra note 397, § 1(9).
400. Compare the one-year statute built into the federal provisions, see supra text accompanying
note 384, with the proposed U.F.C.A. provisions which include a statute of limitations. See Discussion Draft, supra note 397, § 8(b).
Few states appear to have statutes specifically limiting actions related to fraudulent conveyances.
Characterization of such actions for purposes of general limitations on actions has proved to be particularly troublesome in cases involving suits by the United States. See, e.g., United States v. Neidorf,
522 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1975).
401. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE AT § 7, 7A U.L.A. 242 (1978), states that actual intent is
to be distinguished from intent presumed in law, and that a conveyance made or obligation incurred
to defraud either present or future creditors is fraudulent as to both present or future creditors. The
federal provision, discussed supra at note 385, is substantively identical to § 7 of the U.F.C.A., apart
from the one-year federal statute of limitations. The proposed U.F.C.A. provisions refer to actual
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debtor either (a) is or will be thereby rendered insolvent, 403 or (b) intends
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor, and define factors to be considered in
determining actual intent. See Discussion Draft, supranote 397, § 4.
Relatively few cases concerning challenged corporate financial distributions by corporations incorporated in states that have adopted the U.F.C.A. have invoked § 7. See United States v. Gleneagles
Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556, 580-82 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (dividends and share repurchase); Pereira v.
Checkmate Communications Co. (In re Checkmate Stereo & Elecs., Ltd.), 9 Bankr. 585, 612-16
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (dividends); Heffeman v. Bennett & Armour, 110 Cal. App. 2d 564, 243
P.2d 846 (1952) (share repurchase). In jurisdictions with statutes modelled on 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1570),
see supra note 377, the cases involving corporate distributions are more numerous-presumably because of the unavailability of constructive intent provisions. See Panther Pumps & Equip. Co. v.
Hydrocraft, Inc., 566 F.2d 8, 26-27 (7th Cir. 1977) (dividends; Illinois statute); Midland Supply Co.
v. American Drilling Co., 302 F.2d 128, 131 (10th Cir. 1962) (dividend; Oklahoma (pre-U.F.C.A.)
statute); Landers, Frary & Clark v. Vischer Prod. Co., 201 F.2d 319, 324 (7th Cir. 1953) (dividend;
Illinois statute); In re Security Prods. Co., 310 F. Supp. 110, 115-19 (E.D. Mo. 1969) (dividend;
Missouri statute); In re Process-Manz Press, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 333, 348 (N.D. I11. 1964) (dividend;
Illinois statute), rev'd on other grounds, 369 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 957
(1967); Morris Alexander v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 278, 292-96 (1973) (liquidating distribution;
Illinois statute); Collegiate Cap & Gown Co. v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 449, 445-46 (1972) (same);
A.M. Operating Corp. v. Northfield Indus., Inc. (In re A.M. Operating Corp.), 32 Bankr. 38, 39
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983) (dividend; Florida statute); Louisiana Indus. Coatings, Inc. v. Pertuit (In re
Louisiana Indus. Coatings, Inc.), 31 Bankr. 688, 693-94 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1983) (share repurchase;
Louisiana statute); McCulloch v. Williams (In re McCulloch & Son, Inc.), 30 Bankr. 7, 9 (Bankr. D.
Or. 1983) (share repurchase; Oregon statute); Germet v. Silver (In re Harry Kaiser Assocs.), 14
Bankr. 107, 109 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981) (dividend; Florida statute); Blocker v. Drain Line Sewer &
Water Co., 282 N.E.2d 207 (Ill. App. 1972) (dividends; Illinois statute not cited); Atlanta & Walworth Butter & Cheese Ass'n v. Smith, 123 N.W. 106, 109 (Wis. 1909) (repurchase of shares;
Wisconsin (pre-U.F.C.A.) statute).
402. The proposed U.F.C.A. provisions restate this requirement as "without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation." See Discussion Draft, supra note
397, § 4(a)(2). Such language would then substantially duplicate the language in 11 U.S.C. §
548(a)(2)(A) (1982). See supratext accompanying note 387.
403. Section 4 of the U.F.C.A. adds "without regard to his [the debtor's] actual intent." UNIF.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE Acr § 4, 7A U.L.A. 205 (1978). Section 4 also states that such conveyances or obligations are fraudulent "as to creditors." Id. The last phrase has been interpreted to mean
that the section protects only creditors existing at the time the transfer was made or the obligation
incurred. See, e.g., T W M Homes, Inc. v. Atherwood Realty & Inv. Co., 214 Cal. App. 2d 826, 29
Cal. Rptr. 887, 896 (1963). 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982) does not contain such a limitation. See supra
note 388. The proposed U.F.C.A. provisions also limit protection to creditors who extended credit
before the challenged transfer or obligation. See Discussion Draft, supranote 397, § 5.
Almost all of the decisions concerning challenged corporate financial distributions by corporations
incorporated in states that have adopted the U.F.C.A. have invoked § 4. See Hyde Properties v.
McCoy, 507 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1974) (share repurchase); United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565
F. Supp. 556 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (dividends and share repurchase); United States v. 58th St. Plaza
Theatre, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (dividends); Spencer v. Newton, 79 F.R.D. 367
(D. Mass. 1978) (share repurchase); O'Connell v. Hoban (In re Famous State Fair Meat Prods.,
Inc.), 19 Bankr. 48 (Bankr. E.D., Pa. 1982) (dividends); Goldberger v. Bross (In re Complete
Drywall Contracting, Inc.), 11 Bankr. 697 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981) (dividends); Pereira v. Checkmate Communications Co. (In re Checkmate Stereo & Elecs., Ltd.), 9 Bankr. 585 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1981) (dividends); Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 13 Ariz. App. 431, 477 P.2d 550
(1970) (indirect dividend); Heffernan v. Bennett & Armour, 110 Cal. App. 2d 564, 243 P.2d 846
(1952) (share repurchase); Damazo v. Wahby, 305 A.2d 138 (Md. App. 1973) (dividend); Moseley
v. Briggs Realty Co., 320 Mass. 278, 69 N.E.2d 7 (1946) (liquidating dividend); Powers v. Heggie,
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or believes that the debtor will incur debts beyond the debtor's ability to
pay as they mature. 404 A conveyance 405 may also be fraudulent under the
Act if made without receipt of a fair consideration by a debtor engaged or
about to engage in a business for which the debtor's property remaining
406
after the conveyance is an unreasonably small capital.
"Fair consideration" has been given for the property interest conveyed, or obligation incurred, when either (a) in exchange and as a fair
equivalent therefor, and in good faith, property is conveyed or an antecedent debt is satisfied, or (b) such property or obligation is received in

268 Mass. 233, 167 N.E. 314 (1929) (dividends); Lack v. Kreiner, 91 A.D.2d 813, 458 N.Y.S.2d 40
(1982) (dividend); Crete Concrete Corp. v. Josephs, 66 Misc. 2d 837, 322 N.Y.S.2d 935 (Sup. Ct.
1971) (dividends), modified, 39 A.D.2d 543, 332 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1972); Stee v. "L" Monte Indus.,
Inc., 247 N.W.2d 641 (N.D. 1976) (dividend).
404. Section 6 of the U.F.C.A. provides that such conveyances or obligations are fraudulent as
to both present and future creditors. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 6, 7A U.L.A. 240

(1978). Apart from the statute of limitations, it is substantively identical to II U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)
(1982). See supra text accompanying note 390. The proposed U.F.C.A. provisions are virtually
identical to both current provisions, but add the words "or should reasonably have believed" following "believes." See Discussion Draft, supra note 397, § 4(a)(2)(ii).
The only cases invoking this provision of the U.F.C.A. in connection with a corporate financial
distribution are United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (dividends
and share repurchase) and Studley v. Lefrak, 66 A.D.2d 208, 412 N.Y.S.2d 901 (dividends), affd,
48 N.Y.2d 954,401 N.E.2d 187,425 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1979).
405. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A)-(B)(ii) (1982) clearly applies in addition to obligations incurred
by a debtor meeting the conditions described. See supra text accompanying note 385. The proposed
U.F.C.A. provisions extend the operation of the provision to obligations incurred. See Discussion
Draft, supra note 397, § 4(a)(2)(i).
406.

UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 5, 7A U.L.A. 237 (1978). The section also adds the

words "or transaction" following the word "business," and states that such conveyances are fraudulent without regard to the debtor's actual intent, and makes such conveyances fraudulent as to creditors and to other persons who become creditors during the continuance of such business or transaction. Apart from the coverage of obligations incurred, see supra note 405, and the statute of
limitations, § 5 of the U.F.C.A. is substantively identical to I1 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A)-(B)(ii)
(1982). See supra text accompanying note 389. The proposed U.F.C.A. provisions restate the remaining property test as "the assets remaining with the debtor was [sic] unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction." Discussion Draft, supra note 397, § 4(a)(2)(i). In addition, the
proposed provisions label such conveyances fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose before or
after the transfer or incurring of the obligation. See id. § 4(a).
Cases applying the fair consideration clause of § 5 of the U.F.C.A. to corporate financial distributions include: United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (dividends
and share repurchase; alternative holding); Wells Fargo Bank v. Desert View Bldg. Supplies, Inc.,
475 F. Supp. 693 (D. Nev. 1978) (dividend); In re Atlas Foundry Co., 155 F. Supp. 615 (D.N.J.
1957) (dividend); Spanier v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 127 Ariz. 589, 623 P.2d 19 (Ct.
App. 1980) (dividend); Heffernan v. Bennett & Armour, 110 Cal. App. 2d 564,243 P.2d 846 (1952)
(share repurchase; alternative holding); Widett v. George, 336 Mass. 746, 148 N.E.2d 172, 175-76
(1958) (dividend); Studley v. Lefrak, 66 A.D.2d 208, 412 N.Y.S.2d 901 (dividends; alternative
holding), affd, 48 N.Y.2d 954, 401 N.E.2d 187, 425 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1979); and Crete Concrete
Corp. v. Josephs, 66 Misc. 2d 837, 322 N.Y.S.2d 935 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (dividends; alternative holding), modified, 39 A.D.2d 543, 332 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1972).
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good faith to secure a present advance or antecedent debt not dispropor40 7
tionately small as compared to the value of the property or obligation.
A debtor is insolvent under the Act when the present fair salable value
of the debtor's assets is less than the amount that will be required to pay
the debtor's probable liability on existing debts as they become absolute
40 8
and matured.
407. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CoNVEYANCE Acr § 3, 7A U.L.A. 181 (1978). The U.F.C.A. definition
differs in at least two significant ways from the notion of "value" or "reasonably equivalent value"
in II U.S.C. § 548 (1982): (1) under § 548, a transfer for security must be for a reasonably equivalent
value in order to be valid; under § 3 of the U.F.C.A., such a transfer is valid if its value is not
disproportionately large compared to the advance or debt secured; and (2) the "good faith" of the
transferee or obligee is not an element of the bankruptcy definition of value. The proposed U.F.C.A.
provisions provide generally that a transferee or an obligee gives value if such person transfers property or satisfies or secures a present or antecedent debt of the debtor. See Discussion Draft, supranote
397, § 3(a). Such language was obviously derived from 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A) (1982).
Recent cases discussing the existence of "fair consideration" in connection with challenged corporate distributions include Pereira v. Checkmate Communications Co. (In re Checkmate Stereo &
Elecs., Ltd.), 9 Bankr. 585 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (dividends) and Roxbury State Bank v. The
Clarendon, 324 A.2d 24 (N.J. Super. 1974) (disguised share repurchase).
408. UNItF. FRAUDULENT CONvEYANCE ACr § 2(1), 7A U.L.A. 176 (1978). Section 1 of the
U.F.C.A. defines "assets" to mean "property [of the debtor] not exempt from liability for his debts.
To the extent that any property is liable for any debts of the debtor, such property shall be included in
his assets." UNiF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE Acr § 1, 7A U.L.A. 164 (1978). It is not clear under
this language whether property fraudulently conveyed is included in the debtor's assets for this purpose. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRuu'cY 67.32, at 499-500 & nn.8-9 (F. Kennedy & L. King, 14th
ed. 1978); Landers, The Bankrupt's Spouse: The Forgotten Characterin the Bankruptcy Drama,
1974 UTAH L. REV. 709, 731-32. Compare this language with the explicit language in 11 U.S.C. §
101(26)(A)(i) (1982) excluding such property. See supranote 394.
Section 1 of the U.F.C.A. defines "debts" to include "any legal liability, whether matured or
unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, absolute, fixed or contingent." UNtF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANcE ACr § 1, 7A U.L.A. 164 (1978).
Courts have had difficulty determining how the U.F.C.A. insolvency test varies from the bankruptcy and equity definitions of the term. The court's discussion in Larrimer v. Feeney, 192 A.2d
351,353 (Pa. 1963) (citations omitted), is frequently quoted on the matter:.
Insolvency has two well tested meanings. In the bankruptcy sense, the test of insolvency is
purely mathematical and results when the aggregate value of the debtor's property is less than
his liabilities. Insolvency in the equity sense, on the other hand, is the inability to meet obligations as they mature.
The appellant asserts that so long as a debtor continues to pay his debts as they mature, regardless of how he accomplished that object, and regardless of the fact that his liabilities are far
in excess of his assets, he is still solvent under the Pennsylvania act[, the U.F.C.A.]. The Pennsylvania cases have construed the foregoing definition as meaning that a person is insolvent
when he does not have the present ability to pay his debts and not when he is unable to trade on
credit. By the term insolvency is not to be understood an absolute inability to pay one's debts at
some future time upon a settlement and winding up of all a trader's concern, but a trader may be
said to be in insolvent circumstances when he is not in a condition to pay his debts as persons
carrying on trade usually do. The equity definition of insolvency conceives of it as a status or
condition to be differentiated from mere symptomatic occurrences such as chronic defaults in
current payments.
A reasonable construction of the foregoing statutory definition of insolvency indicates that it
not only encompasses insolvency in the bankruptcy sense i.e. a deficit net worth, but also in-
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Costs Resultingfrom the Imposition of FraudulentConveyance Rules
as Additional Restrictionson FinancialDistributions

Imposition of fraudulent conveyance rules as a supplement to state corporation law restrictions on corporate financial distributions will increase

costs incurred by corporations for advice regarding the validity of a proposed distribution. Counsel asked to advise a corporation 409 on the application of the fraudulent conveyance rules to a proposed repurchase of
shares 410 must resolve the following issues: (a) how to define for management and for appraisers the information necessary to apply the bankruptcy
and U.F.C.A. insolvency tests to the proposed repurchase; 4 11 (b) how to
cludes a condition wherein a debtor has insufficient presently salable assets to pay existing debts
as they mature. If a debtor has a deficit net worth, then the present salable value of his assets
must be less than the amount required to pay the liability on his debts as they mature. A debtor
may have substantial paper net worth including assets which have a small salable value, but
which if held to a subsequent date could have a much higher salable value. Nevertheless, if the
present salable value of assets are less than the amount required to pay existing debts as they
mature the debtor is insolvent.
See also McLaughlin, Application of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 46 HARV. L. REv.
404,420(1933).
The proposed U.F.C.A. provisions state that a person is insolvent if the person is generally not
paying the person's debts as they become due, the person cannot pay the person's debts as they
become due, or the sum of the person's debts is greater than the fair value of all of the person's assets.
Discussion Draft, supra note 397, § 2(a). The proposed provisions exclude from a person's "assets"
property which has been fraudulently transferred. Id. § 2(c). "Debt" is defined as "'liability on a
claim," and "claim" is defined as "a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal,
equitable, secured, or unsecured." Id. § 1(5), (3). The definition of debt is thus the same as the first
paragraph of the current bankruptcy definition. See supra note 395.
409. There is some question as to whether the corporation and its decisionmakers will incur these
expenses when liability for distributions made in violation of the fraudulent conveyance rules falls on
shareholder-recipients. The corporation is chosen here on grounds that conscientious directors will
attempt to avoid liability on the part of both directors and shareholders in connection with the distribution, and that most fraudulent conveyances cases appear to involve director-shareholders.
410. It appears from the cases involving the application of the fraudulent conveyance rules to
corporate distributions that a proposed dividend is a likely subject for consultation. See, e.g., cases
cited supra note 388. A proposed share repurchase has nevertheless been chosen for discussion to
promote consistency with earlier analysis, and to present the broadest range of issues possible under
the fraudulent conveyance rules.
411. Under the current bankruptcy definition, the critical data are the items of property to be
included, the debts to be included, and the procedure for determining "fair valuation." See supra
notes 394-96. See also Consove v. Cohen (In re Roco Corp.), 21 Bankr. 429, 435 (Bankr. Ist Cir.
1982) (holding that treasury shares acquired in a challenged repurchase could not be included as an
asset for purposes of application of the test). On "fair valuation," see 2 COLLIER, supra note 373, i,
101.26, at 101-54 to -65; 2 J. BONBRIGHT, THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY ch. 22 (1937).

Under the U.F.C.A. definition, the critical data are the items of property to be included, the debts
to be included, and the procedure for determining "present salable value." See supra note 408. On
"present salable value," see United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556, 578 (M.D. Pa.
1983) ("The phrase means that value which can be obtained if the assets are liquidated with reasonable promptness in an arms-length transaction in an existing and not theoretical market."); Fidelity

Restrictions on Corporate Distributions
apply such tests to a repurchase by a subsidiary of a parent's shares; 4 12 (c)
4 13
what constitutes an "unreasonably small capital" for the corporation;
and (d) what facts lead courts to conclude that a debtor has made a transfer with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, 414 or with intent to
Trust Co. v. Union Bank, 169 A. 209 (Pa. 1933) (error to consider fair salable value instead of
present fair salable value), cert. denied, 291 U.S. 680 (1934).
Under the proposed U.F.C.A. tri-part definition of insolvency, see supra note 408, counsel's task
is increased by the need to describe for management and appraisers the bankruptcy standard and facts
indicating when a person is not generally paying the person's debts as they become due. The second
proposed standard is the equity definition of insolvency, which most counsel must consider as part of
the state corporation law review of the proposed distribution.
412. Under the bankruptcy provisions, insolvency for an "entity" other than a partnership is
defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(26) (1982). Section 101(14) in turn defines "entity" as including a person, estate, trust, or governmental unit. Id. § 101(14). Section 101(30) defines "person" to include
an individual, a partnership, or a corporation. Id. § 101(30). Assuming that grounds do not exist for
disregarding the subsidiary's existence, these definitions seem to result in treating a subsidiary's acquisition of its parent's stock generally by analyzing the effect on the subsidiary level. Thus, if the
transfer causes the subsidiary to become insolvent, and is made within one year of the date of the
filing of the petition, the trustee has the four theories noted supra in text accompanying notes 385-90
to use in setting aside the transfer. Such transfers may also be challenged under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)
(1982) as transfers to an insider. Suppose, however, the subsidiary is solvent after the purchase, but
the parent is insolvent. It is hard to fit such an acquisition into the fraudulent conveyance categories of
11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982). Helpful analysis of the analogous problem of subsidiary guarantees of parent company debt appears in Coquillette, Guaranty of and Securityfor the Debt of a ParentCorporation by a Subsidiary Corporation, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 433 (1980); Rosenberg, Intercorporate
Guaranties and the Law of Fraudulent Conveyances: Lender Beware, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 235
(1976).
The issues appear to be the same under the U.F.C.A. and the proposed U.F.C.A., except that
neither has an equivalent of I1 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982).
413. Examination of corporate distribution cases (see supra notes 389 & 406), and authorities
generally, does not shed much light on the standards by which unreasonably small capital is to be
determined. Many of the cases involve transfers by insolvent corporations, and it is clear that an
insolvent corporation has unreasonably small capital as a matter of law. See, e.g., Spanier v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 127 Ariz. 589, 623 P.2d 19 (Ct. App. 1980). In the cases where a
factual determination was made regarding whether capital remaining was unreasonably small, one
can find authorities implying or stating that the test is a net worth test. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank v.
Desert View Bldg. Supplies, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 693 (D. Nev. 1978) (stressing inadequate capitalization). On the other hand, a number of other cases focus entirely on the debtor's current assets and
current liabilities, apparently reading the test as unreasonably small working capital. See, e.g.,
Widett v. George, 336 Mass. 746, 148 N.E.2d 172, 175-76 (1958); Heffernan v. Bennett & Armour,
110 Cal. App. 2d 564, 243 P.2d 846 (1952). Clark, supranote 380, at 555, interprets the test as a net
worth test, which he then connects to insolvency: "the court must do its best to determine a level of
capital which would provide a reasonable minimum level of protection against future decreases in the
value of the debtor's assets and its subsequent inability to meet obligations to creditors."
Query whether the test is clarified by the language in the proposed U.F.C.A. provisions (assets
remaining are unreasonably small in relation to the business). See supranote 406.
414. Recent helpful discussion in a corporate distribution setting appears in Pirrone v. Toboroff
(In re Vaniman Int'l, Inc.), 22 Bankr. 166, 182-85 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982). Many of the distribution cases find intent from a transfer during insolvency of the corporate transferor. See, e.g., Consove
v. Cohen (In re Roco Corp.), 21 Bankr. 429, 435-37 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1982). See also the discussion
of proof of intent in 4 COLLIER, supra note 373, 584.02, at 548-33 to -41; and proposed U.F.C.A. §
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incur debts beyond the debtor's ability to pay as they mature. 415 A corporation choosing to continue consideration of a proposed distribution after
receiving such advice must presumably incur the cost of appraising assets4 16 to determine their "present fair salable value" and "fair value."
These costs, and the cost of directors' time to consider the advisability
of the proposed distribution in view of such restrictions, are generally 4 17
incurred as an addition to the corporation's costs in determining the advisability of the distribution in view of state corporate law restrictions. But
there are at least two reasons 4 18 to believe that relatively few corporations
contemplating a distribution ever bear costs related to the advisability of a
potentially fraudulent conveyance. First, the number of situations in
which a distribution is permissible under state corporation law, but is prohibited by fraudulent conveyance rules, appears to be quite small. 4 19 That
4(b), Discussion Draft, supra note 455, § 4(b), that lists factors that may be considered in determining actual intent.
415. The limited number of corporate distribution cases involving this provision (see supra notes
390 & 404) all use the provision along with virtually every other fraudulent conveyance rule in finding the transfers involved invalid. They all cite the same evidence used in connection with the other
rules. The general authorities also are not particularly helpful on the proof questions. See 4 COLLIER,
supra note 373, 9 548.05, at 548-49 to -51.
416. On occasion, courts have found such values to be stated on the corporation's financial statements. See, e.g., Consove v. Cohen (In re Roco Corp.), 21 Bankr. 429,435 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1982).
417. The costs incurred in determining standards for, and asset values under, a fair value test
may be used if the state corporate statute permits fair value determinations. See MICH. COMP. LAWS §
450.1106(1) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.200(106)(1) (Callaghan 1983)) (see supra text accompanying
note 151); AMENDED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 45(b), Amendments (1979), supra note 274, at
1872 (see supra text accompanying note 287).
418. A third possible reason is that liability under the fraudulent conveyance rules generally falls
only on shareholder-recipients, and not on the directors who decide to make such distributions. (It
should be noted that an occasional state statute imposes penalties on any party participating in such
transfers which presumably would include directors responsible for the transfer. See, e.g., S.C. CODE
ANN § 27-23-30 (Law. Co-op. 1976).) That fact may lead to mildly increased emphasis on the provisions that impose liability on directors: the state corporation laws.
419. Clark, supra note 380, at 557-60, appears to believe that a significant number of situations
exist wherein distributions permissible under state corporation law will be found to violate fraudulent
conveyance rules. His comparison is made with provisions in the pre-1980 Model Business Corporation Act. He argues that the unreasonably small capital test is stricter than the Model Act's surplus
rules. Id. at 556-59. He seems to argue also that the U.F.C.A. insolvency test is stricter than the
Model Act equitable insolvency test. Id. at 558. Examination of the cases applying fraudulent conveyance rules to corporate distributions appears to belie both arguments.
Only four of the corporate distribution cases discussing unreasonably small capital have involved
only the fraudulent conveyance test. See supra notes 380 & 406. Of the four, Spanier v. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 127 Ariz. 589, 623 P.2d 19 (Ct. App. 1980) involved only the question of
whether an insolvent corporation had unreasonably small capital as a matter of law. The facts in
Wells Fargo Bank v. Desert View Bldg. Supplies, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 693 (D. Nev. 1978), seem to
indicate that the dividend, a putative loan of $250,000, would have been illegal under the corporation
statute (the corporation had a substantial deficit in retained earnings). The facts in In re Atlas Foundry
Co., 155 F. Supp. 615 (D.N.J. 1957), involved a putative loan of $250,000 used to assist a shareholder's purchase of shares in which the transaction was designed to avoid legal restrictions otherwise
preventing repurchase of the shares. In Widett v. George, 336 Mass. 746, 148 N.E. 172, 176 (1958),
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factor, combined with a general lack of emphasis upon the fraudulent
conveyance rules in corporation texts420 and planning guides, 42 1 makes it
likely that corporate counsel will make state corporation law analysis determinative on such distributions. Second, situations clearly presenting
potential violations of the fraudulent conveyance rules often do not get
the facts seem to show equitable insolvency. It seems reasonable to assume that application of the
unreasonably small capital provision would bring an appeal. Thus, these cases appear to be a fair
sample of the courts' most strenuous attempts to apply the provision. And they seem to indicate that
no case has thus far applied the unreasonably small capital provision in circumstances in which a
typical state corporation statute would not have produced the same result.
On the argument that fraudulent conveyance tests for insolvency are more restrictive than the equitable insolvency test, it is generally assumed that divergences in results are likely to be greatest between the current bankruptcy test and the equitable insolvency test. But if one examines the federal
cases applying the current bankruptcy test to corporate distributions, one is likely to find that a significant number offer evidence that the corporation involved was also equitably insolvent. See Consove
v. Cohen (In re Roco Corp.), 21 Bankr. 429 (Bankr. Ist Cir. 1982) (total assets less than liabilities,
but background of extensive cash flow problems); O'Connell v. Hoban (In re Famous State Fair Meat
Prods., Inc.), 19 Bankr. 48 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (evidence of financial difficulties justified finding
of both bankruptcy and U.F.C.A. insolvency); Pereira v. Checkmate Communications Co. (In re
Checkmate Stereo & Elecs., Ltd.), 9 Bankr. 585 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (transfer of all corporation's assets presumably resulted in equitable insolvency). Only Flanigan v. DeFeo (In re DeFeo
Fruit Co.), 24 Bankr. 220 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982), and Gennet v. Silver (In re Harry Kaiser Assocs.), 14 Bankr. 107 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981), do not contain clear evidence of equitable insolvency. But even in those two cases some evidence of current bill-paying difficulty was in the background. A similar pattern appears to have existed under the former bankruptcy test ("a person is
'insolvent' when the present fair salable value of his property is less than the amount required to pay
his debts" (Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 1, sec. 67d(1)(d), 52 Stat. 840, 877 (codified at 11
U.S.C. § 107(d)(1)(d); repealed 1978)). See, e.g., Inland Sec. Co. v. Estate of Kirshner, 382 F.
Supp. 338 (W.D. Mo. 1974) (evidence presented that corporation was not paying debts as they
arose); In re Security Prods. Co., 310 F. Supp. 110 (E.D. Mo. 1969) (same).
On the comparison of the U.F.C.A. insolvency test and the equitable insolvency test, some courts
appear to equate the two. See, e.g., United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556, 579-80
(M.D. Pa. 1983); United States v. 58th St. Plaza Theatre, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
Other courts appear to interpret the U.F.C.A. test as a bankruptcy test. See, e.g., Hyde Properties v.
McCoy, 507 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1974); Damazo v. Wahby, 305 A.2d 138 (Md. App. 1973). In most
of the remaining corporate distribution cases applying the U.F.C.A. test (where it was contested),
equitable insolvency also seems to have been present. See Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Valley Nat'l
Bank, 13 Ariz. App. 431, 477 P.2d 550 (1970) (inability at time of transfer to retire current liabilities); Heffernan v. Bennett & Armour, 110 Cal. App. 2d 564, 243 P.2d 846, 855 (1952) (corporation
in precarious financial condition after transfer); Moseley v. Briggs Realty Co., 320 Mass. 278, 69
N.E.2d 7 (1946) (liquidating distributions made before creditors paid); Crete Concrete Corp. v. Josephs, 66 Misc. 2d 837, 322 N.Y.S.2d 935 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (entire assets drained off), modified, 39
A.D.2d 543, 332 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1972); Stee v. "L" Monte Indus., Inc., 247 N.W.2d 641 (N.D.
1976) (virtually all assets transferred to shareholder).
420. See, e.g., H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER Busu NESs ENTERPRISES 890 n.5 (3d ed. 1983) (reference to fraudulent conveyance rules in footnote); N. LATrm, THE
LAW OF CORPORATIONS 555 (2d ed. 1971) (two-sentence discussion); W. CARY & M. EISENBERO.
CASES AND MATERIA.S ON COR'ORATIONS 1338-42 (5th unabridged ed. 1980) (four pages compared
with over 100 pages on state corporation law rules).
421. See, e.g., 7 Z. CAvrrCH, BusINEss ORGANIZATIONS, WrrH TAx PLANNING ch. 140 & §
155.02 (1983) (entire chapter on state dividend statutes, single paragraph in later chapter on fraudulent conveyances).
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presented to lawyers; the desire by controlling parties to hurriedly rescue
even a portion of their investment takes precedence over the demands of a
422
deliberative process.
A final 423 cost implication of applying the fraudulent conveyance rules
as an additional set of restrictions on corporate distributions concerns the
possible effect of such application on the cost of resolving disputes over
corporate distributions. It appears that many of the cases in which fraudulent conveyance rules were applied to corporate distributions could have
424
been resolved with equal efficacy under state corporation statutes.
While the variation in state corporation statutes makes it difficult to generalize as to the relative costs of a fraudulent conveyance proceeding visa-vis a state corporation law proceeding, the fact-laden content of the is422. The sense that one gets from most of the corporate distribution cases involving fraudulent
conveyance rules is that the situations are so egregious that competent, ethical counsel could not have
been consulted on the transfer. Most involve acts of desperation, as Judge Kearse eloquently stated in
Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 661 F.2d 979, 988-89 (2d Cir. 1981), about most fraudulent transfers:
When an overburdened debtor perceives that he will soon become insolvent, he will often
engage in a flurry of transactions in which he transfers his remaining property, either outright or
as security, in exchange for consideration that is significantly less valuable than what he has
transferred. Although such uneconomical transactions are sometimes merely final acts of recklessness, the calculating debtor may employ them as a means of preferring certain creditors or of
placing his assets in friendly hands where he can reach them but his creditors cannot. Whatever
the motivation, the fraudulent conveyance provisions of § 67(d) of the Bankruptcy Act, II
U.S.C. § 107(d). recognize that such transactions may operate as a constructive fraud upon the
debtor's innocent creditors, for they deplete the debtor's estate of valuable assets without bringing in property of similar value from which creditors' claims might be satisfied.
423. Applying the fraudulent conveyance rules as additional restrictions on corporate distributions should not increase the corporation's accounting costs, or cause losses by preventing distributions in situations in which they would be generally beneficial. Such application would appear to have
little effect on shareholder costs related to the information content of dividends, as few fraudulent
conveyance cases involve publicly held corporations. See, as a possible exception, Powers v. Heggie, 268 Mass. 233, 167 N.E. 314 (1929).
424. As noted supra in note 419, most of the cases appear to present no serious issue under even
the most liberal state corporation statute. It is, of course, fair to ask why more cases have not joined
the two claims. See the limited number of cases cited supra in note 380. Several reasons may be
offered. First, state corporation statutes have only recently broadened the definition of a distribution
to match the definition of a dividend adopted for purposes of this section. See supra note 372, and the
definitions in the California provisions (see supra text accompanying notes 205-08) and in the
Amended Model Business Corporation Act (see supra text accompanying notes 275-80). Prior to
such change, creditors may have had doubt as to whether an unexplained payment to a shareholder,
not surrounded with the formality of a dividend declaration, was a "dividend" for purposes of the
state corporation law. Second, persons suing on behalf of creditors may be more attuned to remedies
thought of as "creditors' rights" (in much the same way that corporate lawyers advising directors
may turn first to the corporation law). Third, as Judge Kearse's statement in supra note 422 indicates,
financial pressures may cause persons in control of failing corporations to grab corporate assets or
transfer them to friendly parties. Suit for recovery of the assets may be considered a more direct way
of resolving the matter than a corporate law suit against directors, which may be followed by a suit
for contribution from knowing recipients.
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sues in fraudulent conveyance proceedings suggests that they often will
425
be more expensive to conduct than a state corporation law proceeding.
4. Benefits Resultingfrom the Imposition ofFraudulentConveyance
Rules as Additional Restrictionson FinancialDistributions
The incremental costs of adding fraudulent conveyance rules as a supplementary restriction on corporate distributions appear to be greater than
the benefits to be derived from such action.
The primary benefit attributed to such addition is the possibility that
unsecured creditors will have greater recoveries in the event of financial
disaster than would accrue from the operation of state corporation
laws. 426 However, it is not clear from the published fraudulent conveyance cases involving corporate distributions that this benefit exists to any
significant degree. 427 While one can posit situations in which a distribution valid under state corporation law would be invalid under the fraudulent conveyance rules, 428 the courts appear to construe the principal provision portending such difference-the unreasonably small capital
provision-so narrowly that few such differences seem likely to occur. 429
It is also not clear that the difference in the classes of potential defendants
under the respective statutes works to produce larger aggregate recoveries
under the fraudulent conveyance rules than under the state corporation
acts. 430 Thus, the benefits from the addition of the fraudulent conveyance
rules seem at best problematical.
State legislatures asked to address the question of making the state corporation law remedies exclusive face a difficult problem. Even if they
agree with the assessment of costs and benefits set forth above, and take
such action, the bankruptcy fraudulent conveyance rules will continue to
be applied until Congress takes similar action. Congress, however, has
evinced no interest in that direction, and may never do so in the face of
variations in state dividend statutes and the argument that a single set of
425. Clark, supra note 380, at 557, states that "dividend restricting statutes are generally easier
than fraudulent conveyance law for courts and shareholders to apply."
426. See id. at 557-58.
427. See Landers, supranote 386, at 596, in which the author reaches the same conclusion.
428. See Clark, supranote 380, at 556-57.
429. See supra note 419.
430. It may appear that suits to set aside the challenged transfers, i.e., against shareholder-recipients, are a more direct and expeditious means of resolving who should ultimately bear liability for
challenged distributions. But in the vast majority of situations to which the fraudulent conveyance
rules might be applied, it appears that parties in control of the debtor are attempting to recover part of
their investment in the face of financial disaster. See supra note 422. Thus, practically, a suit against
directors will reach the same persons sued under fraudulent conveyance rules on many occasions
(perhaps most, if shareholders controlling directors' decisions are treated as directors).
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(fraudulent conveyance) rules should regulate unfair transactions by financially troubled enterprises. 431 Absent congressional action, state action to make state corporation remedies exclusive may have no effect
other than lulling counsel into ignoring the bankruptcy provisions. Until
Congress acts, it would appear to be better legislative strategy to adopt
fraudulent conveyance rules that fully coordinate with the bankruptcy
rules. 4 32 Such action alerts counsel to the rules, and eliminates one level

of tests on corporate distributions.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Legislatures reevaluating statutes regulating financial distributions by
corporations to shareholders should be able to reach consensus on two
major issues in any such inquiry with relative ease. The issue of whether
any change is required in the state's corporate financial provisions should
receive a resounding affirmative answer from the legislature in any state
currently basing such provisions on legal capital. The analysis set forth
above indicates that a number of alternative systems not based on legal
capital will provide a more favorable balance of costs and benefits than
those resulting from the operation of either of the major systems based on
legal capital. Second, the issue of whether any change is required in the
state's fraudulent conveyance act should also receive an affirmative answer. The analysis set forth above indicates that pending Congressional
revision of the bankruptcy fraudulent transfer rules, benefits will be obtained and costs reduced by amending state fraudulent conveyance rules
to coordinate with the bankruptcy rules. The proposed revision of the
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act provides an excellent model for
433
such change.
Legislatures deciding to alter their corporate financial provisions must
then face the more difficult question of which of the alternative systems
not based on legal capital should be chosen. That choice is confounded by
the superficial similarities between the three principal alternative systems,
and more importantly, by the relative imbalance between benefits and
costs of such systems.
The three principal alternative systems do indeed have some remarkable similarities. All three proceed from a common assessment of the inadequacies of the concept of legal capital 434 to abolish not only the statu431.
See Clark, supra note 380, at 558.
432. As is clear from the analysis of the proposed U.F.C.A. provisions, this appears to be an
important objective in the revision.

433.

See generally Discussion Draft, supranote 397; supra Part 111132.

434.

See 2 H. MARSH. supra note 207, at 123-24, concerning the views of the California draf-
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tory underpinnings of the concept (the notion of par value 435 and
accounting rules for consideration received for shares436), but also the series of exceptions (nimble dividends, 437 depletion dividends, 438 and special repurchases of shares 439) and fictions (treasury shares 440) erected because of the existence of the concept. All three subject transfers of cash or
property, or incurrences of indebtedness, by a corporation without consideration to its shareholders to a single set of restrictions, regardless of
the form in which the transfer, or incurrence, occurs. 441 All three address
applications of the restrictions to such transfers, or incurrences, where the
transferor, or obligor, is either the parent, or the subsidiary, of another
corporation. 442 Finally, drafters of each of the systems based their efforts
on the premise that statutory systems founded on legal capital were essentially misleading insofar as they led creditors and senior security holders
to believe that such systems operated to protect their interests. 443
ters; Amendments (1979), supra note 274, at 1867-68, for the views of the ABA Committee on
Corporate Laws; and MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.551 reporter's notes, at 192 (West Supp. 1983), for
the reporter's notes on the Minnesota Act.
435. CAL. CORP. CODE § 205 (West 1979 & Supp. 1983) provides that solely for the purpose of
any statute imposing any tax or fee based upon the capitalization of a corporation, all authorized
shares of a California corporation will be deemed to have a nominal or par value of $1 per share. The
Amended Model Business Corporations Act provides alternative provisions basing franchise taxes on
either the amount of the stated capital of a corporation determined under accounting practices and
principles that are reasonable in the circumstances, or the number of shares issued and outstanding.
See AMENDED MODEL BusINEss CORP. Acr § 132, Amendments (1979), supranote 274, at 1876-77.
Minnesota does not impose such taxes.
436. See 2 H. MARSH, supra note 207, at 124; AMENDED MODEL BusINESs CORP. ACr, Amendments (1979), supra note 274, at 1871 (indicating that the Model Act amendments delete entirely
former § 21, "Determination of Amount of Stated Capital"); MNN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.405 (West
Supp. 1983) (defining consideration for shares, but containing no accounting rules).
437. See 2 H. MARSH, supra note 207, at 124-25; MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.551 reporter's
notes, at 191 (West Supp. 1983). The comment of the ABA Committee on Corporate Laws does not
address the deletion of the concept of nimble dividends. Such dividends were permitted under former
Model Act § 45(a) (alternative), which was presumably deleted with the deletion of former § 45. See
AMENDED MODEL BusiNEss CORP. Acr, Amendments (1979), supranote 274, at 1872.
438. See 2 H. MARSH, supra note 207, at 125-27. The comments of the ABA Committee on
Corporate Laws and the Minnesota reporter do not refer to deletion of the depletion dividend provision.
439. See 2 H. MARSH, supra note 207, at 127-29. The comments of the ABA Committee on
Corporate Laws and the Minnesota reporter do not refer to deletion of the special repurchase provisions.
440. See 2 H. MARSH, supra note 207, at 190-91; AMENDED MODEL BusINEss CORP. Acr,
Amendments (1979), supranote 274, at 1878-79; MIN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.553 reporter's notes, at
197 (West Supp. 1983).
441. The notion of a centralizing concept of a "distribution" is common to all three acts. See
supra text accompanying notes 204, 275 & 331.
442. As noted suprain notes 226, 314 & 360, the acts do this with varying degrees of success.
443. See 2 H. MARSH, supra note 207, at 123-24; Amendments (1979), supranote 274, at 1867;
MtNN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.551 reporter's notes, at 192 (West Supp. 1983).

283

Washington Law Review

Vol. 59:187, 1984

The analysis above indicates that despite these similarities, the three
systems can be clearly distinguished on the basis of their respective responses to that possible misrepresentation. The California series attempts
to rectify the misrepresentation by promulgating rules that will provide
creditors and senior shareholders with the type of protection they thought
they were getting from the legal capital system. 444 On the other hand, the
Amended Model Act and the Minnesota Act both attempt to rectify the
misrepresentation by promulgating rules that will provide creditors and
senior shareholders with the level of protection that the drafters perceived
such groups actually received from the legal capital system. 445 This variance in fundamental goals in turn produces the significant differences be446
tween the Acts on such issues as the relative freedom directors have
and the status in the event of financial difficulty of debt issued on repur447
chase of shares.
The preceding analysis indicates that despite significant efforts at reform, there appears to be an imbalance between the costs related to the
systems not based on legal capital and the benefits obtained thereby. That
imbalance may be the result of errors in my assessment of costs related to
the operation of the two systems (California, Amended Model Act) with
relatively small imbalances, or in my weighting of the benefits obtained
from such operation. I have the sense, however, that the imbalance remains in significant part because of the attempt by the current reform efforts to apply the same standards to all types of corporations. The result is
a series of provisions that tend not to work terribly well for either smaller,
closely held corporations or larger, publicly held corporations.
Another factor undoubtedly contributing to the imbalance is that the list
of benefits does not assign a value to the possibility that the operation of a
particular set of financial provisions will result in the long-term survival
of more corporations than would have survived under the operation of
other provisions. A recent study provides the insight that application of
the California alternative provisions would have prevented distributions
by a significant number of corporations that subsequently went bankrupt. 448 It suggests that similar effects would not have occurred under the
444. See 2 H. MARSH, supra note 207, at 124.
445. This view is not stated directly by either the ABA Committee on Corporate Laws or the
Minnesota reporter. However, both identify the equitable insolvency test, part of most statutory systems based on legal capital, as "the fundamentally important test." See Amendments (1979). supra
note 274, at 1868; MINN STAT. ANN § 302A.551 reporter's notes, at 192 (West Supp. 1983).
446. For example, compare the discretion the directors have under the AMENDED MODEL BUSINESS CORP ACT § 45, Amendments (1979), supra note 274, at 1872, on choice of valuation standards
(and under MINN STAT ANN. § 302A.551(2) (West Supp. 1983)), with the specification of valuation
method set forth in CAL CORP- CODE § 114 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983).
447. See supra discussion in text accompanying notes 321-23.
448.

See Ben-Dror, An Empirical Study of Distribution Rules Under California Corporations
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Amended Model Act provisions. 449 While the study does not conclusively demonstrate that imposition of the California alternative tests will
result in more corporations surviving within the adopting state, it does
seem to indicate that such provisions at a minimum remove what might
otherwise be a temptation for management in the form of legally permissible distributions. 450 That benefit appears significant enough to tip the
cost-benefit scales in the direction of the California provisions.
A legislature considering the California provisions can obtain greater
benefits, or reduce costs, by making the following changes therein:
1. It appears that inclusion of a retained earnings test as an alternative to the
remaining assets tests for the permissibility of making distributions not only
complicates the statute's operation, 451 but also reduces the statute's effectiveness in preventing financial distributions by financially troubled corporations. 452 Thus, it seems reasonable to eliminate the retained earnings
test. 453
2. It appears that the remaining assets tests may benefit from further empirical studies to determine which relationships and weights will optimize, with
minimum costs, the long-run survival of corporations subject to the provisions. 454
Code § 500: Are CreditorsAdequately Protected?, 16 U.C.D. L. REv. 375, 390-408 (1983). BenDror applied the California tests to 100 publicly held corporations that went bankrupt between 1970
and 1976. The tests would have prevented 57 of the corporations from making distributions for the
year prior to bankruptcy, 25 of the corporations from making distributions the second year prior to
bankruptcy, and 11 of the corporations from making distributions the third year prior to bankruptcy.
Id. at 408.
449. For the 100 corporations studied, mean total assets (excluding intangible assets) exceeded
mean total liabilities even in the year preceding bankruptcy. See Ben-Dror, supra note 448, at 393-95
& n.85.
450. This statement assumes that the fraudulent conveyance rules would not have applied to the
distributions.
451. See supra note 225.
452. Ben-Dror states that application of the remaining assets test as the only test for distributions
would have prohibited 68 of the 100 corporations from making distributions one year before bankruptcy. Ben-Dror, supra note 448, at 394. Applying either the retained earnings alternative or the
remaining assets test, reduces the number to 57.
453. Ben-Dror suggests that the retained earnings test and the remaining assets test both be applied to determine whether a proposed distribution could be made. Ben-Dror, supra note 448, at 413.
Such action would increase the number of financially troubled corporations prohibited from making
distributions one year before bankruptcy to 77. See id. at 409. But such action would also increase the
size of the control group of solvent corporations prohibited from making distributions. Id.
Using a retained earnings test brings with it all the accounting difficulties as to the calculation of
that account. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 84-85. Such costs appear to outweigh the
rather minor increase in protection obtained by adopting the retained earnings test in addition to the
remaining assets test. In any event, such added protection may be obtainable by changes in the asset
ratios embodied in the remaining assets test.
454. Ben-Dror argues for "a more sophisticated model of bankruptcy prediction which, based on
a diverse set of predictors, will take into account the industrial category of the corporation and evaluate business trends across several financial statements." See Ben-Dror, supranote 448, at 413. Pre-
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3. Assuming that some type or series of remaining assets tests are to be
applied, such tests should be applied, as in California, as general limits on
distributions by large and small corporations. However, it appears that the
legislature should then address the special problems of financial distributions by the latter type of corporation, which tend to be almost exclusively
related to installment repurchases of shares. The California determination to
test such transactions generally as cash or property paid by the corporation
to the former shareholder 455 generally facilitates entry into such transactions, while affording adequate protection to creditors. But such testing also
operates to present significant continuing risks to the selling shareholder,
which may bulk so large when a change of control is involved as to prevent
an otherwise meritorious transaction. 456 To prevent such problems, the statute should contain a broader elective process 457 by which a selling shareholder can be assured that the statute's tests will be applied only at the time
of entry into the transaction, 458 and therefore that the debt incurred by the
corporation will thereafter be on a parity with debt to third parties. Such
459
election should be available only to small corporations.
4. It appears that the legislature should also consider the special problems of
distributions by publicly held corporations. 460 In the case of dividend distrisumably his reference to a more sophisticated model means a model of the type discussed in one of
his earlier footnotes that uses from five to nine financial ratios and combinations thereof to predict
bankruptcy. See id. at 388 nn.63-66. Such an approach appears unworkable because of the complexity it would interject into the statute, particularly if industry categories and longitudinal data are also
interjected into the formulas. Moreover, the fact that the studies themselves seem to arrive at different
ratios and weights to be applied suggests that the analysis may change over time.
Nevertheless, empirical studies of the type by Ben-Dror may be able to suggest whether different
weights in the California remaining assets test, or slightly different tests, would improve the chances
for corporate survival.
455. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 166 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983).
456. See supra text accompanying notes 263-69. Such risks are quite substantial in connection
with bootstrap acquisitions of the corporation's stock by third parties.
457. The sole election in CAL. CORP. CODE § 166 (West 1977 & Supp. 1983) comes about by the
application of the tests at the outset if a negotiable debt security is issued on the repurchase. Issuance
of such securities does not seem to be an option for a small corporation.
458. The difficulty with the California resolution of the matter is that the tests are applied as each
installment is paid even though the entire transaction, if tested at the outset, could have easily met the
statute's tests. It can be argued, of course, that complete outset testing under any circumstances
deprives creditors of the equitable insolvency cut-off in the California statute. My sense of the way to
deal with that problem is to impose stricter standards to installment repurchases for which outset
treatment is elected than are generally applied to cash or property distributions. I would combine that
approach with a required public filing before the closing of the transaction that indicates that the
corporation meets the stricter standards and proposes to make the repurchase. Such an approach
would probably reduce the number of bootstrap acquisitions of shares, or at least broaden the width of
the strap. Neither effect is undesirable.
459. As is noted below, none of the special reasons for facilitating installment repurchases arises
in the case of publicly held corporations.
460. For simplicity, I would define publicly held corporations as those corporations required to
register shares with the SEC under section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §
781(g) (1982).
While there is no United States precedent for different financial provisions for publicly held corpo-
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butions by such corporations, it appears that shareholders of a publicly held
corporation need the additional protection of notice from the corporation
whenever such distributions for the twelve-month period ending with the
current distribution exceed its earnings for such period. 461 Payment of such
dividends indicates either that management believes that future earnings
prospects are significantly better than recent earnings, or that management
is attempting to obfuscate recent poor earnings performance.. In either
event, notice to shareholders should be beneficial, since it is likely to be
accompanied by management's explanation of the distribution pattern. In
the case of share repurchases by publicly held corporations, there appears to
be no reason not to test repurchases by issuance of corporate debt at the time
of the issuance of such debt. 462 Repurchases for cash, property, or debt that
are in excess of current annual earnings should again trigger a requirement

of notice to shareholders.
These changes, combined with alternatives noted in the analysis of the
California provisions, 463 should produce a favorable benefit-to-cost relationship for the resulting provisions.

rations, the English Companies Act, 1980, ch. 22, placed more stringent requirements on distributions by public companies than those imposed on private companies. See Hare, CompaniesAct 1980V, 124 SoLic. J. 569 (1980); Hare, CompaniesAct 1980-VI, 124 SoLic. J. 585 (1980).
461. Debate has recently been joined regarding the value and feasibility of disclosures by management when changes are made in corporate dividend policy. See Brudney, supra note 13 (arguing
that management be required to disclose when dividend signals are contrary to management's beliefs
regarding corporate prospects); Fischel, supranote 13 (arguing that Brudney exaggerates the benefits
of such disclosure while underestimating its cost).
As is implied in text, it appears to me that Professor Brudney has the better part of the argument
with Professor Fischel.
462. See discussion of reasons for repurchases by publicly held corporations in Kummert, supra
note 10, at 381-91.
463. See supranotes 206-43.
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